

The Senator from Utah [Mr. SMOOT] has spoken about the burdens that we must meet. The first thing that we have got to do is to pay our debts, and pay day is coming. When the pay day comes and we have not the money, unless we raise additional sums by taxation, we have to that extent discouraged private industry that must have assistance if we are to have any relief from the conditions that will prevail in going from a high war level down to a peace level. We must get ready for it now, and I think it is a good time to begin a curtailment of the expenses and the appropriations that are named in these items. When the river and harbor bill and the public buildings bill come, with other department bills, they ought to be cut to the lowest possible limit in line with this curtailment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment of the committee as amended.

Mr. THOMAS. I understand that the vote about to be taken is on section 5.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. As amended.

Mr. LODGE. I make the point of no quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Bankhead	Kenyon	Nugent	Sutherland
Beckham	King	Page	Swanson
Calder	La Follette	Polindexter	Thomas
Curtis	Lenroot	Pollock	Townsend
Fletcher	Lewis	Pomerene	Trammell
France	Lodge	Sheppard	Vardaman
Frelinghuysen	McKellar	Sherman	Wadsworth
Gay	McNary	Simmons	Warren
Henderson	Martin, Va.	Smith, S. C.	
Johnson, S. Dak.	Moses	Smoot	
Jones, N. Mex.	Nelson	Spencer	

Mr. KING. I wish to announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. OVERMAN], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. STERLING] and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WOLCOTT] are detained on official business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-one Senators have answered to their names. There is no quorum present. The Secretary will call the roll of absentees.

The Secretary called the names of the absent Senators, and Mr. KIRBY and Mr. SHAFROTH answered to their names when called.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-three Senators have answered to their names. There is not a quorum.

Mr. BANKHEAD. It is perfectly evident that it would be difficult to secure a quorum to-night, and I move that the Senate take a recess until 11 o'clock to-morrow.

Mr. POMERENE. I shall object to taking a recess. There is morning business that I think should be attended to, and there is not a quorum here, so that a recess can not be taken.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Nothing is in order except a motion to direct the Sergeant at Arms to request the attendance of absent Senators or a motion to adjourn.

Mr. BANKHEAD. I move that the Senate adjourn until 11 o'clock to-morrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the absence of a quorum, only an adjournment to the usual hour of meeting can be taken, the Chair will state to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. BANKHEAD. Then I move that the Senate adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 15 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, February 5, 1919, at 12 o'clock meridian.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

TUESDAY, February 4, 1919.

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty and most merciful God, our Heavenly Father, look down with compassion upon us, forgive our shortcomings, our weaknesses, our sins, and impart unto us wisdom, strength, grace, that whatsoever we do, here, now, and always, may be in consonance with the eternal fitness of things; and Thine be the praise, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MILITARY ACADEMY APPROPRIATIONS.

On motion of Mr. DENT, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 15462) making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. SABATH] was presiding over this Committee of the Whole yesterday, but he seems to be absent. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GARD] will take the chair until the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. SABATH] comes in.

Mr. GARD took the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will proceed with the reading of the bill.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, before the Clerk reads I would like to offer an amendment to the preceding paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to returning to the preceding paragraph for the purpose of offering an amendment?

There was no objection.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I offer the language of the last proviso stricken out on a point of order, down to the word "direct," in line 16, with an addition which I will ask the Clerk to report.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Wisconsin.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. STAFFORD: Page 34, line 10, insert the following:

"And provided, That hereafter, when any machinery, apparatus, implements, supplies, or materials which have been heretofore or may hereafter be purchased or acquired from appropriations made for the support of the United States Military Academy are no longer needed or are no longer serviceable, they may be sold in such manner as the superintendent may direct, and that the proceeds shall be turned into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts."

Mr. DENT. I have no objection to that amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the adoption of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Wisconsin.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments to correct the text of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama offers an amendment, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DENT: Page 32, line 25, after the word "uses," strike out the colon, insert a semicolon, and add the following: "that the Secretary of War is hereby directed to transfer without charge one 10-ton, 3-wheel road roller to the quartermaster of the United States Military Academy."

Mr. MANN. This is a new paragraph, I take it?

Mr. DENT. This is a new paragraph.

Mr. MANN. Before that amendment is presented I move to strike out the last word of the preceding paragraph, for the purpose of asking whether we have corrected the reference to House bill numbered 11185.

Mr. DENT. That is at the bottom of page 33. The amendment now offered is at the bottom of page 32.

Mr. MANN. Very well. That is an amendment to this pending paragraph?

Mr. DENT. Yes; and then I have another amendment to correct the language at the bottom of page 33.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama, which has been read by the Clerk.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. DENT. Now, Mr. Chairman, I offer the other amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. A further amendment is offered by the gentleman from Alabama, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DENT: Page 33, line 25, after the word "in," strike out "House bill No. 11185" and insert in lieu thereof "the act for the support of the Military Academy approved June 27, 1918."

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, since this item was under consideration yesterday I have taken occasion to inquire whether the appropriations as carried in last year's bill for these respective amounts for construction have lapsed. I am informed—and it confirms the position taken by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN]—that when we appropriate money for public buildings the amount appropriated remains available until it is expended. The covering-in act of 1874 does not apply to public buildings, lighthouses, river and harbor improvements, pay of naval officers and the Marine Corps, and one other class, which I fail to recall at this moment. There is no question whatsoever that the authorization of last year is available and will continue available until Congress rescinds it.

Mr. DENT. If that is true there is no necessity to carry it in this bill, but I would like to make some further investigation. It can not possibly do any harm.

Mr. STAFFORD. This is mere surplusage.

Mr. DENT. If that is the law it can not do any harm to repeat it in this bill.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I think this appropriation stands in somewhat different relationship to the rule than the ordinary public building bill, because under the proviso on page 34, line 2, it is—

Provided, That for the purpose of accounting only, all funds hereinbefore appropriated under the titles "Current and ordinary expenses," "Miscellaneous items and incidental expenses," and "buildings and grounds" shall be disbursed and accounted for by the disbursing officer, United States Military Academy, as "Maintenance, United States Military Academy," and for the purpose shall constitute one fund.

Now, I rather think that there is a different condition with respect to the buildings at West Point, because that fund is added to by these other items, and they all constitute one fund.

Mr. STAFFORD. If the gentleman will permit, the proviso which the gentleman has just read relates to a change in the method of accounting. It has no reference to the validity of authorization for construction purposes carried in the last Military Academy appropriation act. There is no question but that the covering-in act which specifically excepted public buildings, river and harbor improvement, pay for the Navy and Marine Corps, and lighthouses, does not apply to the building project as authorized in the last year's bill.

Mr. DENT. "Grading and granolithic pavement"—that is not a part of the building program.

Mr. STAFFORD. Well, this is merely surplusage; and, Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HULL of Iowa: Page 34, line 19, after the word "derived" add as a new paragraph:

"To provide the necessary buildings and other improvements to accommodate and care for the increased corps of cadets at the United States Military Academy, as provided by the act of Congress approved May 4, 1916, and in general accordance with the plans submitted by the board of officers convened under authority of act of Congress, making appropriations for the support of the United States Military Academy, approved August 11, 1916, \$3,000,000, to be immediately available and to remain available until expended, \$3,000,000."

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, to that I reserve a point of order.

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, we might as well discuss the point of order now. If it is good, there is no use in discussing the merits of the proposition. As I look at it, this is in order. Congress amended a law or enacted a law, which was approved June 3, 1916, practically doubling the number of cadets that were sent to West Point. That is in the act known as the national-defense act. On August 11, 1916, you approved of an act which authorized the Secretary of War, or directed him, to appoint three officers of the Army whose duty it shall be to investigate and make report to Congress on the first Monday of December, 1916, of what is necessary to be done in the way of buildings and other improvements to accommodate and care for the increased corps of cadets as provided by the act of May 4, 1916, together with the probable cost thereof.

That report came back to Congress and was approved of by Congress. For two years you have been making appropriations on that continuous program. I am very much surprised that the question whether it is in order should be raised at this time.

Mr. DENT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I will.

Mr. DENT. The gentleman does not mean to say that the report of the Army officers has been approved of by Congress?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. It certainly has; it came back to Congress.

Mr. DENT. Does the gentleman say it has been approved by Congress? I think the gentleman is mistaken in his facts. There never has been any action taken by Congress.

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Do not you approve it when you make appropriations in line of that report?

Mr. DENT. We did not make any appropriations in line with the report.

Mr. HULL of Iowa. In the act of June 27, 1918, you appropriate for Quartermaster Corps \$10,000 for a garage. That is in their report. There are a lot of other items for enlarging the Military Academy to accommodate the authorized number of cadets; constructing cadet buildings at headquarters to be located south of the area of the south barracks, \$500,000. It is under construction now up there. It is a part of the program. We will demonstrate that clearly when we get to the merits of the case.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that this is new construction and has never been provided for by law.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the gentleman's point of order?

Mr. DENT. That this is new construction and has never been provided for by law.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order.

The Clerk read as follows:

The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to allow any corporation, company, or individual to erect on the United States Military Academy reservation at West Point, N. Y., a hotel, in accordance with plans and specifications to be approved by the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy and to enjoy the revenue therefrom for a period of 50 years, after which time said hotel shall become the property of the United States; that said hotel shall be conducted under such regulations, including the rates and the charges for accommodations thereat, as may be promulgated by the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy under the direction of the Secretary of War: *Provided*, That in view of the long and distinguished service of Col. S. E. Tillman, he having had 46 years' service before retirement, 31 of which were as head of an important department of instruction at the United States Military Academy at West Point, N. Y., besides other unusual distinguished service, and having been recalled to active service in June, 1917, at the age of 69, to take charge of the Military Academy at West Point, N. Y., where he is still serving, the President is hereby authorized to place that officer on the retired list of the Army as a brigadier general, with the pay and emoluments of a retired officer of that grade, and to grant him a commission in accordance with such advanced rank.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on the paragraph.

Mr. KAHN. Will not the gentleman reserve his point of order?

Mr. STAFFORD. I will reserve the point of order.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I hope that the gentleman from Wisconsin will not insist on his point of order so far as the hotel provision is concerned, at least. The hotel at West Point was built, I believe, in 1818. It is now a disgrace to the Government of the United States. Very few improvements have been made there during all the years that it has been on the grounds. When the parents of the young men who are at the Point for instruction visit their sons they are compelled to stay at this old ramshackle building. There is a party or corporation, I understand, that is willing to put up a new modern hotel building on the grounds without a dollar's cost to the Government. They will have the privilege from the Government of conducting the hotel under such regulations as the War Department will establish, and at the end of 50 years it will become the property outright of our Government.

To me it seems almost intolerable to continue that old building on the grounds. Even the Board of Visitors at West Point, the Members of the Senate and House who are compelled to go to West Point to inspect the institution, all recognize the fact that this present building ought to be torn down and a new hotel put up. If private capital is not to be allowed to do it, then the Government ought to do it. The hotel is in no sense modern or up to date. It has no heating conveniences except old coal grates. The charges are high enough, God knows, to have a splendid hotel, but under existing conditions I am sorry for the relatives of the young men who have to find accommodations there during the brief time they may be visiting their sons.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Does the gentleman know who has the placing of the location of this proposed hotel, and will it be placed where the present building is?

Mr. FIELDS. It was so stated.

Mr. KAHN. Right near there, and I think that is a good location for the hotel.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. The gentleman is familiar with the old hotel there at the present time, and that it is the scenic view spot of the academy. Would it not be better, in view of the fact that the academy is to be enlarged and more ground is desirable, that the hotel be placed in some other location?

Mr. KAHN. Of course, that is one of the problems that the engineers have had a great deal of difficulty with. West Point is situated upon the side of a mountain, and every acre of ground has to be made, except that low, level space which is used as a parade ground and on which the principal buildings are located. To make additional ground is a very hard matter and a very costly matter, and so I suppose that the present location is as good as any ground that can be secured.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. It is certainly desirable for a hotel location, being, as I said, in the view spot of the academy grounds; but the gentleman is cognizant of the fact that ground is at a premium there, and it would materially increase the capacity of the camping ground, the parade ground, if that could be occupied as a part of active military maneuvers, and the hotel put some place else.

Mr. KAHN. I presume in the final analysis the War Department in locating the hotel will take all of those facts into consideration and would select a desirable spot for the hotel.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Just one further observation. The bill is silent as to who shall locate this hotel. Would it not be wise to put in a provision there that it shall be located under the direction of the Secretary of War or some one else?

Mr. KAHN. I do not think that is necessary. Of course, the Secretary of War or the Superintendent of the Academy would be authorized under the bill to negotiate for the construction of a hotel, and doubtless he would take into consideration the matter of its location also.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to proceed for one minute more.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Who owns the present hotel?

Mr. KAHN. The United States Government.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Is it run and conducted by the Government?

Mr. KAHN. No; a lady conducts it. She is the lessee. She pays only a nominal rental, but I understand at that that she has a great deal of trouble in making both ends meet.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. If this should go through and be incorporated in the act, it will not do any harm to anybody's property rights, will it?

Mr. KAHN. No; and it will very much enhance the conveniences at the academy.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has again expired.

Mr. LITTLE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the time be extended for two minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. LITTLE. Mr. Chairman, will the hotel company pay the Government anything for the use of this land?

Mr. KAHN. No; they will put up an entirely new building and run it for 50 years, and then it will revert to the ownership of the Government.

Mr. LITTLE. What is to be the cost?

Mr. MORIN. The last plan submitted to the committee was \$400,000.

Mr. DENT. Four hundred thousand dollars.

Mr. LITTLE. I notice the gentleman spoke of the visits to the students. What proportion of the students are visited by any of their kin in a year?

Mr. KAHN. There are a great many visitors during the term, and in addition to that, at graduation there are hundreds of visitors at the academy.

Mr. FIELDS. There are a great many visitors from foreign countries also.

Mr. MORIN. There are a great many of the kin of the cadets who come back after one visit.

Mr. LITTLE. Is it not a fact that 90 per cent of the boys never have any visits from their kin in all the time they are there?

Mr. MORIN. And in case of sickness they are visited.

Mr. LITTLE. I never heard of anybody from my country going there.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, this is subject to a point of order, but, like the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN], I hope that the point of order will not be made as to the hotel proposition at least. This is a subject that the Military Committee annually has to wrestle with. There is no question but that the hotel at West Point now is a disgrace to the Government. That is the uniform testimony upon the subject, and we finally reached the conclusion that this is the only solution that can be made of the proposition. Of course, as a general rule I do not agree with the idea that private people should put up buildings on Government property, but there have been exceptions to it. We have made exceptions during the war. We have allowed the Young Men's Christian Association, the Knights of Columbus, and other organizations to erect buildings upon Government property. After many years of wrestling with a proposition of this kind, we have reached the conclusion that this is the only solution by which you can get a hotel at West Point.

Mr. WELLING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DENT. Yes.

Mr. WELLING. If the hotel is built there it will not involve any additional expense to the Government?

Mr. DENT. Not a dollar in the world.

Mr. WELLING. Will it involve any additional expense to the patrons who now visit the hotel at West Point?

Mr. DENT. It will not, because a provision is carried that the Secretary of War, through the superintendent at the Academy, will have absolute control of the charges and prices to be made by the owners.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DENT. Yes.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. And the very opposite from a business proposition or a commercial speculation is involved in this proposition. It is more in the shape of a memorial to the past cadets, erected by some of their families and friends, and, while it is to be a practical thing, yet it will be run with sentimental overcast, at least, that will take it altogether out of a money proposition or any speculation on the part of the people who propose it.

Mr. DENT. Absolutely so.

Mr. MANN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. DENT. I will.

Mr. MANN. My attention is called to a letter, which is found in the hearings on page 98, addressed to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MORIN], in which there is proposed by Mr. Edward M. Flexner, apparently of Louisville, Ky., to present to the Government, if the Government will accept it, a hotel, to be called Pershing Hall. Now, would that be authorized under the terms of this language?

Mr. DENT. I think so.

Mr. FIELDS. I think we were told in the hearing that is the very purpose of this legislation.

Mr. MANN. I think that would be a very desirable thing to be done if somebody will construct a new hotel there—probably could not get a better name for it than Pershing Hall, although I do not think the name is so important—and present it to the Government. It seems to me that would be very desirable, although I do not think the language now in the bill would permit it.

Mr. DENT. I do not see why it would not.

Mr. MANN. The reason why it would not—and it can be easily corrected—is that under the language of the bill whoever builds this hotel will have to operate it for 50 years, and the Government would only accept it at the end of the 50 years. It would be very easy, if the language remained in the bill, to add a provision to it at the end providing that the Government might accept title to the hotel at any time.

Mr. DENT. I am sure nobody would object to the amendment.

Mr. MANN. I am sure nobody would object to that amendment if the rest remained in. If that is the only purpose, of course that ought to be covered.

Mr. DENT. I think so.

Mr. MANN. If we can get a fine hotel there presented to the Government in place of the present hotel—about which personally I know nothing; I have never been there, except as Members tell me—it would be a very desirable thing, it seems to me.

Mr. DENT. I think that is a good suggestion.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the point of order so far as it relates to the hotel proposition, but I shall make the point of order on the proviso beginning line 7, page 35.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin withdraws the point of order so far as the proposed erection and maintenance of a hotel are concerned, and makes the point of order as to the proviso beginning line 7, page 35, to line 19, inclusive.

Mr. DENT. Of course, it is subject to the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman will withdraw that request or the amendment until the gentleman from Illinois can again offer his amendment to perfect the language of the hotel provision.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I move to amend by adding, after the word "States," in line 2, page 35, the following: "Provided, That the title and ownership of said hotel may be accepted by the Secretary of War on behalf of the United States at any time."

Mr. DENT. I accept that.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman kindly prepare his amendment.

Mr. MANN. It is not long; the Clerk, I think, has got it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MANN: Page 35, line 2, after the word "States," insert:
"Provided, That the title and ownership of said hotel may be accepted by the Secretary of War on behalf of the United States at any time."

Mr. LITTLE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. I merely want to get a little more information here from the chairman of the committee or the ranking minority member. I notice this clause here says that they are authorized to erect the hotel and enjoy the revenues therefrom. Does not the gentleman think there ought to be some provision that the

hotel should be maintained and operated? Now, a man might erect a very flimsy structure, even if he followed the plans of somebody else, and if it did not do well he might let it run down so that at the end of the 50-year period it would be so dilapidated it will not have any value.

Mr. DENT. I call the gentleman's attention to this paragraph, which reads as follows:

That said hotel shall be conducted under such regulations, including the rates and the charges for accommodation thereat, as may be promulgated by the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy under the direction of the Secretary of War.

I think that gives absolute authority.

Mr. LITTLE. Perhaps it does, but it seems to me if the bill simply stated that he should not only erect but maintain and operate it we would have him tied up so that there would not be any room for any other construction. I just offer the suggestion.

Mr. DENT. I think that clause takes care of it. Mr. Chairman, in view—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Kansas withdraw his pro forma amendment?

Mr. LITTLE. I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

Mr. DILLON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN]. Would his amendment permit the Secretary of War to accept this building project before it was completed?

Mr. MANN. Well, it might.

Mr. DILLON. Suppose irresponsible parties were in control of the project and might throw it up, could the Secretary go in and accept it and compel the Government to go on and complete that expensive building?

Mr. MANN. It would not compel the Government to complete it. However, I apprehend the gentleman will not make any mistake about that, that if somebody starts to build a \$400,000 building and spends \$200,000 and breaks up and if there was no safe bond requiring the completion of the hotel it would not stand there that way forever and maybe the Government would have to complete it.

Mr. DILLON. It is pretty easy to unload on the Government—

Mr. MANN. I assume the Secretary would require a proper bond.

Mr. DILLON. It is pretty easy to obtain the consent of the Secretary of War in these immense enterprises and cast the burden upon the Government. I only am directing my thought to the point as to whether it is wise to put in this amendment.

Mr. MANN. It certainly would be better that the Secretary of War should have the right to take the ownership of an uncompleted hotel than to leave it there while belonging to somebody else. I do not think there are any two sides to that.

Mr. DENT. I would suggest to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] and ask him a question, if it would not be better for his amendment to come in after the word "war" on line 6 of page 35?

Mr. MANN. I thought of that, but it comes in where the title is referred to.

Mr. DENT. Then the subsequent paragraph ought to be an additional proviso.

Mr. MANN. It does not have to be. It has a period, and it commences with a new sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN].

The question was taken, and the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk has finished the reading of the bill.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise and report the bill back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GAMB, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 15462) making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, and for other purposes, had directed him to report the same to the House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass.

The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gross.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

On motion of Mr. DENT, a motion to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed was laid on the table.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

Mr. ROSE, by unanimous consent, was granted leave of absence for three days on account of important business.

THE NAVY.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 15539, the naval appropriation bill, and pending that I would like to ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] as to what may be agreed upon for general debate.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Speaker, since a conversation with the gentleman from Tennessee concerning the length of general debate, I will say that I have requests here that will cover six hours, and gentlemen are asking now, as the chairman will see, for more time. While I desire to hasten the consideration of the bill as much as possible, if agreeable to the gentleman I suggest to him we allow the general debate to go along without fixing any limit upon it now. We can consult later in regard to limiting the time.

Mr. PADGETT. In view of the statement that the gentleman has requests for six hours of time, I think we had best postpone agreeing to time for debate for the present.

Mr. MANN. The demands are sure to increase.

Mr. BUTLER. A gentleman just now asked me for time that certainly will cover 40 or 50 minutes additional. We can not fix the time now. I have no other remedy to suggest than that we may go ahead with the discussion of this bill, and perhaps this evening or to-morrow morning we can agree on a limit of time for general debate. I am very much inclined to give gentlemen an opportunity to speak on this bill.

Mr. PADGETT. Then, just for the present, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 15539, and will ask that I may control one half of the time and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] the other half; and we will not fix a limit for the present.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee asks that he control half of the time and the gentleman from Pennsylvania the other half. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

The question is on going into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the naval appropriation bill.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill H. R. 15539, with Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 15539, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 15539) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, and for other purposes.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, it is not my purpose to attempt to make a set speech or to engage at this time in a lengthy discussion. I submitted, on behalf of the committee, a report explaining at length and in much detail the various provisions of the bill. And I shall be content at this time to call attention in a general way to the provisions contained in it and then to answer as best I can such questions explanatory of the bill as may be submitted.

The estimates submitted through the Treasury Department, which were made out while hostilities were going on and before the termination of the war, and submitted upon a war basis, aggregated \$2,644,307,046.05. The committee conducted very extensive and particular hearings, having before it the chiefs of the various bureaus of the Navy Department having cognizance of the appropriations and expenditures. The bureau chiefs reduced the appropriations as originally submitted through the Treasury Department very largely, and the estimates as submitted by the bureau chiefs in their hearings amounted to \$1,414,064,090.15.

While the hearings were progressing the committee furnished to the Secretary of the Navy, as each hearing was had, copies of the stenographic report of the hearings, so that he could keep advised as they progressed and be the better prepared when he came before the committee to submit his recommendations upon a review of the entire situation.

Mr. LITTLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. LITTLE. Can the chairman give to the House in the course of the day the number of men we have in the training camps, the training schools, the Naval Reserves, and those who are enlisted in the Regular Navy? Would that be possible?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; it is set out in the hearings, and I will call attention to the personnel as I go along.

Mr. LITTLE. I think the House would appreciate it if it is not too much trouble.

Mr. PADGETT. I shall be glad to do it.

The estimates, as revised by the Secretary, aggregate \$975,903,621.28. Upon consideration of all the hearings, taking up item after item, the committee made large reductions, and the aggregate reported by the committee is \$746,457,440.33, making a reduction by the committee of the estimates submitted by the Secretary of the Navy upon his revised estimates of \$229,446,180.95.

The total appropriations for the Naval Establishment for the fiscal year 1919 aggregated \$1,685,379,553.82. The amount recommended for the fiscal year 1920, for which this bill is providing, reduces the amount appropriated for the current fiscal year by \$938,922,113.49.

I wish to state that it was the policy and the purpose of the committee to reduce and to make appropriations for the lowest amount compatible with an efficient administration of the naval service. If the committee made any mistake, it was, in my judgment, in making severe reductions of estimates. However, the committee in going over these estimates reduced them, as I have stated, very largely and very substantially, making a reduction of \$1,998,000,000 under the original estimates submitted through the Treasury Department, and \$938,000,000 under the appropriations for the current year, and \$229,000,000 under the revised estimate of the Secretary of the Navy.

The committee pursued a policy also which I think it is necessary and proper that I should call to the attention of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union. On shore stations we reduced the appropriations to the very minimum, allowing only for those items which we felt were absolutely necessary to the operations of the stations during the fiscal year. The committee declined to report any purchase of land, any new projects or extensive enlargements, feeling that the appropriations that had been made during the current year and the preceding fiscal year were so large that the shore stations could well afford to wait until conditions were adjusted more to a peace basis and the Congress could see what the exact status was, and what were the precise and urgent needs.

The estimates for the personnel are based upon an aggregate of enlisted personnel for the Navy of 225,000. Of that number under existing law 131,485 is the established permanent personnel, and in addition 6,000 apprentice seamen, 350 for the Flying Corps and 5,720, as I remember, for the Hospital Corps, making in round numbers 143,000 in the permanent Naval Establishment. The difference of 82,000 was regarded by the committee as being necessary for the operation of the Army transport troop ships and the ships furnished by the Shipping Board and operated by the Navy. A number of German ships, 20, as I understand, were recently turned over to this Government for commercial purposes, to be manned and operated by the Navy. We inserted, however, a provision that as the number used in transport and Shipping Board service is reduced below the 82,000, that number shall be discharged from the service and the enlisted personnel to the extent of that difference reduced, so that as the requirements for the operation of the troop service and the Shipping Board ships reduces automatically, the number of men in the Navy will be reduced out of this temporary increase that is provided.

The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. LITTLE] asked a moment ago about the personnel. As I remember, on the 11th day of November, the day when the armistice was signed, the total number of enlisted personnel in the Navy was 497,030, so that it will appear that in the provisions made in this bill it is reduced more than half.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. FOSS. I wanted to ask whether or not this personnel of 225,000 will provide sufficient men for all the ships that will be in commission?

Mr. PADGETT. Well, sir, that is a matter that is very much disputed. Officers in the Bureau of Navigation insist that it will not afford a sufficient number to give the complements on the ships which they insist there should be. But the committee considered all of the surroundings and circumstances and the fact that we would be in peace time, feeling that the complements upon the ships should not be so large as they were during war time. We feel that the 225,000 will take care of the real needs of the personnel. But I will say to gentlemen that a number of officers strongly controvert that position.

Mr. FOSS. What does the Navy Department propose to keep in commission?

Mr. PADGETT. In the hearing of the Secretary of the Navy he sets it out. He proposes to keep in full commission all of the ships from the beginning of the dreadnaught class. That would be the *Michigan* and the *South Carolina* and all the ships subsequent to those. I believe they embrace 16 such ships at the present time. Another one is about being put in commission—the *Idaho*—and two others during the fiscal year, making 19 of that type. Then there will be others that will be kept in a reserve commission. Then he proposes to keep a considerable number of destroyers in commission.

Mr. FOSS. We have a large number of those, have we not?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; 342, as I remember, will be the number of destroyers, but all of those will not be kept in full commission.

Mr. FOSS. And of the submarines we have a large number, have we not?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; but not all of those will be kept in full commission.

Mr. FOSS. And we have a large number of submarine chasers. Is it proposed to keep them in commission?

Mr. PADGETT. Not all of them. They are proposing, as I understand, to sell some of those, and those chasers and Eagle boats are to take the place of the gunboats in the service in shallow waters and in the river service and in the Orient and in South and Central America. And I will state that there were ordered about 112 of the Eagle boats. The Secretary canceled the contracts down to 60.

Mr. FOSS. How many of these Eagle boats have already gone into commission? Those are the Ford boats?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. I believe it was either five or seven. I believe it was five that were put up.

Mr. FOSS. Does the gentleman feel, taking into consideration all of these vessels that he has referred to, that he has made ample provision for manning them in recommending 225,000 men?

Mr. PADGETT. Instead of using the word "ample" I will use the word "economical." We have made economical provision for them.

Mr. FOSS. Although at the present time the Navy has over 400,000 men, the gentleman says.

Mr. PADGETT. Four hundred and ninety-seven thousand on the 11th of November, but a large number of those have been discharged.

Mr. IGOE. How many have been discharged?

Mr. PADGETT. The number varies from day to day, but I think more than 100,000 have been discharged.

Mr. BUTLER. The Secretary of the Navy has ordered the discharge of more than 40 per cent.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; but they have not all been discharged.

Mr. BUTLER. The order is out to discharge more than 40 per cent—nearly 50 per cent, according to my recollection.

Mr. IGOE. That was 40 per cent of the reserve, was it not?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. IGOE. Will the chairman of the committee explain that?

Mr. PADGETT. The reserves are not discharged. They are placed upon inactive duty, which is the same as a discharge. To grant a discharge to the reserve would be to disintegrate and destroy the reserve. The reserve is essentially a peace organization. It is an organization composed of men distributed through civil life, engaged in civilian occupations in time of peace, but to whom the department have a string, so that they can call these men into the service in time of war or in time of national emergency proclaimed by the President under authority of law. Now, if you were to discharge those men, you would disrupt and disintegrate the reserve force. When they were called into active service during the war they received the same pay as the regular Navy and became a part of it. But when the war is over, when the President puts them back, they go back to their peace basis, like they were before the war. They are enrolled, and they receive the pay of \$12 a year, called their retainer pay. Then they are required to drill two months out of three years in order to keep in touch and in practice on a ship; so that the Navy has this reserve that is available, that it can

call without having the expense of maintaining so large a force in active service when they are not needed.

Mr. HARDY. Is that \$12 a year all that the men in the Naval Reserve receive?

Mr. PADGETT. That is all they receive, except that they get full pay during the two months that they are in active service in time of peace. In time of war they get the same pay as other men of their ratings in the Regular Navy.

Mr. HARDY. They are paid for the drilling time?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. They get the pay of their regular rating.

Mr. McKENZIE. While we are on the question of personnel, I want to ask the chairman of the committee one question.

Mr. PADGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. McKENZIE. Of course, we understand that this appropriation is a peace-time appropriation. That is, it will take care of the Navy from July next until July, 1920.

Mr. PADGETT. That is what it is purposed to do.

Mr. McKENZIE. If I understood the chairman of the committee, in discussing the question of personnel, he said that a certain number of the men in this personnel would be used to man the transports, including those taken over from the German Government. What I desire to ask the chairman of this committee is in regard to the policy of the Navy. Is it to be the policy of the Navy to enlist young men into the naval forces of our country and then use them to man merchant and commercial ships in time of peace?

Mr. PADGETT. Those ships were turned over to the Navy. The Navy did not ask for them, when they were turned over to them, but the Navy were commanded to operate them, and they put on the official and the enlisted personnel to operate them, and they have done so during the war. I got a letter, transmitted to me by the Secretary of the Navy from the Shipping Board, stating that they did not intend hereafter to turn over any other ships than the ones that they have, but it comes in an indirect way. The Shipping Board turned them over to the Army, and the Army turned them over to the Navy, and called upon the Navy to come to the rescue of the Army and operate these ships to bring back the men from overseas. Now, the Navy have taken the position, "We have not asked for these ships, but we accept any duty that is placed upon us by authority."

Mr. McKENZIE. Then, as far as the gentleman knows, there is no purpose behind this, and there is no fixed policy to enlist men into the Navy to be utilized in running commercial ships in time of peace.

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir.

Mr. McKENZIE. Of course, we all agree that at this time it is necessary to bring the boys back.

Mr. PADGETT. We are in only a quasi peace condition now.

Mr. McKENZIE. I understand that.

Mr. PADGETT. And during the coming year it will be necessary for the Navy to operate a large number of ships for the Army. That will extend through this coming fiscal year, in order to bring back the men who are over there, and the army of occupation, and to bring back the millions of tons of supplies and equipment and all that which we have over there.

Mr. McKENZIE. The chairman of the committee will understand that I am finding no fault, nor am I objecting to that policy in war time or while we are returning our troops and matériel from abroad; but I think it would be bad policy in time of peace.

Mr. PADGETT. I understand that, and as I understand it is not the policy of the Navy Department to take over these ships and operate them for commercial purposes; but the Secretary of the Navy has stated repeatedly to the committee that the question of policy as to that was one to be determined by the Congress, and that he awaited whatever direction Congress should give him.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will say further to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. McKENZIE] that this bill carries a provision that when these men now needed for this temporary duty are no longer needed for this temporary duty they are to be mustered out of the service, or an equal number of men mustered out, so it is not the intention to carry it beyond the temporary need for bringing back the men, or supplying the men over there with food and other materials.

Mr. PADGETT. I have stated that fully.

Mr. McKENZIE. I read that in the report, and it was one of the things that suggested the question to my mind as to what was going to be the policy of the department.

Mr. PADGETT. The Secretary of the Navy has stated to the committee a number of times, as I said to the gentleman a moment ago, that the Congress must determine the policy as to operating the Shipping Board ships. And I want to say to the

gentleman that I think Congress will have a big problem on its hands to determine that policy.

Mr. SNELL. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SNELL. Will the gentleman tell me how many men there are at the Great Lakes Naval Station at the present time?

Mr. PADGETT. About 25,000.

Mr. SNELL. What is going to be done with these young men?

Mr. PADGETT. They are discharging them as rapidly as they can; but let me call the gentleman's attention to the difference between the situation in the Navy and that in the Army with reference to discharging the men. The Army has nothing except its personnel. It has no ships, it has no boats, or anything of that kind. They can discharge a whole unit, a regiment, and that is what they do. We can not discharge a whole complement of the ship and leave it stripped and bare. It takes a certain number of men to operate the ships.

Mr. SNELL. But these men of the Great Lakes are not connected with any special department.

Mr. PADGETT. No; but they are men sent there, being trained.

Mr. SNELL. They are not attached to any ship.

Mr. PADGETT. No; but, as I say, they are being discharged as rapidly as they can.

Mr. SNELL. How rapidly is that?

Mr. PADGETT. I have it in my mind that there has been something over 100,000 discharged since the armistice was signed.

Mr. SNELL. From the Great Lakes station?

Mr. PADGETT. No; the whole number discharged. New men enlist in the Navy and are sent to these training camps, and the men in the training camp that enlisted for four years and their time is expiring are discharged.

Mr. SNELL. Are they taking on new enlistments?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SNELL. And sent to the Great Lakes?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; to the Great Lakes and to Newport and to Hampton Roads.

Mr. SNELL. I am interested in getting some young men out of there who are anxious to get home. I received a lengthy communication from the commandant, and when I read it through it concluded with the statement that he would think it over and let me know.

Mr. PADGETT. I got one of the very same kind from the commandant, stating that on account of the need of men—for instance, here is a man doing duty, and some one has to take his place.

Mr. SNELL. I wondered what his duties were and why it was necessary to keep so many young men there.

Mr. PADGETT. It is largely a training camp, composed of men being trained, and it is mixed up with men that are there who are to stay permanently. Some are temporary—

Mr. SNELL. The temporary ones are the ones I am interested in. Why is it necessary to keep them there?

Mr. PADGETT. It might be necessary to keep a man there to take the place of some man whose four-year enlistment is about to expire, and they want to discharge him. All these things can not be done in a day or in a week. I got a similar letter to the one the gentleman got.

Mr. IGOE. How does the gentleman handle that?

Mr. STAFFORD. These are circular letters with the name of the Member inserted.

Mr. PADGETT. I do not think it is a circular letter.

Mr. STAFFORD. If the gentleman will examine closely, he will find his name inserted in a very nice way so that you would hardly detect that it was a circular letter.

Mr. PADGETT. I did not notice that it was.

Mr. SNELL. What portion of the men there now want to be discharged and what number are permanent?

Mr. PADGETT. I could not tell the gentleman; they are shifting every day. They are turning the temporaries out and are taking in others. They told me the other day that there had come in a thousand or twelve hundred men from all over the country within a day or two. These men are going into the training camps.

Mr. SNELL. I thought if there was a way to get these men out I would like to know it. If there is not, I am willing to take my turn with the rest.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. HENSLEY. Take a case of this kind: One of these young men has a dependent wife and a father who is looking to the boy to help him. He is getting old. The boy is a tooter of a horn in the Navy. That is all the service he is rendering.

The man over him declares that he can not dispense with his services to the Government at this time. Would the gentleman regard that as being so important that the boy should remain in the service and not be discharged?

Mr. SNELL. That is practically the same thing that a young man wrote me, only he said he was not doing anything.

Mr. PADGETT. I should think that in the case mentioned by the gentleman from Missouri, the boy could be dispensed with, but I can not pass on all the details or the exigencies of the service at the particular time. I found this condition, gentlemen, and I think all of you will verify it. There is more anxiety now about the boys and we are getting more letters now than we did while the war was going on and while it was in active operation.

Mr. DOWELL. Is there not a good reason for that, when they know that there is no need of their being any longer in the service?

Mr. PADGETT. If the gentleman will wait a moment, that might apply with a broader significance to the Army than the Navy. We have got these men on the ships and we can not abandon the ships. We have got to hold the men on there until an organization is brought down to where they can be cared for. Every fellow thinks that he is an individual, but when you think that these individuals from all over the country are making the same claim, the same argument, and thousands and thousands of them are coming in, you will appreciate the situation. It was stated to the committee, I think, that 50 per cent of the entire personnel were insisting on getting out at once.

Mr. IGOE. What is the personnel? I think we all want to have the transports and ships commanded properly to bring the boys back, because we are all pleading for them to be returned. We have got to admit that the Navy must be manned to bring them back, but what is the total number of men which the Navy needs for their service at this time and what is the total number we have in the service?

Mr. PADGETT. As I stated a little while ago, on the 11th of November the Navy had 497,000 men. The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation insists that he could not get along now with less than 350,000 men.

Mr. IGOE. What are these 350,000 needed for? Does that include troop ships, which the gentleman spoke of as having been taken over?

Mr. PADGETT. Troop ships, transports, and Navy ships, and all the ships we have in operation. There are something like 2,000 ships all told with the Navy to-day in operation. We can not abandon them all at once.

Mr. SNELL. My special inquiry is directed in respect to the men who have never been assigned to ships and never expect to be.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. And never will be.

Mr. SNELL. And never will be. I appreciate the fact that the ones assigned to ships you have need for and that they must be retained in the service.

Mr. PADGETT. And the gentleman must remember that with 350,000 men needed for the ships, there is a large number of men who are sick, there is a large number of men whose term is expired by limitation, who have the right to go out, and you have got to have replacements. These replacements come from these schools, these training places, and the navigation officers must look forward to what are on the ships, what is required, what is coming off—men who are sick, men whose terms are expired, men who are debilitated. There must be a reserve in these schools for replacements.

Mr. SNELL. You would have that reserve among the young men who intend to remain permanently in the Navy, but as to these 40 or 50 per cent that are going to be discharged some time, who are never going to remain, who are not training themselves especially at this time, I can not understand why we can not get that complement out.

Mr. PADGETT. But the gentleman must remember that on the ships—

Mr. SNELL. But these are not on the ships; these are at the stations.

Mr. PADGETT. On the ships there are thousands of men who have reasons to get out that are more urgent than the young men who are in the schools.

Mr. SNELL. But the commandant says that they are going to let them go.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SNELL. When?

Mr. PADGETT. As soon as they can.

Mr. SNELL. That is the thing we would like to get definite information about. If we can not get it here in Congress from the Naval Committee, I do not know where we are going to get it.

Mr. PADGETT. They can not tell you; they are complaining to us. I talked to Capt. Taussig two days ago, and he told me they were letting them out so fast that they were right down to the danger point as to how they would get men to operate the ships.

Mr. SNELL. A lot of these young men at the present time are not doing anything.

Mr. PADGETT. They are in the training schools, and some of those men may be sent to the ships for a while until they can be replaced with permanent men.

Mr. SNELL. Are there not a lot of these young men at the present time who have stopped training since the armistice was signed?

Mr. PADGETT. No.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Oh, the gentleman is mistaken about that.

Mr. PADGETT. I think the men in the schools are all being trained.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. No.

Mr. SNELL. I have letters saying that they are not doing the work they did formerly.

Mr. PADGETT. I can not answer that.

Mr. SNELL. I would like to get that information.

Mr. PADGETT. My understanding is that they are still carrying on the training of these men in the schools.

Mr. SNELL. I had a letter from a young man at Pelham Bay the other day, and he said that he was absolutely doing nothing, and had not been doing anything for six or eight weeks. That is the general information that I get from many places. It seems to me that there might be some machinery manufactured somewhere, so as to get that sort of people out.

Mr. PADGETT. They are now turning them out by the thousands, and as to whether the gentleman's particular young man gets out—

Mr. SNELL. I am not interested in any particular young man, but all of these young men who are not doing anything at the present time at these naval stations.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, it might help the gentleman from New York to know that after the 1st of July only 225,000 men can be kept in the Navy.

Mr. SNELL. Then we are sure of getting them out by the 1st of July?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Down to 225,000, and if your young man happened to be among the 225,000 who are needed—

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Is the gentleman positive about that?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. We do not appropriate any money beyond that, and I imagine that will govern.

Mr. SNOOK. When a young man is in the Navy or the Naval Reserve and wants to get out and files an application it is referred to his immediate commanding officer for recommendation. Is that right?

Mr. PADGETT. That is right.

Mr. SNOOK. In my experience I find that some of these commanding officers are very diligent and take up these applications and go over them and recommend that a certain percentage of the men on the boats who are under their command be discharged. Other commanding officers entirely ignore these applications and pay no attention to them whatever and discharge nobody. Ought not some way to be provided where a young man has a good case, like some of these cases that have been spoken of here, where his parents are dying, or where he has a family dependent upon him, in case the commanding officers ignore the applications, so that he could appeal to a board, where he could have the matter retried?

Mr. PADGETT. I have understood that the Secretary has given orders that in all cases where they had declined to grant the application, the papers, with the applications, should be forwarded to the department here for consideration and review. Where they were granted, that is the end of it and there was no necessity for forwarding them.

Mr. SNOOK. Yes, but I have had considerable experience with the department here. When you take up a case with the department here in Washington they say they do not have anything to do with it, it is the commanding officer that must pass upon the application. They will say that they will recommend him to discharge the boy if he thinks it is consistent with the service, or this, that, or the other.

I know of cases where the commanding officer entirely ignored all applications, and it seems to me, both in the Army and the Navy, there ought to be some kind of a court or some kind of a board to which a boy who has a meritorious case can appeal from the decision of the commanding officer and have it pass on his application.

Mr. PADGETT. He could address his communication to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who is superior to this officer, and call attention to it.

Mr. SNOOK. I have had occasion to talk to the gentleman to whom the gentleman refers, Capt. Taussig, a very fine man, and he gives a great deal of information; but after all, when you talk to the Bureau of Navigation about it, they say it is up to the commanding officer; and if the boy has a meritorious case and his commanding officer refuses to pass on it, there seems to be no way to get around it at all, and there ought to be some board to which the boy could present his case.

Mr. STEENERSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. I will.

Mr. STEENERSON. I have been much instructed by the discussion in regard to the release of men from the Navy. I would like to know if the same rule governs the men from the Marine Corps?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir. Now, there is this about the Marine Corps: That part of the Marine Corps that is in France, about 25,000 all told, are under the control of the Army and Gen. Pershing. The moment they land in France they become a part of the Army. They are not under the control of the Navy, and they would only come back to the Navy when Gen. Pershing sends them back as a part of his army, or if they should be withdrawn by order of the President. The Marine Corps that are not in France, who are here in the United States, or in South or Central America, or Asia, or wherever the marines are operating, why they are under the jurisdiction of the Navy, and I understand the same rule applies to them.

Mr. STEENERSON. The applications which have come to me lately from my district are young men who enlisted at the outbreak of the war in the Marine Corps and are now in France—some at Brest, some at Bordeaux—

Mr. PADGETT. Those who are in France, they are not discharged, but they would be sent home through Gen. Pershing, and through the military channels.

Mr. STEENERSON. In what way do they proceed if they want a discharge?

Mr. PADGETT. I had had some cases of that kind, and they instructed me that they should address a communication to Gen. Pershing and forward it through military channels, stating fully all the reasons why they are asking to be sent home, and it will be passed upon by Gen. Pershing under military authority.

Mr. STEENERSON. That would be sent through their immediate commanders?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir; and Gen. Pershing. That is what I have been informed.

Mr. STEENERSON. That is, they are not discharged, but—

Mr. PADGETT. They would be sent home, and when they came back home they become part of the Navy and under the jurisdiction of the Navy then, and their discharge would be acted upon here by the Secretary of the Navy or the commandant of the Marine Corps.

Mr. HARDY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. I will.

Mr. HARDY. I think I understand the idea and policy under which the head of the Navy Department leaves necessarily to the commandant in charge in the immediate locality, or a ship, the ultimate decision as to whether or not he will discharge or grant a discharge upon application—

Mr. PADGETT. Not the ultimate one.

Mr. HARDY. Just one minute, and I will come to that. That is, under ordinary circumstances, he being on the ground, knows the condition and is the better one to judge?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. But if I understand it right, if an applicant makes a justifiable application for discharge, and the commandant should simply ignore it or should refuse without just reason, there is an appeal to the head of the Bureau of Navigation.

Mr. PADGETT. I understand so; that they are entitled to have it reviewed by the Bureau of Navigation.

Mr. HARDY. Now, it is the duty of the commandant to send the papers up whether he grants the discharge or refuses it?

Mr. PADGETT. No; I understand if he grants the discharge that is the end of it.

Mr. HARDY. He turns the party loose?

Mr. PADGETT. If he does not grant it, as I understand, he is directed to forward those refusals to the department for consideration here, and that is the reason for their action.

Mr. HARDY. I do not think it would often occur, but it may occur that some commandant utterly ignored that part of his duty and refused to present the matter, then what is the remedy?

Mr. PADGETT. In that case the only thing I can see is for the young man himself to write to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation or the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. HARDY. Then would he be disciplined for going over the head of his immediate superior?

Mr. PADGETT. I think not.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Probably so.

Mr. PADGETT. I think if he should state that he had made his application and that his application had not been considered I do not believe that he would receive any penalty or be punished.

Mr. HARDY. Does the gentleman think the head of the Navy Department should sit down on any attempt to discipline that young man?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not think he would be disciplined, sir. I will reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, before the gentleman sits down I wish to call his attention to some figures set forth in the report. I notice the report states that the estimates for the support of the Naval Establishment for the fiscal year 1920, as set forth in the Book of Estimates, was \$2,644,000,000. I suppose these estimates were submitted in reference to the continuation of the war?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. So they may not be regarded in this connection. I notice the amount subsequently recommended by the bureau chiefs was \$1,400,000,000. That contemplated a peace-time program?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. What is it that was eliminated from the bureau chiefs' estimate?

Mr. PADGETT. They made those estimates on the basis of 350,000 men, and the committee reduced the number of enlisted men to 225,000. That is one item, and there are many other items along that line.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Let me ask you if there was no addition to the number of ships proposed here for which they wish 350,000 men?

Mr. PADGETT. There were a number of ships proposed, and they had a larger complement for the ships than the committee felt was necessary in peace times.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I understand, then, that the recommendation of this bureau for additional ships is a recommendation the committee has eliminated?

Mr. PADGETT. We do not think there will be as many ships in operation as would require the 350,000 men.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. In other words, you reduce the number of ships, and you think that the ships will not be built to require the number of men that were contemplated in the estimates of the bureau chiefs?

Mr. PADGETT. A great many of the ships that they have now and are being operated, and that we estimated would be operated during the whole of the fiscal year, will be dispensed with.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. These reductions then, I understand, do not relate to reduction in the number of ships but to maintenance of operation?

Mr. PADGETT. The operation of the ships.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I notice after these bureau chiefs—

Mr. PADGETT. That is only one item that I can mention. A great deal of that was reduced many millions from the estimates for appropriations for navy yards and shore stations, and aircraft, and many things of that kind. For instance, the original estimate for aircraft was \$225,000,000. In the estimates by the bureau chiefs they estimated that they could use \$85,000,000, and they wanted \$85,000,000. The Secretary of the Navy reduced it, as I remember, to \$36,000,000, and the committee reduced it to \$25,000,000. And that runs all through the hearings.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. May I ask the chairman in this connection who are comprehended under the head of bureau chiefs?

Mr. PADGETT. The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with subdivisions under that.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Now, the recommendations that were made in this connection I suppose were based upon the idea that the proper defense of the country needed the full amount contained in their recommendations?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir; they were honest in their recommendations.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I do not question their honesty.

Mr. PADGETT. I do not mean honesty in that sense. I mean the conviction that was necessary.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I understand. But I was trying to ascertain to what extent the committee used its own judgment in overriding the judgment of these bureau chiefs.

I noticed the Secretary of the Navy reduced his recommendations for so-called preparedness, which came from the heads mentioned, down to \$975,000,000. Now, in what direction and in what details did the Secretary of the Navy reduce the recommendation of these bureau chiefs?

Mr. PADGETT. The Secretary took up the various items and then insisted that they could get along on less appropriation. And if you look on page 901, I believe it is, of the hearings you will find a parallel, itemized statement, where in one column is the title of the appropriation. In the first column after that is the original estimate; in the next column is the amount that the Secretary has recommended, and in the last column the amount that was proposed by the bureau chiefs, parallel with each other, showing every item which he had reduced, and his recommendations.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Then the committee differed with the recommendations, first, of the chiefs and then with the Secretary of the Navy, by reducing the bill down to \$746,000,000?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir. Out of the great desire of the committee to reduce appropriations to the very lowest limit that they thought would be consistent with the operation, and curtailing all enlargements and extensions.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. And the committee reported what, in its judgment, is adequate defense, and they considered they could eliminate \$900,000,000 of what these heads thought was adequate defense and at the same time still preserve our adequate defense?

Mr. PADGETT. Two hundred and twenty-nine millions.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I thought you were making a reduction here of \$938,000,000?

Mr. PADGETT. That is out of the appropriations for the current year.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I am calling attention to them.

Mr. PADGETT. But the current year's appropriations were made on a war basis.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. As to the \$200,000,000 you speak of, is there a difference between the report of the committee and the report of the Secretary of the Navy?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. And then the \$746,000,000 and the \$1,414,000,000 shows the difference between the bureau chiefs and the report of the committee.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Now, Mr. Chairman, I notice that the total for the Naval Establishment for the fiscal year 1919 you put at \$1,600,000,000?

Mr. PADGETT. That is the one I referred to a moment ago.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. It provides for that year for maintenance and new construction.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; and so does this one carry maintenance and new construction also.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. What do you mean by this one?

Mr. PADGETT. This bill. It carries authorization for new construction.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I had not reached that point as yet. I wanted to ask as to the appropriation for 1919—the \$1,600,000,000 that is carried for the maintenance of the Navy during that year and for construction during that year.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; and for war operations.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. What would be the proportion of that \$1,600,000,000 that would be for operating expenses, for maintenance, and for construction, as nearly as you can state them?

Mr. PADGETT. If I remember aright the bill, it is set out in the bill of last year, of July 1. In the present bill, I think, we have appropriated for construction about \$170,000,000.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. My recollection is that last year the new construction amounted to about \$350,000,000.

Mr. PADGETT. It is itemized in the bill last year.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. And there were some from emergency sources in addition.

Mr. PADGETT. The total increase of the Navy in the bill last year was \$184,397,000. That was carried in the regular bill. Now, there were many, many millions of dollars that were appropriated in deficiency bills for authorizations that ran it up, as suggested by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY], perhaps to \$300,000,000.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I will put the question in this way: When the construction heretofore authorized shall have been completed, so that we will have the present Navy plus the ships authorized, what will be the annual cost of the operation and maintenance of that Navy?

Mr. PADGETT. That is a matter that the committee made inquiry about and had estimates about. It varies. Some of

them were put up, I think, as high as about \$650,000,000. Personally, I do not think it would be that much.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. You mean, without adding a ship under any new authorizations in this bill, when all the outstanding authorizations are completed, and the ships are manned, the annual maintenance and operation charge of that fleet, so composed, would be from \$600,000,000, to \$650,000,000?

Mr. PADGETT. There were some estimates of that kind; yes, sir.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I notice here that you have another building program.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. On page 3. What is the aggregate cost, so far as the committee can now figure it, of that program? Of course, we understand that the actual figures in the result always run far ahead of the provisional estimates; but so far as the committee can figure out, what will be the cost of the building program on page 3?

Mr. PADGETT. Based on the present cost of ships, the present cost of labor and material, which is a very high charge, it is estimated that the battleships will cost \$32,400,000 each.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. That would be \$324,000,000 for the 10 battleships?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; and the scout cruisers will cost about \$8,800,000 each. That would be \$88,000,000.

Mr. HARDY. Does that estimate include the equipment of the ships also?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. I am speaking of them complete; and those appropriations would be distributed over about seven years.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. That provision contemplates, then, a new building program, an additional and supplemental program, one that will cost, according to the best figures you can now make, about \$412,000,000?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir. I will state to the gentleman that the opinion was expressed to the committee that there would be a reduction in the cost of materials and of labor under this program before it was completed, which would be distributed over six or seven years—or six years anyway—and as to whether or not that is correct, you can guess as well as I can.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I have had that hope expressed heretofore, but never seen it realized, so far as my immediate experience has gone.

Mr. PADGETT. I imagine that there will be, as we get back to peace conditions, of necessity a decline in the cost of living and the cost of materials and labor. I believe they must go down to a normal basis, and go down proportionately.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Do the figures you have given me put a ship into condition to go into the line of battle?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. It includes, then, guns and ammunition, and is a completed ship?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Yes.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I notice on page 35 of the hearings that Admiral Earle testified that 112 of these Eagle boats are to be completed.

Mr. PADGETT. No; 112 were ordered. The Secretary canceled 52, leaving 60 to be completed.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Admiral Earle says on page 35 that 112 are to be finished. The approximate cost of these boats, as I understand, is in the vicinity of \$275,000 each. Is that correct?

Mr. PADGETT. No; it is much more than that. The estimate was made originally that they could build them for \$275,000 each, but Admiral Taylor, Chief Constructor, stated to the committee that while they hoped to build them for that, they never expected to build them for that, and they expected them to cost much more than that, and if they were built for \$400,000 each it would be a very good job and a very fair price.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. That is the Ford Motor Co. contract?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir. But the company made this sort of a contract: It was on the cost-plus plan; they were to be paid the cost of construction and \$20,000 on each boat as their profit.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Now, there are to be 58 of those completed?

Mr. PADGETT. Sixty.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Sixty?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. What is the general purpose that those boats will be used for when they are completed?

Mr. PADGETT. Largely as substitutes for gunboats in South and Central American waters, the West Indies, in the Orient, in China, the river service in shallow waters, and services of that kind.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Is it also contemplated that they shall take the place of the revenue cutters?

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir. The Revenue-Cutter Service in time of peace is under the Treasury. In time of war its vessels are under the Navy. A bill has been introduced, that is pending before another committee, to transfer permanently to the Navy the old Revenue-Cutter Service, now called the Coast Guard Service.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. That is what I am after.

Mr. PADGETT. But that is pending before another committee and has not been considered by our committee at all.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Would these Eagle boats be available for that purpose?

Mr. PADGETT. If the Congress should turn them over, or if the department should transfer them by consent of Congress, I presume they could be used for that purpose.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Does the gentleman know if the Navy Department has that in view as the reason for asking that these 60 Eagle boats be completed?

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir. I understand the 60 are being completed because they had progressed so far at the time of the signing of the armistice, in the gathering of the materials and the fabrication and the progress of the work, that it was an advantage to the Government to complete those 60. The 52 had not been completed to that extent, and the contracts for them were canceled.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. And there are two or three or four in commission now, I believe.

Mr. PADGETT. I have it in my mind that five of them have been put out in the water. Whether I am correct on that or not I do not recall. It is a small number.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Is it the judgment of the Navy that those boats are a success?

Mr. PADGETT. Admiral Taylor speaks very nicely of them. He is the chief constructor. He says that they are good boats, and that they will be very serviceable and will be well worth what they will cost the Government.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. They mount two 4-inch guns, do they not?

Mr. PADGETT. I believe they have either 4 or 5 inch guns. I am not sure which.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I have one further question that I wish to ask. When this supplemental program is completed, which is to cost \$412,000,000, what then will be the annual maintenance charge of our Navy, if we add nothing more?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not think it would aggregate any more than with the others, because many of those that we now have would be supplemented by these new ships.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Has it been the experience of the chairman heretofore that from year to year the expenses of the Navy have ever declined?

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Have we any reason to believe, then, that in the future the experience will be different?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; I think we have reached the point where, owing to the age of our ships, many of those that we now have will go out of service and be supplemented by the larger, better, and newer ships.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. If the chairman of the committee will permit, in answering the question of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SAUNDERS] as to the cost of maintaining the present Navy as now authorized, without adding any more ships, the chairman stated that it was estimated by some to be as much as \$600,000,000.

Mr. PADGETT. I said \$650,000,000. That is my recollection.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. The only estimate submitted to the committee on that question was a letter from Admiral McGowan, which will be found on page 825 of the hearings. In making that estimate he took into account the ships of the August, 1916, building program and also a duplication of that program. It will be interesting to the gentleman to read that letter. Admiral McGowan makes the statement therein that in the opinion of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 25 per cent of the original cost of ships represents the fair annual cost of maintenance; and he sets out in that table what the Navy authorized prior to August, 1916, cost, which was approximately \$775,000,000. He estimated the cost of the August, 1916, program at \$761,000,000, and he estimated that to duplicate the 1916 program would cost \$913,000,000, taking into account the present increased cost of labor and materials, and he then gave as

the minimum cost to maintain the Navy after the completion of the August, 1916, program and a duplication thereof to be \$612,250,000 as the minimum and \$806,000,000 as the maximum.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. On the basis, though, of \$900,000,000 for the duplication.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. Yes; for a duplication of the 1916 program, which the admiral bases his estimate on.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I do not want to have the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SAUNDERS] confused, because this program is only for \$400,000,000.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. That is interesting. Then, according to Admiral McGowan's figures, the minimum cost in the situation predicated would be \$625,000,000, and the maximum cost would be how much?

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. About \$806,000,000.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. It is pretty safe, then, to figure on \$750,000,000.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. In making this estimate he took into account the building of another program such as we ordered in August, 1916, and instead of \$750,000,000 he estimated that it would cost something over \$800,000,000.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I was just going to ask this question, if the gentleman had the figures, because if he can furnish the figures I can do a little mathematical computation and get at my results.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. Yes.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. By the time the ships contemplated in the 1916 program are completed, and by the time this supplemental program recommended by your committee is completed, what will be as of that future date the aggregate cost of all of the ships then in the American Navy? If you can give me that, I can divide that by 4 and get at the maintenance.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. The aggregate cost of the ships ordered prior to August, 1916, was stated by the admiral to be approximately \$775,000,000, and the aggregate cost of the ships of the August, 1916, program is estimated by the admiral to be \$761,000,000. But at a later hearing Admiral Taylor stated that that would be \$806,000,000. The aggregate cost of the duplication of the August, 1916, building program, as estimated by Admiral McGowan, is over \$900,000,000. Instead of authorizing the duplication of that program of 1916, as was first suggested, the only part of that program we have authorized is 10 battleships and 10 scout cruisers, which the chairman states are estimated by Admiral Taylor to cost approximately \$400,000,000.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. May I ask this question? It is often stated in our body, that when the Congress authorizes battleships and scout cruisers, their construction is always followed by requests for a number of smaller vessels which the Navy needs insist are necessary to make a well-balanced Navy. Hence the moment we begin to build battleships and scout cruisers, then this other construction is a corollary, you may say.

Mr. PADGETT. If the gentleman from Alabama will permit, I will say that before the war our Navy was an unbalanced Navy. We had more capital ships—that is, large ships—and had emphasized that and had been leaving off the small ships. On account of the exigencies of this war, and the operation of the submarines against commercial ships, the thing shifted, and we have now a multitude of small ships and a surplus of small ships, so that the Navy is now unbalanced by having more small ships out of proportion to what we have of large ships. So in this war it changed. For instance, we have 342 destroyers built, building, and authorized. Before the war I think we had between 70 and 80, if I remember the figures offhand.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Fifty-four.

Mr. BUTLER. Fifty-four small boats.

Mr. PADGETT. I was perhaps putting it too high. Now, we have the same condition about submarines. We have the chasers, we have the Eagle boats, and various others, so that we do not need small craft at all, and for that reason the committee has not reported any part of the program with reference to the small craft, but we are reporting two of the larger type.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. What the chairman has stated does not alter the rule. He states that we have more smaller ships than we used to have, and that so far as the larger ships are concerned, we will not need so many small ships. With reference to capital ships, it appears just now that we have a disproportionate number of small ships. But that does not meet the question that I am asking. Do our naval experts, the naval heads, consider that when you shall have built the heavy ships contemplated in the 1916 building program, and the heavy ships contemplated in the supplementary program, you will then have such a well-balanced Navy, that there will be no demand for additional smaller ships?

Mr. PADGETT. Well, there is a division of opinion among the naval men. Some insist that we should have more and some say that we have a sufficiency. We have never been able to get an absolute agreement on any proposition.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. May I ask one further question, and then I will not take any further time of the committee. So far as this war is concerned, our heavy ships have played practically no part, is not that true?

Mr. PADGETT. No; it is not. The salvation of our cause and the cause of the allies were saved by British big ships.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. But the gentleman does not answer my question. I said "our ships"; I did not say anything about the British ships.

Mr. PADGETT. Had it not been for the big ships Germany would have won the war before we got into it, and we would have had to fight it alone.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. If it had not been for the British fighting men, you may say Germany would have won the war. I am asking the gentleman, so far as the present war is concerned, whether our big ships played any but a comparatively unimportant part in it. The gentleman does not answer the question by telling me what the English ships did.

Mr. PADGETT. We sent over a part of our ships to act with the British Navy.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Our heavy ships were a part of the grand fleet. I am not minimizing our part in the naval war, for I well understand that our smaller ships played a big part in the antisubmarine operations. But is it not true that the big ships of this country made but a small contribution to the naval operations?

Mr. PADGETT. England was very glad to have them sent over there.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Yes, I know that they welcomed our battleships, when our admirals in command reached England. I know that they were splendid ships, and that they would have done well if there had been any fighting to be done. They would have played a magnificent part, I may say, but as a matter of fact our big ships had but little to do, and there were comparatively few on the other side.

Mr. PADGETT. We sent five over at first.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Five dreadnaughts?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; and they went up into the Orkney Islands, and then later we sent seven more, I believe.

Mr. BUTLER. Four more, nine in all.

Mr. PADGETT. The gentleman from Pennsylvania says four more. They went over.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I wish to get at the facts. Nine went over there. You say now the British grand fleet were waiting for the German fleet to emerge. As a matter of fact it did not emerge before we got over. They never emerged, save as captives. Our heavy ships were naturally welcomed, but they were not needed. The British fleet was ample to contain the German fleet.

Mr. PADGETT. And were there ready.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. And were there ready and waiting for the Germans to come out. Had they come our ships would have fought like bulldogs. That is true, but they never emerged, and never contemplated emerging. The British had enough heavy ships to take care of the German fleet, if it had emerged, is not that true?

Mr. PADGETT. I think so; but ours contributed a very important part in being there.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. And the actual active helpful contributions, so far as opposition to the real naval activities of Germany were concerned, which consisted of submarine warfare, were conducted by our lighter ships.

Mr. PADGETT. Oh, certainly; and the English small ships also operated against them.

Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. Absolutely, but I am dealing with our contribution to the naval warfare, not the part the English played.

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SNYDER. I want to ask a few questions along another line. I notice in the report that the present authorized strength of the Navy is 143,000 men and odd. Can the gentleman give us any idea as to how many men there are in the Navy now?

Mr. PADGETT. I did that. On the 11th of November, when the armistice was signed, there were 497,020 men. I understand that something like 100,000 have been discharged since then.

Mr. SNYDER. I note that the committee recommends for the temporary organization, until June 30, 1920, 225,000 men.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SNYDER. And it is stated that 82,000 of these men are for the purpose of the Shipping Board and for transports?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SNYDER. What I am asking is, are these 82,000 men charged up to the Shipping Board, or are they paid out of the Navy appropriation?

Mr. PADGETT. They are paid out of the appropriation for the Navy, and that is a work that the Navy is doing in addition to strictly naval work.

Mr. SNYDER. I appreciate all that, but what I am trying to get at is when the Shipping Board makes their rates for tonnage, do they have to consider in any way the payment of these men in making up their costs?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not know what the Shipping Board takes into consideration.

Mr. SNYDER. It seems to me that is a very important question right here now.

Mr. PADGETT. The big part I find is for the Army—operation for the Army—and there are certain amounts that the Army refunds to the Navy, and that goes into the Treasury as general receipts, but there is a large part of it that the Navy bears the expense of and does not get any compensation for.

Mr. SNYDER. I understand that when these ships are brought out of Hog Island, if they ever are, they are immediately manned by men from the Navy.

Mr. PADGETT. The Shipping Board turns over its ships to the Army, and the Army then calls upon the Navy to man and operate them.

Mr. SNYDER. The question that I want to clear up, if I can, is this: When the Army or the Navy supplies these men to the Shipping Board, does the Shipping Board contemplate the cost of those men in the rates they give the public for carrying freight?

Mr. PADGETT. I am unable to answer that, because I have no information from the Shipping Board.

Mr. SNYDER. It seems to me that would be information we need here now.

Mr. PADGETT. As to what elements go into the Shipping Board in fixing the rates.

Mr. SNYDER. If the Government is going to supply men and operate its ships and pay those men out of the taxes we are raising for the people, then compete with shippers who are trying to compete with that situation, it seems to me that our whole shipbuilding scheme will go for nothing.

Mr. PADGETT. I agree with the gentleman that it is an element that ought to be considered by the Shipping Board, but they are not under our control or jurisdiction.

Mr. SNYDER. Is it the correct thing for us to do here—

Mr. PADGETT. Our ships are being operated for military purposes.

Mr. SNYDER. To appropriate money in a naval bill for the purpose of operating merchant ships?

Mr. PADGETT. We are not operating merchant ships in commerce.

Mr. SNYDER. You are operating ships for the Shipping Board, and they are carrying merchandise.

Mr. PADGETT. Oh, no; only for military purposes.

Mr. SNYDER. They are operated by the Army—by men furnished the Army by the Navy.

Mr. PADGETT. They are for bringing troops back and equipment of war and materials of war.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, there have been several questions asked here this morning upon which I think perhaps I am able to throw a little light, if the gentleman will permit. I have just telephoned to the Bureau of Navigation in regard to the release of men. They have not the figures as to the actual number, but they have authorized the discharge of 20 per cent of those who enlisted for the duration of the war, 10 per cent of those who enlisted for four years and who joined the Navy after April 6, 1917, and 40 per cent of the Naval Reserves. A query was made in regard to the battery upon the Eagle patrol boats. These vessels have a battery consisting of two 4-inch 50-caliber guns, one 3-inch 50-caliber gun, one Y depth-bomb projector, and two machine guns.

Mr. GILLET. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. GILLET. Mr. Chairman, there have been statements in the press that action of the committee was determined, or at least influenced, by secret cablegrams from the President. I wondered whether in this era of pitiless publicity the chairman could tell this House whether that is so or not?

Mr. PADGETT. The papers stated that the chairman had received a cablegram from the President. That is not correct. The President did not cable me nor did I cable the President.

I do not think that any member of the committee did. I think I am warranted in saying no member of the committee did.

Mr. BUTLER. Cable the President, I did not!

Mr. PADGETT. I do not think any member of the committee received a cable from the President. I was going to state this, however, to the House. During the debate in the committee in the hearing, and so forth, there was a diversity of opinion as to the propriety or the need of going ahead with the building program at this time pending the development of the league of nations, the question of disarmament, and what progress had been made, and so forth. That was in the hearing, and I had talked also with the Secretary of the Navy and told him of these various contentions and arguments in the House and in the committee with the membership of the House, and the Secretary of the Navy cabled the President and told him of this situation and asked him if anything had happened over there or if there had been any development—I am giving it in substance—that would change his recommendation as to the three-year program, and the President cabled back in substance—I do not give the words—that he had not changed his mind, that he still insisted and desired very earnestly the three-year program.

Mr. GILLET. I wondered if the telegram—I do not know whether the gentleman will tell us or not—contained any facts upon which the committee could base its own judgment or whether it was simply an expression of opinion like the similar message on the Panama Canal tolls.

Mr. PADGETT. As I stated, the President stated in substance—I do not give his words—that nothing had occurred over there to change his recommendation for the three-year program and insisted very earnestly that Congress should carry out the three-year program. He stated, however, that if there are developments in the way of tribunals, and so forth, for disarmament and a league of nations, or along that line, that he would be willing that a proviso should be inserted to allow him to discontinue or stop the building program if an agreement was reached internationally.

Mr. GILLET. And would the gentleman be willing to state whether the alleged quotation in the Washington Post of this morning, "that it would interfere with my negotiations"—

SEVERAL MEMBERS. "Fatal."

Mr. GILLET. "Be fatal to my negotiations"—whether that was accurate or not?

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir; that was not accurate.

Mr. GILLET. The gentleman does not feel at liberty to give us the full cablegram, so that the House will have the same information which the committee had on which to base its decision?

Mr. PADGETT. I would not; no, sir; but I want to state that the words which were quoted in the Post this morning were not correct as they were there quoted.

Mr. BUTLER. Will the gentleman permit me to ask him a question?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir; I do not want to give the words—

Mr. BUTLER. I am not asking the gentleman to disclose what the President of the United States cabled, and until this minute I never have admitted to those who have spoken to me that the President even did cable; nevertheless, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs having said he did cable to America something concerning this building program, I would like to ask the chairman of the committee whether or not those words which were put to the chairman by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GILLET] concerning the effect of the refusal to adopt this program pending negotiations were in substance correct?

Mr. PADGETT. I stated, and I will state now, I will not give the words—

Mr. BUTLER. I am not asking the gentleman to do that.

Mr. PADGETT. But the President was very earnest and very insistent that the three-year program should be carried out.

Mr. BUTLER. Nevertheless, I do not want to stand here, like a yip; I do not want to be considered in the House a sort of a yip, turning in and out, whichever way the wind blows; but the chairman will agree with me in this, that I was opposed to this program—

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. That something was said to me that altered my opinion as to what I should do, and I made the statement to the chairman and members of the committee that I could not, from what was said to me, assume the responsibility of voting against this program, and nothing the chairman said now would change my opinion.

Mr. PADGETT. I want to say, the President was very earnest and very insistent—

Mr. BUTLER. He was.

Mr. PADGETT. That this program should continue. I think I can say that much to the House.

Mr. ROGERS. If the gentleman will yield, did the President say in substance that the failure of the program would be "fatal to my negotiations"? Did he use the word "fatal"?

Mr. PADGETT. The gentleman must excuse me from answering as to the words that were or were not in the President's cablegram. I have stated the substance, that the President was insistent and very earnest that the three-year program should go ahead, and I will not either affirm or deny any word that was used in that telegram.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, does not the gentleman think—does the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. Does not the gentleman think that at a critical time like this the American Congress should be furnished with all the information which the Committee on Naval Affairs has in reference to a policy vitally concerning the American people in order to enable it to make up its mind? [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. All I can say is that the critical time is not limited to here; it is over there also. And it would not be proper, I will say to the gentleman, for me to give the words that were used. If the President wants to give them, all right. I have told the substance. I have told you he was earnest, he was insistent; but I will not give the words either that he did or did not use.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. I want to know, if the chairman will tell me, if this telegraphic communication did not come to the Secretary of the Navy?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Was that communication then given to your committee?

Mr. PADGETT. It was given to me confidentially, and I told the Secretary of the Navy that what he had given to me in confidence I felt I ought to give to the members of the committee, and I did so, in the same confidence that it was given to me, so far as the language was concerned.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Is it not true that the information that you conveyed to the members of your Naval Affairs Committee is the one reason that this report here is unanimous?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. And the information you gave them influenced them in voting for this program?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir; some of them.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. This information you say you can not give to the House?

Mr. PADGETT. I can not do it, because it involves more than our own domestic policy.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Do you not think, in view of the situation, in view of the fact that this committee has been influenced to do this by information, that we who vote for this appropriation ought to know something about it?

Mr. PADGETT. I have stated very fully and practically what the wish and insistence was, but I can not give you the language, because it would not be proper that it should be given.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I was going to revert to what is to me a rather pertinent question by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROGERS]. I recall that he is a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, and I would like to ask him whether or not, in presenting matters to the House, all questions of diplomacy that are discussed in his committee or all information had in his committee is presented to the House?

Mr. ROGERS. I am not aware, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the committee has ever declined to submit to the House fundamental information upon a great policy for which the Congress was asked to appropriate.

Mr. PADGETT. I am giving the fundamental information here very fully and very freely.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas and Mr. MANN rose.

Mr. PADGETT. I first yield to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. CAMPBELL].

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. I am sure that during the early part of the discussion here this morning Members were thinking of something besides what was being talked about. They were thinking about this thing. Nothing of greater importance has occurred during my legislative experience in this House. Dispatches from Paris indicate that much progress has been made toward the establishment of the league of nations. On yesterday it was announced from Paris that a progressive disarmament program had been agreed upon. It is announced this morning that secret treaties are to be denounced and are now

being exposed. It does not seem to me conceivable that the man who is leading the program for settling international differences without resort to arms, who is leading in a program of a progressive disarmament, and who has insisted upon open diplomacy would secretly ask the Committee on Naval Affairs to insist upon a naval program that the Congress and the country could not understand or know about. Now, are the contents of the cablegram a statement of facts or a statement of the position or opinion of the President?

Mr. PADGETT. I stated to the gentleman and to the House that these matters were submitted to the President as to the league of nations and the disarmament question and postponing the authorization of the building program, and the President insists that we shall go ahead with the building program—the three-year program.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. While he in Paris is leading for a program of progressive disarmament?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir. That is what he is doing.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Urging upon the peace conference disarmament and upon the Congress of the United States an unusual program of increasing its Naval Establishment.

Mr. PADGETT. An authorization, coupled with a provision that it may stop if a tribunal or tribunals are established that will make it unnecessary to carry on the program.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. What will the gentleman from Tennessee be willing to state to the House with respect to the intent of the President's cablegram? Is it the intention that the Congress, notwithstanding the program of disarmament throughout the world, should give this authorization for an increased Naval Establishment for the purpose of enabling the President to hold that over those with whom he is now in consultation? Is it a threat?

Mr. PADGETT. There was no expression or indication of any such purpose in his cablegram. I will answer that far.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Does the gentleman from Tennessee have in mind what the real purpose of the President was in sending this cablegram?

Mr. PADGETT. I think the gentleman can surmise that as well as I can. He sent an answer to a cablegram—

Mr. MANN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I understood the gentleman to say that the cablegram from the President had an effect in the committee on the naval program.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANN. Now, while I appreciate the gentleman's position, and I do not think he would be justified in making public a cablegram which was handed to him confidentially, does not the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee believe that if a cablegram comes from the President which not only is designed to but does affect the judgment of the Committee on Naval Affairs that that information ought to be furnished to the House, so that Members of the House will be able to determine their attitude?

And if it was necessary to get a cablegram from the President to have this bill reported out of the Committee on Naval Affairs, should not the Secretary of the Navy make public to the House the contents of the cablegram in order to get the bill passed through the House? [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir. I think when I told the House that the President had these matters submitted to him and explained what was submitted, and he stated that he still insisted upon his recommendation and that he had not changed his mind as to the necessity and the desirability of the three-year program, and did not want it postponed, but wanted it carried out, I have told the House all that it could expect us to tell and not quote the words of the President.

Mr. MANN. Well, I take it that the gentleman would not be warranted in revealing the telegram to the House, but perhaps he would be warranted in saying whether the report in the Washington Post this morning, which states that the failure to carry out this naval program would be fatal to the desires of the President at the peace table, is correct or not.

Mr. PADGETT. Well, the President did not say a word about the peace table. [Laughter.]

Mr. MANN. No; nor the purposes of the President abroad. The language quoted in the Washington Post is that—

Failure to report favorably upon the huge naval building program would be "fatal to my negotiations."

Now, I do not desire to embarrass the gentleman. I wish somebody would tell us whether that, or substantially that, information was furnished to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Mr. PADGETT. I stated that those words were not used as that quotation has it; all of those words.

Mr. MANN. I do not wish to embarrass the gentleman, but was it that or substantially that? Here is what I want to get at and what the country wants to know: Whether the Congress is asked in the blind, without information, without knowledge, without laying the cards on the table, as has been frequently suggested by the President, to vote an immense naval program, when the information which would influence Congress is right here in Washington and the administration refuses to take Congress into its confidence and tell it what the information is?

Mr. PADGETT. I have told the House fully.

Mr. MANN. I think the gentleman has been very courteous to the House as to what he has told us, but the gentleman is not the administration. What we want to know is whether the administration up here will give us the information that is furnished to the Committee on Naval Affairs? [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. I have stated to the House the insistence and the recommendation of the President, and that he renews his recommendation that was made to the Congress, and insists that the Congress shall carry out that recommendation and not postpone it. Now, I think I have dealt fully and freely and frankly with the House.

Mr. DYER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. DYER. Will the gentleman state, if he can and thinks it proper, whether he was told by the Secretary of the Navy that the contents of this cablegram could not be given to the House?

Mr. PADGETT. It was given to me confidentially.

Mr. DYER. The Secretary of the Navy is the one who is refusing the information to the House?

Mr. PADGETT. No. I am the one that is refusing it.

Mr. DYER. Well, the gentleman was told by the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Navy told him in effect, that it was confidential and should not be given to the House?

Mr. PADGETT. No. The Secretary of the Navy sent it to me confidentially, and I gave it to the committee confidentially—the wording. I have given to the House the insistence and the recommendation of the President, but I decline to give the words, to either affirm or deny the words that were used.

Mr. DYER. If the gentleman were permitted by the Secretary of the Navy, would he do so?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not think it would be proper to publish it.

Mr. HUSTED. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. HUSTED. Will the gentleman state whether the cablegram that the President sent contained the facts upon which the President based his insistence and recommendation?

Mr. PADGETT. It did not.

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SNYDER. Will the gentleman answer one short question?

Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. Respecting the reluctance of the gentleman to make a direct statement, will the gentleman state to the House why it was that the President did not send a message directly to the Congress upon this momentous issue, as provided by the Constitution, instead of sending it around by the way of the Horn, through the Naval Committee, which, I understand, is not the usual means of making communications by the Chief Executive of the United States to the Congress of the United States?

Mr. PADGETT. I will answer the gentleman's question. The President did submit it to the Congress in a constitutional way, and I will read it:

I take it for granted that the Congress will carry out the naval program which was undertaken before we entered the war. The Secretary of the Navy has submitted to your committee for authorization that part of the program which covers the building plans for the next three years. These plans have been prepared along the lines and in accordance with the policy which the Congress established, not under the exceptional conditions of the war, but with the intention of adhering to a definite method of development for the Navy. I earnestly recommend the uninterrupted pursuit of that policy. It would clearly be unwise for us to attempt to adjust our programs to a future world policy as yet undetermined.

Mr. SLOAN. What about?

Mr. PADGETT. That was the President's recommendation to Congress, and he adheres now to that recommendation.

Mr. SLOAN. But not through a message. It was his farewell address.

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. FREAR. I believe that the House is more impressed with the fact that the members of this committee were suddenly determined in their action to support a bill when first they refused, and that is the important proposition that the House would like to have light on. For that reason I ask the gentleman if he will yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER], who tells us that suddenly in committee his mind was changed on the bill? He can give us light if he is permitted to do so.

Mr. PADGETT. There were some Members who changed their opinion and others who did not.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I personally, of course, shall respect the confidence reposed in me by the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, but I want to ask the gentleman this question—and this has nothing to do with what the gentleman conceives it to be his duty to inform the House, or how far he may feel justified in informing the House. But I want to read from the President's last message to Congress, just before going abroad—

Mr. JOHNSON of Washington. His farewell address.

Mr. LONGWORTH. In which he used this language, which undoubtedly the gentleman heard:

I shall be in close touch with you and with affairs on this side of the water, and you will know all that I do.

Under those circumstances—

Mr. McCORMICK. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee has the floor.

Mr. PADGETT. I have yielded to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I want to ask the gentleman if under those circumstances he does not think that some official in the executive branch of the administration ought to let us know of this information from the other side?

Mr. PADGETT. I have told the gentleman the substance of the President's cablegram. I did not give the words. I have told the House, though, fully and freely, what the substance was, and that substance was that he adheres to this recommendation and wants it carried out and not postponed.

Mr. LONGWORTH. There are a few Members of the House who do know the contents of this cablegram?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Does not the gentleman think, in view of the President's assurance, given to this House on the eve of his departure for Europe, that at all times we would know all that he does, that in asking for an appropriation of this size the membership of the House are entitled to the information?

Mr. SNYDER and Mr. McCORMICK rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. PADGETT. I will yield to the gentleman from New York first, and then to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. SNYDER. In making up my mind on this proposition I would like to know if the gentleman can say without breach of confidence whether or not the complete cablegram from the President was read to the Committee on Naval Affairs?

Mr. PADGETT. It was.

Mr. McCORMICK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. McCORMICK. I want to ask the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LONGWORTH] if he felt that the seizure of the cables by the Postmaster General was not an extenuating circumstance in the inhibition of news from the President in Europe?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I wish the gentleman would ask that question of some member of the Committee on Naval Affairs rather than of me.

Mr. HARDY. In withholding the wording of that cablegram, is the chairman of the committee now withholding the knowledge of any fact from Congress?

Mr. PADGETT. I am not.

Mr. HARDY. So that the House has the information which the President intended to convey to us.

Mr. PADGETT. Now I yield the floor, and will ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] to use some of his time.

Mr. TEMPLE. Will the gentleman from Tennessee yield for one question before he yields the floor?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE. Does the gentleman know whether the building program is intended in any way to influence the President's negotiations?

Mr. PADGETT. I am not prepared to answer that question.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I intend in a few minutes to yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY] to make

a speech on this bill; but before he begins his speech, I think I owe something to myself and to my good friend from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR]. He has asked me to state what influenced my mind at the last minute when this naval program was under consideration in the committee room. My friend from New Jersey [Mr. BROWNING] has asked me to state what influenced his mind. The same statement that moved him moved me, but that statement I will never disclose to anybody. I do not think it is fair to the President of the United States to disclose it. [Applause.] I do not think it is fair to make it public at this time lest it might in some way embarrass the President of the United States. Now, I want, as an American citizen, to have it understood that during these negotiations that are now occurring abroad, and recollecting the great responsibility we placed upon the President of the United States—or at least he has assumed it—

Mr. McCORMICK. That is a very valuable correction. To withhold individual action which might embarrass him.

Mr. BUTLER. Until the last minute I had resolved that I would not vote for this building program. Although our discussions had been absolutely agreeable, yet nevertheless they were sometimes carried on with considerable heat over this proposed building program. If you will permit me to say it, I became embarrassed lest I might be wrong. Gentlemen on that committee were able to judge of the right thing to do as well as I, and therefore I was in doubt whether I was right or not. Yet I would not have voted for it if I had not been influenced by what the President of the United States said to us through the Secretary of the Navy in very great confidence.

Mr. CARTER of Oklahoma. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. CARTER of Oklahoma. The gentleman says he does not think this would be fair to the President.

Mr. BUTLER. Not when he said it to us in confidence.

Mr. CARTER of Oklahoma. Does the gentleman think it would be fair to the country?

Mr. BUTLER. I believe that before the Congress of the United States ought to impose this great burden upon the people it ought to know the reason why. [Applause.] But remember this, that it was not what was said by the President of the United States to us at the last minute that influenced the great majority of this committee. Mr. BROWNING and I stood almost alone in our opposition to this proposed plan. Some of the Democrats, perhaps, were opposed to it, but I shall not speak for them. But I want the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. CARTER] to understand that what the President said in this cablegram did not influence the great majority of that committee, in my judgment. I despise mysteries—

Mr. TOWNER and Mr. BRITTEN rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield, and if so, to whom?

Mr. BUTLER. I think the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. TOWNER] rose first.

Mr. TOWNER. Of course the members of the committee all knew what the desire of the President was, but, as I understand it, in this cablegram the President gave to the committee in confidence some confidential reasons for his advice; so that we are not ignorant of the desire of the President, but we are ignorant of the reasons which he assigned for his wish being carried out, and the committee had disclosed to them the reasons in order to influence their action; but the President was unwilling, or the Secretary of the Navy was unwilling, that those reasons should be given to the House, although the House would be compelled to act upon the bill. I ask the gentleman if that is a correct statement?

Mr. BUTLER. If I understand the gentleman's statement—and I hesitate to speak, lest I may say too much—I do not think there was any reason given in the message, as I recollect it. There was a statement made about this program, but I can not permit you to take from me that which was given to me in great confidence. Mr. Chairman, I despise the mystery which seems to surround this paragraph of the bill. I despise mystery and all things connected with it. I was raised with a class of people who gave us reasons why we should do certain things and leave others undone. But while these negotiations are pending in Europe, while this responsibility is assumed by the President and those who are with him, I shall not do anything to embarrass him or them in any way if I know it. [Applause.] At the same time I anxiously wait for the period to come when I, as a free and independent man, can do as I please without fear of hurting a great cause over which I have no control.

Mr. McCORMICK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. McCORMICK. The gentleman means that it is now impossible to achieve "open covenants of peace openly arrived at"? Let us speak the facts.

Mr. BUTLER. I do not know anything about that. [Laughter.]

Mr. McCORMICK. I merely asked the gentleman if he does not mean to suggest that point No. 1 of the 14 points has so shrunk, so dwindled, so shriveled, so faded, and become so exiguous that it has come to be of no consequence? [Laughter.]

Mr. BRITTEN. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. BUTLER. I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BRITTEN. We as members of the committee and of the House can realize that the President is confronted with great responsibilities, and if the passage of the \$700,000,000 naval bill will support the American contention in Europe, is it not a good thing to pass it?

Mr. JOHNSON of Washington. Then why not suspend the rules and pass it?

Mr. BRITTEN. I am in favor of suspending the rules and passing it.

Mr. McCORMICK. Is the gentleman sure that this is the American contention?

Mr. BRITTEN. I am.

Mr. BUTLER. Did the gentleman from Illinois ask me a question?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes. Why not pass this bill if it will strengthen the American contention in Europe?

Mr. BAER. How does the gentleman know it will?

Mr. BUTLER. I want to answer my colleague—and he knows how I feel about this—that the adoption of this item in this bill will not help the situation in Europe one bit. [Applause.]

Mr. BRITTEN. That is not the way the President feels about it.

Mr. BUTLER. I fear to vote against it for fear that it might.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. BUTLER. I will.

Mr. SLAYDEN. It appears that a communication was made by the President which has reached some Members of Congress, which has influenced their action, and possibly they are entirely right; but other Members of Congress, acting in the dark, can not avoid having some doubt as to the propriety of their conduct. Now, I would like to ask why it is not possible to have an executive session of Congress or of the House, and communicate to it matters of sufficient importance to control their votes?

Mr. BUTLER. In answer to the gentleman's question, we had an executive session in the Committee on Naval Affairs, in which I think there were 18 or 20 members present. I only speak for myself—I did not leak information, but some one did. [Laughter.]

Mr. SLAYDEN. I have more confidence in my fellow Members than that.

Mr. MANN. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania allow me?

Mr. BUTLER. Certainly.

Mr. MANN. I want to remind gentlemen of Rule XXIX of the House:

Whenever confidential communications are received from the President of the United States, or whenever the Speaker or any Member shall inform the House that he has communications which he believes ought to be kept secret for the present, the House shall be cleared of all persons except the Members and officers thereof, and so continue during the reading of such communications, the debates and proceedings thereon, unless otherwise ordered by the House.

There is always a method provided.

Mr. FREAR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. FREAR. The gentleman from Pennsylvania states to us that he has voted and stood for this bill, but that if the bill is passed, in his judgment it will not affect any European situation. Will the gentleman advise the House whether or not he wishes the House to stand with him on his judgment or on his vote?

Mr. BUTLER. I can not advise the House. I do not ask the House to vote for this paragraph because of anything I have said. That is for the judgment of the House. I am thinking about myself only. I regret very greatly that I am unable to tell the gentleman of this committee the reason that moved me to vote for it.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. I want to ask the gentleman if he does not believe that every one of the gallery gods up there knows every word of this telegram?

Mr. BUTLER. If the members of the gallery know it, we will know it to-morrow morning. [Laughter.]

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Was the gentleman a Member of Congress at the time the President sent his message on the Panama Canal tolls?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes; and I voted against the repeal.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Is it not the same situation, the same mystery?

Mr. BUTLER. The same sort of injunction put on it; but, nevertheless, I am going to say to the gentleman that that only concerned dollars and cents, and this concerns more than that.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Does the gentleman recall the mystery surrounding the \$640,000,000 voted for aviation?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes; I do, my friend.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The gentleman will remember that we took at its word the committee that told us not to inquire too much, although it was afterwards shown by a Senate committee that we had no combat planes in France. May I ask the gentleman this: Since he has stated to the committee that the passage of this bill would probably not affect the situation in Europe, does he think it would be for the interests of the United States?

Mr. BUTLER. Aside from any international complications?

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. None whatever. I would not vote for it. And why? Let me answer the gentleman's question. I believe this program is never to be built, and I do not believe in fooling the people in any way. [Applause.] I do not believe these ships will be built. I can see no real reason, so far as it concerns America alone, for providing a building program that can not be constructed for several years to come, and I can see no real reason, as I have stated to my friends on the committee, for imposing this great burden upon the people. We are a great big band of brethren, working out these problems as best we can. They perhaps took the position that I did, or at least were willing to agree with me, those who thought with me in putting into the bill a condition that it should not be begun for a year from this time.

Mr. BROWNING. It will take 10 years to build it.

Mr. BUTLER. My friend here says that it will take 10 years to complete it. Nevertheless the whole subject will come back to the American Congress before a dollar can be used toward its commencement.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I have always stood with the gentleman for a larger Navy. I think I have supported him every time he took his stand upon that question in the House. I am for that kind of a Navy that will guard the interests of the United States against any other country on earth. Now, I want to ask the gentleman—

Mr. BUTLER. Wait a minute; let me say something right there. I want to know what the situation is that confronts this country after the peace council in Europe is done, and then I am willing to go as far as anybody else, and perhaps further than most of the Members of this House, toward providing armaments at sea. Nobody can say of me that I have been holding back upon naval construction. We have a Navy now in my judgment at this time such as is necessary for all purposes—I mean, when we complete the 1916 program.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Thus far it appears that a vote against this bill would be a vote to embarrass the President of the United States, whose message to Congress has not been read?

Mr. BUTLER. Do not ask me; I do not know.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. That is the first proposition.

Mr. BUTLER. I have tried to say to my friend, with all the rest of the gentlemen here, as near as I could, without disclosing what I feel I should not tell, the reason why I voted for this. I want to see the peace negotiations in Europe finished. I do not want to do or say anything that will embarrass our people in their attempt to make a peace that will settle down on this world forever. That is what I am after, and nothing else.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The gentleman wants to help us to vote right, especially those who have supported him heretofore?

Mr. BUTLER. Do not put it in that way.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I assume the gentleman is going to vote for the bill?

Mr. BUTLER. Oh, I suppose I shall vote for that paragraph in the bill. There are very many things in the bill that I think are of such importance that I propose to express my views on some of the paragraphs. I think, perhaps, there is more money appropriated than we should appropriate. I am now talking about this one paragraph which the gentleman has in mind. Unless something should happen between now and next Saturday, something told to me that will induce me to change my mind, I shall vote for it. I am not asking anyone else to do it.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I want to be with the gentleman on that proposition. I wanted to know that I was voting in the interest of the United States. I assume the gentleman believes that way about it.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, before my colleague from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY] proceeds, will he permit me to yield for a moment to my colleague from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOCHT], who desires to have a letter read?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Certainly.

Mr. BUTLER. I yield now for a moment to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOCHT].

Mr. FOCHT. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to discuss this question after what has been said here this morning. It is self-evident that with the keenness and alertness and the vision of the newspapers and the American people we will know all about what was in that telegram at least before the House votes on the question.

At some future time I shall have something to say about House bill 13440, but for the present will be content to have read by the Clerk a letter which I have received from a former Congressman, Hon. J. D. Hicks, now department commander of the Grand Army of the Republic of Pennsylvania. I send the letter to the desk and ask that it be read in my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC,
Altoona, Pa., January 28, 1919.

Hon. B. K. FOCHT.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN AND FRIEND: On behalf of the Department of Pennsylvania, Grand Army of the Republic, I most earnestly request that you protest against the bill recently introduced in Congress by Congressman GANDY, of South Dakota, providing for the transfer of the Battle Mountain Home at Hot Springs, S. Dak., to the War Department for the use of the hospital for the soldiers of the present war, which bill provides for the transfer of the Civil and Spanish War veterans to other homes, principally to the home at Danville, Ill. While we do not object to the use of the home at Battle Mountain for the soldiers of the world war, we do object to the removal of the veterans of the Civil and Spanish Wars to other homes, for the reason that the sanitarium at Battle Mountain is specially equipped for the treatment of all kinds of diseases to which aged soldiers are subject; and if they are removed to Danville, Ill., or to other homes, our comrades of the Civil War would be deprived of this treatment.

The commander in chief of the Grand Army of the Republic has already protested against the proposed action, and you will earn the everlasting gratitude of the members of the Grand Army of the Republic of Pennsylvania by using your best efforts against the passage of Congressman GANDY'S bill.

I have the honor to be, sincerely, yours,

J. D. HICKS.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I now yield one hour to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY]. [Applause.]

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the House, reverting just for a moment to the discussion which has been going on, for myself I desire to say that I made up my mind some little time ago to support this proposition for an additional building program. Some gentlemen awhile ago seemed to think that such a program would be inconsistent with the declared policy of Congress and the country, looking to a reduction of armaments, but I think not. The President of the United States and his associates are working now to secure a reduction of armament. We place in this bill a proviso that the ships authorized herein shall not be started before the 1st of February, 1920, and we have repealed a provision of legislation requiring the Secretary of the Navy to start all ships heretofore authorized before the 1st of July next.

The obvious purpose of all that is to give the United States, through its official representatives abroad, whoever they happen for the instant to be, it does not matter, an opportunity to work out a proper reduction of armament that all the world hopes will be accomplished. Now, if it is going to help the commissioners of other nations and our own to bring about a reduction of armament to know what the policy of America would be in the event that a reduction of armament is not to be effected, then the world is entitled to know in advance what that policy is to be, and that is why, not because the President advised it or because any other person advised it, that it has appealed to me as being a sound and proper course for the American people to pursue. And with me it is no bluff, either. I want the load that is on the back of the world for armament to be lifted. Nobody wants it any more than I, but if the world decides that that load is not to be lifted and that each nation must look out for itself, then, as for myself, I do not propose to have our country ever caught again in a position where it must depend for its protection upon the good offices of a friendly power. [Applause.]

Mr. FARR. And a majority of the committee.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Well, I speak only for myself. Now, it was with considerable difficulty that we made this bill, because the first estimates which came to the committee were

based on war conditions, and nobody could tell how much money would be required, and if the war had continued we would have voted all that the executive branch of the Government thought it needed to carry on the war, just as we did during the days of the war. So they asked for \$2,640,000,000, and the armistice came, and they knew at once, of course, they would not need so much money. They did not know exactly how much they would need.

Bureau chiefs could not tell, but they made as good an estimate as they could, and the sum total of what they asked was reduced to \$1,400,000,000. Then the hearings were begun and bureau chiefs came before the committee and more information began to come through as to what would be required during this demobilization period, and after hearings were closed the Secretary reduced the estimate to \$975,000,000, and then the committee, in view of all we had learned and from subsequent information which came through, exercising its best judgment, decided that \$746,000,000 was sufficient to take care of the extra expenses incidental to the demobilization and at the same time take care of the regular Naval Establishment. So this bill carries \$746,000,000. I have tried to work out what I thought might be in the minds of a good many Members of the House as to what part of this \$746,000,000 may be temporary in its character and which would not recur in future appropriations. Now, the bill carries \$179,000,000 increase for the Navy. That does not include anything for the new ships herein authorized.

Mr. EAGLE. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. In just a moment; let me finish what I am saying about that part of the appropriation which is due to temporary conditions. Now, with that taken out, that leaves \$567,000,000 for the maintenance of the Navy, temporary and permanent. Now, we fixed the enlisted personnel of the Regular Navy just as it was before, 143,000 men. We allowed 82,000 men, what the Navy Department and the Army thought would be necessary to man the ships carrying food to our soldiers as long as they are in Europe and to carry troops back, and provided that as fast as that service ended men automatically would be mustered out of the service. So these 82,000 men, or an equal number of men, will drop out of the Navy as fast as the temporary service in which they are engaged is ended. Now, as somebody has said, I think the chairman, we have 25,000 marines in France. The whole strength of the Marine Corps when this temporary period passes by is only about 17,000 men, so that unless we provide for a temporary increase of the Marine Corps we would have no marines in the United States at all after July 1 next. Our whole Marine Corps, and more, too, would be in France, and, of course, we could not think of calling marines home ahead of the soldiers with whom they are serving abroad. So we provided that while the marines are in France there is to be a temporary increase of the Marine Corps of 25,000 men, and as fast as they are brought home they or an equal number are to be demobilized and mustered out of the service.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Will the gentleman yield for an inquiry?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I do.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. This bill, of course, takes effect after the 30th of June next. Before any provision of this character could be made operative or put into operation thereafter probably several more months would transpire. Has the gentleman information that it would be 8 or 10 months or a year before the marines would be brought back from France?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will say to the gentleman that the marines are scattered all through France, and there are about 10,000 of them at Coblenz, in Germany, and I assume that they are the regular marines, and the chances are they may stay longer than anybody else.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Might I submit just this observation? Of course, at the time that the marines were sent to France everybody applauded; it was a splendid and proper thing to do, but the war is over and land operations on a great scale are ended. Having in mind the peculiar work the marines are designed to perform, would it not be wiser if we took every one out of France immediately and utilized them in Guam, Porto Rico, China, Hawaii, South America, Central America, and the West Indies—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will say that the idea—

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Why should not that be done?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. That the idea which the gentleman has expressed entered my mind, too.

But the Marine Corps officials thought that it would demoralize the Marine Corps to do that; that it would destroy the morale if the Government should say that these boys who

are now over there as a part of the Army should be picked out, one by one, simply because they are marines, and brought home ahead of the soldiers who are performing a similar service abroad. And if by any chance it did reflect upon the Marine Corps, how unfair such action would be, in view of the magnificent service that they rendered their country upon the battle fields of Europe. And so, for myself, I abandoned the idea and said, "All right; let the marines come home just as the Army comes home and whenever the Army sees fit to bring them."

Now, the 82,000 men on the ships necessary to take the food over and bring the men back, plus the 25,000 extra men in the Marine Corps, makes a total of 107,000 extra temporary men carried in this bill out of a total of 225,000 men. I have tried to estimate how much these extra 107,000 men will add to this bill, and as near as one could get at it it probably would be in the neighborhood of \$100,000,000; possibly more. So I have, therefore, pointed out in the item of men alone a temporary situation which, when it ends, will result in a reduction of \$100,000,000 per year. You can go through the bill all the way and find items that run into the millions and which are evidently of a temporary character or greatly increased on account of this temporary condition. For example, there is one provision appropriating \$20,000,000 to put back in the same condition in which we took them the ships, the yachts, and vessels of all sorts that were turned over to the Government when the war broke out and which we contracted to turn back in the same condition in which they were received, or substantially so; and the bill carries an item of \$20,000,000 for this purpose, purely temporary, and which will not appear in future bills.

Mr. EAGLE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. EAGLE. The gentleman was speaking of the gross item of \$740,000,000 carried in the bill, and in that connection was speaking of a considerable proportion of it being for an item which he designated as "demobilization."

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. EAGLE. I wanted to ask him whether he means the demobilization of the naval forces down to a peace basis or the expense which the Naval Establishment incurred in the transport of troops, with reference to the demobilization of the Army?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The gentleman has stated it very much more accurately than I did.

Now, I have estimated there are probably in the neighborhood of \$200,000,000 in this bill that can be ascribed almost wholly to a temporary situation.

Here is one item that runs into a good many millions of dollars. We have placed guns on all the merchant ships that were in trans-Atlantic service, running into the thousands. Those guns have all to be taken off those ships, have to be taken to the navy yards and repaired and stored, and it involves an expenditure of a good many million dollars to preserve, repair, and store these guns carried on ships in the overseas service. And so I think I am conservative in saying that at least \$200,000,000 of this bill is of a temporary character, and that, taking the increase of the Navy out would reduce the bill for maintenance and operation of the regular Naval Establishment to \$367,000,000. And I agree with the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] that this amount is too large. But when you do not know where to cut, it is a very difficult thing to apply the knife with reason.

Mr. BUTLER. How can we do any better?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I do not think we can.

Mr. BUTLER. At this time.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I think the House will appreciate that when we cut the estimates from \$2,640,000,000 to \$746,000,000 we have applied the knife pretty generously, if not always wisely.

Mr. IGOE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. IGOE. It is very noticeable in the Army demobilization work that a great many men are being retained in the military service doing work which should be turned over to civilians. I do not know what the situation might be on shore in the Navy. I would like to ask the gentleman whether the committee has gone into that matter, and whether effort has been made to turn over to civilians work which is now done by enlisted men?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. No. I will say to the gentleman from Missouri that we did not take up that phase of it. There are a good many things that the committee could well busy itself with no doubt that would result in large savings and great convenience to the country now that hostilities have actually suspended.

Mr. IGOE. I do not know that it would be a saving, but it would be a convenience.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. It would be a convenience.

Mr. BRITTEN. It is well known that in time of peace as well as in time of war that the enlisted personnel of the Marine Corps, as well as of the Navy, is utilized at naval stations and at naval yards for doing a large portion of the work that might be done by civilians, and might be done very economically.

Mr. IGOE. Not to such extent as it has been done during the war. What I was talking about was taking care of men who were relieved from the service. I know that thousands and thousands of men in the Army who are drawing wages at military posts, but in the end the expense would be as much.

Mr. BRITTEN. Probably greater; but that condition does not occur in the Army.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Referring to the naval schools at Newport and the Great Lakes Station, I assume they had in those a great many—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. They had 50,000 at the Great Lakes Station at one time a few months ago.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Many of them were being trained, as I understand, to run merchant ships. I would like to inquire what the program is in that regard now. Is the Navy assuming to provide and train any men at all for the merchant ships, for the Shipping Board?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. No; except as they are needed for the Army in the transport and overseas service.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I did not refer to the transports. I referred to merchant ships.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The policy with respect to the Navy is purely temporary. It is not looking to the employment of ships for commercial purposes at all. That is a matter that will have to be thoroughly thrashed out by Congress and a policy formulated. But during this period, when we have to carry supplies to the troops abroad and carry the troops home, it is apparent, I think, that the proper thing for the Navy to do is to man transports and other ships needed by the Army as long as the emergency lasts, and we have put it in the bill that as soon as this work ceases these men will be mustered out of the service.

Mr. BRITTEN. In the last 10 days I understand 450,000 tons of German shipping were turned over to the Navy by the Shipping Board?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes; for that purpose. As to what will ultimately be done with ships that come from any source, whether we build them or get them from Germany or from any other source, that, of course, will be a matter that will be handled by the Committee on the Merchant Marine and brought here through that committee.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I do not want to trespass unduly upon the gentleman's time, but at the beginning of the war we had transports operated by the Quartermaster's Department of the Army and transports operated by the Navy. Can the gentleman inform us now what the situation is? Does the Navy handle all the transports crossing the ocean?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. All overseas service is under the Navy.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. And no transports are being operated to France by the Army?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. None by the Army.

Mr. AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. AUSTIN. Is there a provision in this bill for the payment of a bonus to men in the Navy when they are discharged, as in the Army?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. No.

Mr. AUSTIN. I understood from the press that the British Government is providing for a bonus for the naval forces. Is any such increase provided here for the Navy?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The temporary increase in the pay of the Navy is continued and is made permanent by a provision in the bill.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Did the gentleman make the remark that all overseas service of our Government was under the control of the Navy?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. So far as I know; yes.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. I want to correct the gentleman in that. I think there is a considerable overseas service being done by private companies.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Not for the Army.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Yes; for the Army. Let me continue this inquiry that I was making. I do not know that I understand exactly what the gentleman means, but during this war the French line, for instance, has been running steamers regularly and has been transporting troops for our Government, and has been transporting munitions. I know that from my own personal knowledge. That is being done by private contract, is it not, in some cases with private ship lines?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes; that is true also with regard to British merchant ships that are carrying troops and supplies. I do not know of any American private lines that are carrying troops or supplies for the Army.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Two or three foreign private lines have been doing it for some time, and are doing it now.

Mr. LITTLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes; but I do not want to be diverted from the thing I have in mind. I was talking about the expense of the Navy, and I hope the gentleman's question is directed to that point.

Mr. LITTLE. Yes; but if this question is not in accordance with the gentleman's argument I can wait until we reach that point. I understand there are 14 submarines provided for in addition to cruisers and battleships. Has the gentleman any information as to the relative fighting results achieved by submarines and battleships?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will come to that later.

Mr. LITTLE. Very well.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman suffer an interruption?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. I was very much interested in the statement the gentleman made as to the items carried in this bill which could be considered as temporary items of expense.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. And which could be omitted from future bills. Can the gentleman give us a brief statement of the items to which he refers when he states that there can probably be omitted from future bills an amount approximating \$300,000,000?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. \$200,000,000.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. Give the general headings.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I think I can do that. But first let me say that I stated that if the temporary items could be sifted out, in my judgment the bill would stand at about \$367,000,000, and I thought that that was high. I judge from the question of the gentleman from Alabama, though perhaps I am mistaken, that he thinks otherwise. But I checked it up in this way: For 15 years prior to the war the expense of operation and maintenance of the Navy afloat and ashore ran rather uniformly at about 25 per cent of the investment in ships; that ratio is so well fixed that it is of considerable value in checking up this appropriation bill. I have calculated, with the assistance of the department, that the total investment in the fleet for the period covered by this bill to June 30, 1920, will be \$1,263,000,000, and one-fourth of that sum would be \$315,000,000, and I have allowed here \$367,000,000 as the amount carried in the bill for the permanent establishment. And so, based upon past experience, it would seem as though we have allowed liberally in this bill.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman suffer another interruption?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. The gentleman and I are in full accord as to the necessity of economizing, and yet it would be a mistake now to let the House feel that by adequately providing in the next bill for the Navy we could perhaps reduce the amount now appropriated by some \$375,000,000, because—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I was trying, if the gentleman will excuse me, to point out that not more than \$367,000,000 of what we are now appropriating is for the permanent Navy, exclusive of the building program.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. Here are items that the gentleman, perhaps, fails to take into account, and I do not mention them for the purpose of making the bill unpopular, because we must, until some international agreement as to limitation of armament is made, maintain a strong and efficient Navy, and must provide the money for that purpose, whether large or small. But on the authorized building program there will remain unappropriated, after the amounts carried in this bill, something like \$486,000,000. That amount must be carried, perhaps, in the next two bills, which will increase the amount for the construction even of the existing Navy over the amount carried in this bill.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I have not discussed anything beyond this bill. I have not yet entered upon the matter of future expense or appropriations.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. I understand.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. When I get to that I will have some facts to present. I do not want the gentleman to get ahead of me in my speech.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. I beg the gentleman's pardon.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I am glad to have the gentleman keep up with me, but I do not want him to get ahead of me.

Mr. OLIVER of Alabama. That is all right.

Mr. BRITTEN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BRITTEN. In the gentleman's calculation of \$367,000,000 as a possible point at which we may arrive next year—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. No; that is this year, in this bill.

Mr. BRITTEN. For the permanent establishment?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. On how many men in the permanent establishment is the gentleman basing that?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. One hundred and forty-three thousand men in the permanent establishment for the year of 1919-20.

Mr. BRITTEN. The gentleman knows that the Navy never will get back to 146,000 men in the enlisted personnel.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I do not know that.

Mr. BRITTEN. It can not be done with the ships that we have.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The question of the number of men needed is an open question all the while. For instance, it was testified before the committee that in time of war the British put about a thousand men on each of their greatest dreadnaughts, while we were carrying between 1,400 and 1,500; and I asked one officer if he did not think that if we put as many men on the ships in time of peace as the British put on theirs in time of war we were making a fair allowance of men; and I leave the gentleman to answer whether that is not true. And if we reduce the number to anything like the numbers carried on British vessels I think my colleague will agree with me that 146,000 men will be ample to take care of the ships which we provide for in this bill up to June 30, 1920.

Mr. BRITTEN. Oh, no; I could not possibly agree to that, because we learned in the committee that the fighting ships built for the American Navy during the war will require 95,000 men. Now, we certainly had some Navy before we got into this war.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes; but the gentleman will remember that we built during the war a great number of small craft. If we keep in commission all the 60 Eagles that Mr. Ford is going to build—

Mr. BRITTEN. I am disregarding them entirely.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. And if we keep in commission the 240 submarine chasers and the 342 destroyers that nobody ever dreamed we would need in order to have a proper proportion to our battleships, but which we had to have because of the submarine menace—if we should keep all those small ships in commission they would require more men just for those small ships that we built during the last year or so than we had in our entire Navy in 1916; but I would not assume for a moment that any administration of the Navy would undertake any such expensive and unnecessary policy. That is why I voted to stand on the proposition of 146,000 men for the ships that we already have, or will have prior to June 30, 1920, in the regular Navy.

Mr. TILSON. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. TILSON. Is it not a fact that a battleship or any capital ship, being a large machine shop in a way, the labor-saving machinery that is being installed and improved from time to time will naturally reduce the number of men necessary to man a warship properly?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The testimony seemed to indicate the reverse of what you would naturally expect on that.

Mr. TILSON. That is what I would expect if it was as it is in our factories.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. They said this, that in the old days a ship when it got out of order was taken to a navy yard, or docked somewhere, and the machinery repaired, but that now these ships are so well supplied with machine shops and everything necessary for the making of repairs that the bulk of all the minor repairs, heretofore made at navy yards, are now made on board ship, and that therefore a larger number of men are required.

Mr. ANTHONY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. Can the gentleman tell us if they still have in commission the hundreds of little motor boats that were put in commission at the beginning of the war with the idea that they were going to use them as a defense against U-boats?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. If they are in commission now they will not be by the time this bill goes into effect next July, because we have provided for only 225,000 men.

Mr. ANTHONY. I think they were the biggest farce that has been attempted.

Mr. BUTLER. Will the gentleman yield for an interruption?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. BUTLER. I will promise the gentleman as much time as is required to finish his very able speech. Has the gentleman the figures furnished to us by the Bureau of Yards and Docks showing the expenditures made in the last 18 months in these navy yards?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I have not got those figures here.

Mr. BUTLER. Did the gentleman count up the figures?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I do not recall just the total expenditures on yards and docks. I know it is enormous.

Mr. BUTLER. Does the gentleman know that it is over \$300,000,000 on stations on land?

Mr. PADGETT. About \$330,000,000.

Mr. BUTLER. I thank the gentleman. Did the gentleman look over these figures and separate the appropriations that were made by the Naval Affairs Committee and those obtained from lump sums?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. No; I did not. Without any doubt, during the war large expansions have been made in naval stations. A great many new stations have been started, and I suppose it is human nature that when you get a big establishment going you are rather likely to keep it going. That is particularly true of the aeroplane business. We built aeroplane stations at short distances along the coast. When the first estimates came in they asked for 12 or 15 more aero stations, and the committee has incorporated in this bill a provision requiring the Secretary of the Navy to abandon all stations on the Atlantic coast but three, one on the Gulf coast and one on the Pacific coast. A thorough examination of new projects in navy yards and naval stations, going back as near as we can to where we were before the war, as to the number of stations and curtailing new enterprises where they were no longer needed will net a good many million dollars to the Government, and I have no doubt that that will be undertaken in the next Congress by the Naval Committee under the able leadership of my colleague [Mr. BUTLER].

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. I noticed in the newspapers a statement that the Secretary of the Navy has just purchased land where an aero station was located—I think along the Massachusetts coast—at a total expense of \$4,000,000. Does the gentleman know of his own knowledge whether the Secretary of the Navy is still acquiring stations for aero service along the coast?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The chances are that that is a site on which a plant has already been built, and the Secretary may be acquiring the land; I do not know about that.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I gathered from the remarks of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] that the Navy Department had been purchasing land for naval purposes out of lump-sum appropriations. Is it possible that that is true?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will let the gentleman from Pennsylvania answer that question.

Mr. BUTLER. I hesitate to say, but I believe that is true. I noticed in the newspaper that there has been a large sum taken out of a lump-sum appropriation for the purchase of land at Cape May for an aeroplane station.

Mr. STAFFORD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will.

Mr. STAFFORD. Will the gentleman inform the committee whether the committee in its long hearings went into an investigation, as did the Committee on Appropriations, seeking to withdraw appropriations and authorizations for the Naval Establishment?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will say to the gentleman that our work has been preparing this bill, which provides for the Navy for the fiscal year beginning next July and running until the July following.

Mr. STAFFORD. You make no provision whatever for the curtailment of authorizations carried during the war period?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. This is a bill pure and simple for supplying the Navy with money to run it from July 1, 1919, to July 1, 1920.

Mr. McKENZIE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. McKENZIE. Has it not been the policy in the past to permit the Secretary of the Navy to purchase land for any purpose without being authorized by Congress?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I think not, but during the war blanket authority was conferred upon the executive branch of the Government, which was undoubtedly exercised through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and some other departments of the Government, and quite likely that is where the authority arose. We gave the President blanket powers to spend money for the purchase of land, for the taking over of property, and doing almost anything for the prosecution of the war. There is no provision of that kind in this bill, neither is there any provision for the purchase of land.

Mr. McKENZIE. I want to say that I thought that evil practice had been confined to the Military Establishment, but it seems that it has not.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. No; it spreads if given a chance, no doubt.

Mr. MANN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I understood the gentleman to say that there was no provision in the bill for the purchase of land?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. If the gentleman has found a provision I will stand corrected.

Mr. MANN. Here is a provision for \$25,000,000 for aeroplanes, any portion of which can be used for the purchase of land.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. For the purchase of a site upon which to erect a lighter-than-air station. You are correct, but that is the only one that I recall, and I thank the gentleman from Illinois for the correction.

Now, I would like to go back to the question of cost of the Navy. If all the ships heretofore authorized and all the ships proposed to be authorized in this bill are built within a reasonable time, say by 1924 or 1925, there would be an outlay for new ships of approximately \$200,000,000 per year. If you add that to approximately \$350,000,000 for operation and maintenance to the Navy, I do not see how we can get away from a bill every year for the next four or five years of \$550,000,000, or possibly a little more, depending upon the price of labor and material.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I am astounded at that. Great Britain, which has a navy twice as big as ours—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I think the gentleman is wrong about the relative size of the British Navy and ours, with those additions to our Navy which are contemplated by this bill.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Well, I should say perhaps not right now, but, say, two years back. It was then about twice as great as ours, and their entire budget, as I understand, for upkeep and building and everything, is only \$250,000,000. Is it possible that we with a Navy half as large are going to expend \$550,000,000?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I am including \$200,000,000 per year for new construction for the next four or five years. It will take that long to build the Navy we are now projecting, and when it is built it would be fairly comparable in strength with the British Navy if Great Britain in the meantime does not also expand its navy. But further, as to relative expenses, the gentleman must remember that the British sailor gets very small pay. The officer gets much less pay than the officer of the United States Navy. We pay ordinary seamen now as a minimum \$33 a month, and we propose in this bill to make that temporary increase which we put on during the war permanent, upon the theory that \$33 a month and board is not unreasonable pay for those defending the country.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. What is the pay of a British sailor?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I am not quite sure, but perhaps the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] can say what a sailor in the British Navy gets.

Mr. BUTLER. Yes; it is less than half what we used to pay. They have several rates of pay, but I have always understood that it was less than half of what was paid by us when we were paying the rate of \$17.50. I think it is about \$5 to \$7 a month.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. So that if we completed all of the ships we have already authorized, and added to them these 20 proposed in this bill, our annual appropriation for the next five years could not, in my judgment, be less than \$550,000,000. At the end of that time what will our situation be, provided we stop there? The total investment in the fleet by the 1st of July, 1924, we will say, which would give five years to build it all, would be \$1,935,000,000. One-quarter of that, which was the rule for 15 years, would mean an annual charge of \$484,000,000 to keep that Navy up. Of course there might be some reductions, due to the fact that in 1924 we will have a large number of old ships, running all the way from 20 to 30 years old, and they would probably have to be put out of commission or put in reserve. This would cut the expense considerably.

Mr. SNYDER. Is the gentleman correct in his figures when he spoke of the investment in the Navy being \$1,000,000,000?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The total investment, when both of these three-year programs are completed, would be \$1,935,000,000, and one-quarter of that—for upkeep and operation—would be \$484,000,000; in round numbers, \$500,000,000. So that, as it looks to me, conservatively speaking, if we go forward with the completion of the existing program and the new program it will cost us to complete it and to keep it up while it is being completed over \$500,000,000 a year, and when completed it can be maintained for something slightly over \$500,000,000 a year.

Mr. SHERWOOD. I see by the cablegrams of yesterday that the powers have substantially agreed upon general disarmament.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes; and that is entirely consistent with this bill.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Yes; but you authorize the Secretary to go ahead. Why that authorization if it is not necessary to build them?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. It may not be necessary, and in that event we will not build them.

Mr. SHERWOOD. What is the necessity now for that kind of legislation; and what is the necessity for dreadnaughts anyway?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I am a little surprised that the gentlemen should ask me that question.

Mr. SHERWOOD. The *Queen Elizabeth* was the greatest dreadnaught that was ever set afloat. She carried a turret of 15-inch guns and she was put out of business by one German submarine.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Yes; but I want to call the attention of the gentleman to this, that back there in the Kiel Canal was a latent power, a masterful fleet, anxious and ready to come out and destroy the commerce and transports of its enemy did it but dare to do so, and I ask the gentleman what prevented the German fleet from coming out of its hiding and destroying the transports carrying the soldiers of America to the fields of France?

Mr. SHERWOOD. I will answer that by asking the gentleman what prevented the English fleet from coming out?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Why, they were simply lying there hoping and praying that the German fleet would come out.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Why did they not come out and go after the German fleet?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The British fleet accomplished its purpose without doing that. The destruction of the German fleet was of no particular consequence. The business of the British fleet and our fleet was to keep the sea clear for the transports, for the soldiers to cross over, for the supplies, for the ammunition, and all of that, for the allied armies, and when the British fleet did that, in conjunction with ours, it performed the great purpose for which a fleet exists. No sensible commander, of course, would take these great instruments of war, costing \$30,000,000 each, into a mine-infested region, such as they would have to pass through in going to the Kiel Canal. But men must remember that if it had not been for the power of those great ships of the allied fleets the German men-of-war would have come out and would have raided the seas, destroyed the commerce, sunk our transports, and we could not have landed either a pound of goods or a soldier upon the soil of France. [Applause.] So it is idle to talk about doing away with big ships, or that the big ships served no useful purpose in the recent war.

Mr. TILSON. Were not the German ships just as impotent in the Kiel Canal as they would have been at the bottom of the North Sea?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. That is what I say, and the purpose of the English and the American commanders was accomplished without taking the risk of sinking these valuable ships by going in there and attempting to destroy the German fleet. They had performed their purpose when they made it impossible

for the German fleet to interfere with the purpose of America and the allies in the war.

Mr. STAFFORD. With the German fleet now impotent, where is there any need of a great Navy to rival the great fleet of England, with England as our ally?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I will say this, that circumstances of war never appear twice alike in the history of the world. If men have not learned something from this war, if men have not learned the need of being able to take care of themselves, then I am afraid some of the most valuable lessons incident to the war have escaped them.

I want to say now, as I stated in the beginning, that I never want to see this Nation again put in a position where it must rely upon the protection of a friendly power to take care of its coasts, its commerce, or its transports carrying the soldiers of the Republic. [Applause.] I sincerely hope that the nations of the world will adopt a disarmament policy at the conference now in session at Versailles. But if this can not be brought about, I believe we should adopt such a naval policy as will enable us to take care of ourselves and the great interests we have in the world. If disarmament fails America should not rely for its defense upon the generosity of another nation, no matter how friendly that nation may be, or how closely it may be tied to us by bonds of affection, language, or laws. So that I say I am in favor of building a Navy which will of ourselves, if that is the decree of the world, take care of ourselves. [Applause.]

Mr. STAFFORD. Then, as I understand the gentleman's proposal, it is to provide a Navy so as to have it alone give protection to transports and our merchant marine to fight on a foreign soil?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Oh, I do not know where we will be called upon to fight. That is an old question that clogged men's minds in days gone by in this House. Whether our soldiers should fight on one kind of soil or on another. It matters not the soil, if the reason for fighting exists America will always go where the enemy is no matter where they may be. [Applause.] But I hope, as you do, that America will have to fight no more, and I believe it will contribute to the disarmament of the world if the world knows in advance that in the event reduction of armament fails in this great crisis, much as it may be against our will, our interests in the world are such that we can not afford to rely on others to protect those interests, but we will build such a Navy as may be adequate for that purpose, hoping and praying, as we will, that the world may see that a continued increase in armament is unnecessary and that an agreement may be brought about especially between these two great friendly peoples—the British and America. Why should it not be brought about? There is no reason in the world why Britain should suspect America any more than America should suspect Britain. America and Great Britain should sail the seas on even terms. We should be able to take care of ourselves, asking no favors, courting no quarrel with any other nation, our merchant ships going out upon every sea, as they will from now on if the next Congress is as wise as I think it is going to be. All of our interests, our extensive coast lines, our great cities like New York and Boston lying upon our seaboard, our great South American interests and duties, the Panama Canal, our Pacific and Asiatic possessions, all of these require that this mighty Republic, blessed of God in material resources as no other nation has been blessed in all the tide of time, should henceforth be able and willing to take care of itself on the sea or on the land wherever it is necessary to defend American institutions, American rights, or American citizens. [Applause.]

Mr. LITTLE. Will the gentleman from Michigan object to giving the data about which I inquired?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The gentleman from Kansas wanted to know, I think, about the relative value of the submarine and the battleship.

Mr. LITTLE. I wanted to know if any data had been presented to the committee by those with experience in the relative fighting qualities—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. They are not comparable at all; they are wholly dissimilar weapons.

Mr. LITTLE. Suppose—

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Of course, the submarine did give to the world a whole lot of trouble.

Mr. LITTLE. I see that the naval program contemplates the building of 12 battleships and cruisers and 14 submarines. Now, if the two were to meet, which would achieve a victory?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I think I grasp the gentleman's question and I think I know what he has in mind. Superficially, one might think that the powerful ships are not of so much use, but, after all, whoever controls the surface of the

ocean controls the ocean. Whoever controls the surface, in spite of anybody else, will get his ships through, as the allies did in the war just closed.

Mr. LITTLE. Which would control the surface, the 14 submarines or the 12 battleships?

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Which did control the surface?

Mr. LITTLE. I am asking the gentleman.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Well, I am turning the question back upon the gentleman.

Mr. LITTLE. No; I stated specifically that I am seeking for information. If the gentleman does not know, just say so.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Very well.

Mr. LONGWORTH. If the gentleman will permit, does the gentleman remember any case where a submarine sunk any armed ship going at a rate faster than 15 knots an hour in the whole period of the war?

Mr. LITTLE. And does the gentleman remember an instance, relatively speaking, where a submarine was sunk by a battleship in the same way at 15 miles an hour?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. EAGLE].

Mr. EAGLE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, there is one consideration in connection with whatever Navy we have and whatever Navy we may authorize which it has appeared to me for some years, and now appears to me, that neither the Navy Department nor the Committee on Naval Affairs has ever given sufficient, if any, consideration to, but which is, however, of vital importance.

I do not in the remarks I want to submit to you have any motive in my mind for the submission of them, except to induce you to think about the point and conclude whether it is worthy of mature consideration; not now necessarily, but in due course.

Have you ever reflected on the fact that this marvelous, modern civilization of ours, the most wonderful which the world has ever known, is founded more largely upon petroleum than upon any other single material thing except food? And yet, while we are building a tremendous merchant marine—and I made the opening address for it three years ago, and in favor of the Congress making an appropriation of \$50,000,000 to undertake it, since private individuals would not sufficiently carry forward the work which properly pertains, under our American system of government, to private initiative and enterprise—and while we are building this wonderful Navy with vast funds, neither one of them can perform their functions without oil.

Not a factory in this land could run without oil. And therefore the shoes on your feet, if the crude petroleum production should cease, would probably not be manufactured to-day, but the condition would be similar to that when our fathers made the shoes for the children in their families. Each parent would make the shoes for his own children. The clothing worn by every person within the sound of my voice would cease to be manufactured at wholesale, economically, and with taste; but the wool would be cut from the sheep and carded and dyed in walnuts and woven by the loom, and our clothes made again by our wives, even as our mothers made the clothing of many of us who are here. The cities would soon starve, because oil must run the locomotives into the cities to carry food and fuel. The populations would spread out over the country; they would devastate the areas. The whole of your civilization would break down. With that thought, crude and hastily expressed, in order to make a predicate for the thing I had in mind to say, permit me to say that in the year 1917, as I have the figures, in an imperfect way and only in the way of approximation, there were produced within the United States a total of about 300,000,000 barrels of oil, but there were consumed within the United States during that same year of 1917 a total of about 335,000,000 barrels of oil.

That means that the consumption exceeded the production by about 35,000,000 barrels in the single year of 1917.

Now, on January 1 of the year 1917 there was above ground within the United States, in pipe lines, in tank cars and in storage, and in every form, a total of about 165,000,000 barrels of oil. That means that if that current rate of relative consumption and production be maintained within five years' time there will be not one drop of crude petroleum above ground in the United States.

Now, then, we are building, at an expense so enormous that it staggers the imagination much more the comprehension, a merchant marine to carry the products of this marvelous land of food and fiber, and of manufacture, and of mines and mining and forest, to every corner of the civilized world. We are building, at an expense that staggers not the comprehension alone but

the imagination as well, a Navy to protect the legitimate rights of American citizens upon the high seas wherever our flag shall float under the heavens. I have helped to do it. I am going, during all the time I remain in Congress, at each opportunity, to help do that vigorous American thing. And yet the whole of that Navy's propulsion power is oil; its lubrication is oil; the one the crude product exuding or draining from the wells, the other the manufactured product. Notwithstanding that fact, and notwithstanding the fact that recently we came within three months of the exhaustion of the petroleum and naphtha and gasoline supplies of this country—when our Government inaugurated the gasless Sundays last winter we were within a few weeks of the exhaustion of the supplies of oil necessary to our processes, not of industry alone but the processes of prosecuting this war for civilization. Still, the Navy Department has never recommended—or, if so, it has never been printed—and the Naval Affairs Committee has never considered—or, if so, it has not given the Congress to understand that it has considered—the question of storing an adequate supply of crude petroleum in its own receptacles for the use of the merchant marine and the Navy.

It takes about between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 barrels of crude petroleum per year to run the United States Navy. Where does the Navy get that, gentlemen? The department buys it from the pipe-line companies, the storage-tank companies, and institutions that have prepared themselves to buy cheaply and to store for profit the great output of petroleum as and when market conditions render such purchase and storage profitable to them. And so, while crude petroleum in the great southwestern fields of Louisiana, of Oklahoma, and notably of Texas, is now less than \$2 per barrel, the Navy Department is now paying a large profit for the current supplies of crude petroleum with which to propel its ships on the sea, and will continue to pay increased prices as increasing demands follow. Is that common sense? Is it national safety? It is not, gentlemen. The Navy should erect and own its own storage and keep it completely filled at all times.

It is roughly estimated that for 50 cents per barrel this Nation can acquire the lands, the pipe-line connections, a sufficient number of 50,000-barrel steel storage tanks with which to store an annual supply of crude petroleum a year in advance, and once the storage tankage is erected it will last a lifetime.

We should authorize the Navy Department to construct storage to hold at least 25,000,000 barrels; that should cost about \$12,500,000, in round numbers. By forethought this Navy Department, if authorized by this Congress, can build enough storage capacity to take care of 25,000,000 barrels of oil—buy it in advance at the market price at less than \$2 a barrel. That is to say, for 50 cents a barrel, or \$12,500,000, it can acquire all tankage and connections in which to put this oil by, and then you keep a permanent store of a year's supply of fuel oil for the American Navy. Whenever new fields are developed new supplies can be emptied, at the least possible price, in the interest of efficiency and safety, into these storage vaults, wherever the Navy may choose to locate them, in proximity to the deep-water ports; and then, instead of being helpless and dependent upon the price and quantity at which private industry will give the Navy and the merchant marine their supplies of oil, our Navy and merchant marine would thus be rendered secure for their future activities.

Here is an interesting fact, gentlemen: The greatest oil well the world has ever seen was in Mexico. They celebrated one day last January the one-hundred-millionth barrel that flowed out of that one well. Within half an hour after it had been flowing at the rate of 100,000 barrels a day, it ceased absolutely to flow a barrel of oil and went into salt water.

That is the Lord Cowdrey oil well, which has been the chief supply of Great Britain for furnishing petroleum to the British Navy, which has prevented the submarines from destroying commerce and making a German victory. That went into salt water within an hour or so, crude petroleum not being like coal in the ground, where its supply is known in advance, but is exhausted without notice. It must be taken out and stored in steel vaults in order that a certain supply in advance may be assured.

Mr. Chairman, I want to call your attention to the fact that at any time the supply of petroleum adequate to the needs of the people of the country, and particularly the Navy and the merchant marine, may suddenly cease, and it would be a tragedy the like of which you can scarce conceive if, all of a sudden, an adequate supply of crude petroleum requisite for the Navy and the merchant marine should suddenly cease, whereas by the expenditure of a relatively small sum of money we can provide against that contingency, and we ought to do it.

Mr. Chairman, whilst speaking, and having finished that branch of what I came here to say, I want to say just this: It is not exactly clear to me how we should vote upon this specific \$700,000,000 item to provide for a second three-year naval building program. It seems to me that the President of the United States had a perfect right to communicate by cable with his Secretary of the Navy. It would seem to me that the Secretary of the Navy would have a perfect right in turn to communicate the wishes, the thoughts, the sentiments at this critical time of the President of the United States to the chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs.

Perhaps it was entirely wise for that chairman to communicate the same to the membership of this House in order to induce a unanimity of report. But to save the life of me I can not see why any of these gentlemen, from the President down to the Members of this House, should put a scare out among us without giving us full information and the reasons for their conclusions. [Applause.]

Now, I have followed President Wilson in this House for six years, as you gentlemen all know, in season and out of season, when I understood him.

I am willing in this instance to do anything he asks me to do if he tells me or lets me know directly that in the present position of tremendous responsibility in which he is placed he needs my support in this connection. I would like to know what it is about. I happen to have 300,000 people who have selected me to do their voting here. They may not be the most important people to him in this world; they may not be the most important people to any of you gentlemen in this world; but they are the most important people to themselves and to me that there are upon this earth. [Applause.] I am willing to burden them, in common with the rest of the citizens of this Nation, no more and no less, to build the most splendid Navy that floats on the high seas if an exigency now exists or shall arise which, in the judgment of the splendid Executive of the people of the whole United States, makes it not requisite alone but indispensable and necessary to authorize it, and I would do that, subordinating my own individual judgment, if need be.

Primarily I believe in a Navy that rides the sea not by permission of any other nation on earth. [Applause.] I do not believe in asking the permission of any nation on earth how big a Navy we shall build. I do not believe that the rights of America should be allowed to be violated anywhere. I do not believe that a league of nations ought ever to be formed which is capable of becoming a Frankenstein monster of sufficient physical force in turn to compel the obedience of this Nation, and if I had the power to prevent it it would never be done. [Applause.] I am in favor of a league of nations founded on moral understanding of minds and spirit, but not founded on force. I would be willing to vote for this item if it had in it a proviso that such \$700,000,000 additional three-year program should become obsolete if disarmament should be declared throughout the world as the result of the peace conference. But if we must vote for it before such peace treaty be finally ratified, I shall vote for the second three-year building program, because so long as I stay in Congress never by my vote or my action shall that proud flag that floats there ever be humiliated on account of our not being prepared to defend its glory and its honor wherever American interests and American pride and American honor dictate that it shall go. [Applause.]

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Hicks] 40 minutes.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to indorse the conclusions reached and support the arguments advanced by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY], and to echo his splendid sentiment in regard to the Navy of the United States. As he has taken up the present and future of the Navy, I desire in the time allotted me to speak of what the Navy has done in the great conflict just brought to a close.

Out of the mist and the snow of the morning of December 26 a great battle fleet entered the harbor of New York and in the majesty of its power steamed past the Statue of Liberty. It came as a messenger of a conflict won, a silent victory, but a triumph as complete and overwhelming as any ever won by the American Navy. We are too near the tragic events of the great struggle to write with accuracy and fullness the log of our Navy's brilliant achievements. The complete record of the valor, the heroism and sublime courage of the officers and men who manned those ships, and the unselfish spirit and devotion to duty of those whose fighting strength at home carried forward the organization which made victory possible, will come only through the perspective of the future. To-day we can but briefly appraise their gallant deeds, but we can and we do, in the name of the Republic, extend to them all our heartfelt

thanks. For all time they have earned the gratitude of their country in maintaining the high principles for which our Republic entered the conflict, and for which they fought and died. The honor and the glory of the flag was safe in their hands.

In the words of Rudyard Kipling, "The Navy is very old and very wise. Much of her wisdom is on record and available for reference, but more of it works in the unconscious blood of those who serve her."

The magnitude of our Army and the dazzling record of its brilliant achievements may in some degree obscure the service rendered to our country and to its allies by the American Navy, but it must ever be remembered that our ships were a part of the great war forces which kept open the highways of the deep and made possible the final triumph of the allied armies. Had the command of the oceans slipped from our hands those armies would have languished and been beaten back for lack of support in men and material. Had the scepter of the seas passed to our foes, our own Army would never have inscribed on its banners the imperishable names of Cantigny, Belleau Wood, Chateau-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Argonne. The one essential and indisputable element of victory was the supremacy of the allied fleet. The New York Evening Post in commenting upon this feature refers to the late Admiral Mahan, the great naval theoretician and expert:

Mahan, thou shouldst be living at this hour! The great naval theoretician, steeped in history and in fact, the American who first taught the English fully to know what their sea power had wrought, would surely have thrilled with satisfaction if he could have lived to see the amazing spectacle of to-day. A "fleet in being" has done its perfect work. With little actual fighting, its heavier ships having scarcely been engaged during the four years of war, there it has ridden at anchor on the north coast of Scotland. Apparently it was doing nothing. It looked as idle as painted ships upon a painted ocean. But in reality it was exerting irresistible and decisive power. . . . The grand fleet in harbor has exerted the indivisible compulsion across the North Sea which finally dragged the enemy vessels to the most impressive and astounding naval capitulation ever seen.

In order that Congress may judge of the work of the Navy, let me give, briefly, some interesting figures. Of the 2,079,800 men transported to France since April 7, 1917, 911,047 were taken over in United States transports and 40,499 in other American ships, or 46½ per cent of the total carried. 48½ per cent were conveyed in British ships and 5½ per cent in ships of other nations. Of the total strength of the naval escort guarding all those convoys 3½ per cent was furnished by France, 14½ by Great Britain, and 82½ by the American Navy. A splendid testimonial to the efficiency of the convoy operations lies in the fact that not one of the eastbound American transports was torpedoed or damaged by the enemy, and only three sunk on the return voyage.

Utmost secrecy was imperative in the operation of this transport service. The fleets, often numbering as high as 30 ships, plowed through the perilous seas in utter darkness and in imminent danger of collision. Under the watchful care of the Bureau of Operations, the courses of these ships across the ocean and through the war zone were directed by the wireless from shore stations, where every movement of enemy submarines was charted and from whence flashed warnings and directions across the deep to the approaching ships. In this convoy work—arduous and exacting—all our destroyers, cruisers, and many of our older battleships were constantly engaged. As Secretary Daniels has truly said:

The history of the convoy operations in which our naval forces have taken part, due to which we have been able so successfully to transport such a large number of our military forces abroad and so many supplies for the Army, is a chapter in itself. It is probably our major operation in this war, and will in the future stand as a monument to both the Army and the Navy as the greatest and most difficult troop transporting effort which has ever been conducted across seas.

There was nothing spectacular about this grinding duty. Winter and summer, by day and by night, in the fog and in the rain and the ice, it demanded constant vigilance, unceasing toil, and extreme endurance. The work of this hazardous service was endless and its hardships and dangers are barely realized. During the winter storms of the North Atlantic the maddened seas all but engulfed these tiny but staunch destroyers, when for days they breasted the fury of the gale and defied the very elements in their struggle for the mastery. No sleep then for the tired crew; no hot food; no dry clothes. Yet despite it all, with each hour perhaps the last, with death stalking through the staggering hulls, not a man—to the everlasting glory of the American Navy—not a man but felt himself especially favored in being assigned that duty.

Sir Eric Geddes during his recent visit paid this high compliment to our service:

I know that you will appreciate what demands the present conditions of sea warfare impose upon this type of craft. They scour the seas, either hunting the submarine or keeping a careful watch over the valuable human lives, equipment, and transports intrusted to their care to escort. I have both traveled in and been escorted by American destroyers, and I know their high standard. They are an essential part of the fighting strength of the fleet, and, together with the

cruisers, they are the watchdogs of the allied trade and the terror of the U boat. It will convey some idea of the strain imposed upon the vessels and their crews when I tell you that each American destroyer in European waters steams between 4,000 and 5,000 miles a month. For hard work, constant vigilance, and almost perpetual discomfort, this record is hard to beat even in this great war of universal strain and hardship.

As an indication of the extent of the work done by our naval vessels in the war zone, let me submit the averages of miles steamed per month:

Destroyers	275,000
Mine sweepers	10,000
Mine layers	10,000
Battleships and submarines	90,000
Submarine chasers	121,000
Miscellaneous patrol craft	120,000

Or a total of 626,000 miles per month, and these figures do not include troopships, transports, cargo carriers, or merchant ships plying through the war zone.

During July and August, 1918, 3,444,012 tons of shipping were escorted to and from France by American escort vessels; of the above amount, 1,577,735 tons were escorted in and 1,864,077 tons were escorted out of French ports. Of the tonnage escorted into French ports during this time, only 16,988 tons, or 0.009 per cent, were lost through enemy action; and of the tonnage escorted out from French ports only 27,858 tons, or 0.013 per cent, were lost through the same cause. During the same period 259,604 American troops were escorted to France by United States escort vessels without the loss of a single man through enemy action.

On the day hostilities ceased we had in the service in the various branches, over 600,000 men and 9,600 yeowomen and 1,386 women nurses, divided as follows:

	Enlisted force.	Officers.	Totals.
Regular Navy	216,644	10,588	227,232
Reserves	286,826	23,137	309,963
Marine Corps	70,527	2,430	72,957
Coast Guard	5,727	678	6,405
Grand total	579,724	36,833	616,557

At the close of the war approximately 5,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted men were serving in our naval forces in Europe, a number exceeding our total naval strength before the war.

On the day war was declared 197 ships were in commission; at its close there were 2,003, of which 338 were in foreign waters. When Germany surrendered her fleet we had abroad 9 battleships—the *New York*, *Texas*, *Wyoming*, *Florida*, *Arkansas*, *Nevada*, *Utah*, *Arizona*, *Oklahoma*—and 74 destroyers.

As to the smaller craft of the fleet, the patrol of our harbors and bays, their work was ceaseless and under conditions the most trying; 713 scout patrol boats and 89 subchasers were attached to the eight naval districts on the East and Gulf coasts of the United States. No hope of enemy action, no chance for individual achievement against the foe inspired them in their daily task; their only incentive was in the conscious pride of a duty faithfully performed, and yet, without complaint at the lack of opportunity, they did their part and rendered invaluable service.

And what of the officers and men of the transport service and of the mercantile marine, the hardy mariners who drove their ships through the fog and the storm and the darkness of the death-infested ocean? At best, even in peace times, seaman-ship is a comfortless and a cheerless calling. But in war, to the ordinary perils of the sea are added unusual hardships, which reach their maximum in the dangers and terrors of the war zone—the attack without warning of the invisible foe, whose presence too frequently is known only by a terrific explosion which casts the hapless crew adrift on surging seas, leagues from a friendly shore. Think of the terrific strain under which these men performed their perilous tasks. Gun crews on continuous duty, ever ready with the shot that might save the ship; the men below in the engineer's force expecting every moment to receive the fatal blast which would entrap them in a hideous death; the watch, ceaseless in its vigil by day and by night, peering through the darkness and the mist, conscious that upon their alertness depended the lives of all. Yet under these conditions of unprecedented hardships each man performed his duty with the highest degree of courage and self-sacrifice. [Applause.]

Let me recite one of the many instances of the matchless courage of the men engaged in this hazardous service. Last September the *Mount Vernon*, with several hundred sick and wounded soldiers on board, was torpedoed when a short distance out from Brest. Thirty-six men of the engineer force met their death in the fire and steam and boiling water of

the stokehole. With two compartments flooded, their comrades dead and dying, with a seeming certainty that the attack would continue, which would mean that every man in the compartment where the torpedo struck would be drowned or burned to death, yet despite it all when volunteers were called for, to man the still undamaged furnaces to keep up steam for the run back to port, every man of the force stepped forward and said he was ready to go below.

In aviation also the Navy won distinction, and well-merited praise can justly be bestowed upon the officers and men for their accomplishments in this dangerous service. During the war we established abroad 2 repair and assembly bases, 4 kite-balloon stations, 18 seaplane stations, 5 bombing-plane stations, and 3 dirigible stations, all manned with Navy personnel, which included 624 officers, 97 observers, and over 15,000 enlisted men.

And what shall we say of the marines, the intrepid soldiers of the sea, winning with the victorious American Army imperishable glory on the battle fields of France? We need say but little, for the world to-day acclaims their valor. For matchless courage and supreme bravery, with heroism which nothing could daunt, with dogged determination which nothing could overcome, with spirit which nothing could conquer, the record of the United States Marines, fighting with the equally brave and equally courageous soldiers of the American Army, is without parallel in the history of military achievements.

Without relief, without sleep, without food or water they held the lines in those grim days of the terrific onslaught of the German drive; held when to yield would have meant irretrievable disaster; held and saved Paris. Exhausted to the very limit of human endurance, with ranks decimated, fighting in American fashion and with American daring, they met attack after attack and charge after charge. They beat to its knees the invincible Prussian Guard, which had been thrown in to "show these amateurs how to fight"; then smashing forward, they hurled back, ever back, in disorder and defeat, the legions of the Imperial Army. In all the annals of war there is no story comparable with this.

But there are many who will never fight again. They will be mourned by fathers and mothers, sisters and wives, and they will be revered by the millions of Americans who will pay them homage everlasting. Every spot where American blood has been shed for American honor is hallowed ground, every deed a sacred memory, every grave a consecrated shrine. Belleau Wood and Chateau-Thierry are forever written on the pages of American history. With Lexington and New Orleans, with Gettysburg and Antietam and San Juan they will endure, imperishable monuments to the bravery and courage of American heroes, the vindication of democracy and the triumph of liberty and of righteousness.

Let me speak of other achievements of the Navy, accomplishments of incalculable assistance to our fighting forces and potent factors in the final triumph. To avert the submarine menace and prevent the destruction of tankers carrying oil to the allied fleets in the North Sea a great pipe line was constructed across Scotland, thus reducing both the danger and distance of supplying the ships with fuel. This project, so startling to our British cousins, was carried forward to completion with the same energy and quiet determination that characterized every undertaking to which the Navy set its hand.

Over 56,000 American mines were laid in strategical areas in European waters, the personnel engaged in these activities alone calling for 6,700 men, a dangerous occupation and one fraught with trying hardships and ceaseless toil. But the work of supreme magnitude and importance was the laying of a great mine barrage, 25 miles wide and 230 miles in length, from Scotland to Norway, across the deep waters of the North Sea. This daring project had its inception in the Bureau of Ordnance in April, 1917, and called for the planting of upward of 70,000 mines from the surface to distances of 250 to 300 feet below the surface. Owing to the great depths between coasts, in places exceeding 800 feet, a special type of mine had to be devised. This undertaking was carried forward by our Navy working in conjunction with the British fleet, 80 per cent of which was performed by our men, and while the work was only completed a few days before the termination of the war, from reports received it is evident that at least 10 German submarines met their doom in this network of mines.

To the achievements of the Navy, in erecting great training camps, destroyer and aviation bases, hospital units, in training thousands of men for oversea duty, the arming of merchant ships, the building of a vast fleet of smaller vessels, the construction of great warehouses, the manufacture of heavy guns and their mounts, the production of powder, and the purchasing of enormous quantities of supplies, must be added the most

spectacular achievement of all—the repair of interned German ships. When these vessels, many of them of the largest type of trans-Atlantic liners, were taken over by our Government it was found that the machinery of several had been seriously damaged by the maliciously planned and carefully executed sabotage of the crews. The principal injury was to the cylinders and other parts of the engines, and, as these passenger ships were potent factors in the transportation of troops, their immediate repair was a vital necessity. To resort to the usual practice of casting new cylinders would have involved too great a loss of time. Nothing daunted by the magnitude of the task, our Navy undertook the repair of these broken cylinders by employing the system of electric welding, and so successfully was this work accomplished that during all the months of service in which these vessels have been engaged, not a single defective weld has developed. All honor to the officers who risked their professional reputations and carried forward to complete success an accomplishment which expert engine manufacturers considered impossible. To the notations left by the Germans on many of the broken cylinders, "Can not be repaired," the genius of American experts and the skill of American mechanics gave the answer, "It will be and it has been done."

Let me speak, too, of the great railway battery of 14-inch Navy guns, manned exclusively by bluejackets. These huge guns, built originally for our new battle cruisers, were mounted on great railway trucks. Each gun had a complement of 12 specially constructed cars for the operation of the battery and the maintenance of its crew. There were armored ammunition cars and machine-shop cars, barrack, kitchen, crane, and radio cars, making the battery independent of any permanent artillery base. With a range of 30 miles, these guns were the most powerful of any on the line and did splendid execution in the closing days of the conflict.

The Navy gave not alone of its strength and its skill and its blood but of its substance as well, for in the last two liberty loans the men in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard subscribed for over \$66,000,000 of bonds.

When we speak of the Navy we speak, too, of the Coast Guard, for upon the declaration of war this important branch of the service, with all its personnel and equipment, came under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department, and the record made since then is most commendable. The service was at once placed upon a war basis, additional men were enlisted, vessels equipped, stations brought up to the highest degree of efficiency, and the lines of coastal communication extended. In every way in which service could be rendered in the prosecution of the war this branch of our fighting force performed its duty fully and effectively. By their self-sacrificing devotion to a hazardous calling the officers and men of this service merit the highest praise. Their bravery and their unflinching response to duty in times of disaster endows their perilous vocation with the noblest attributes of humanity—the saving of lives and ministering to those in distress.

On November 21 five American dreadnaughts were in that far-flung double line of allied ships through which passed in surrender the dreadnaughts, cruisers, and destroyers of the second most powerful navy in the world. When Admiral Beatty set his famous signal, "The German flag is to be hauled down at 3.57 and is not to be hoisted again without permission," the work of our Navy as a battle unit in the war zone was over. Too high a tribute can not be paid the officers and men of our

Navy who faced the dangers of war and the perils of the sea with exalted courage and unfaltering determination. Their loyalty and patriotism have never been questioned, their valor and heroism never doubted. By their deeds they have added new luster to the glorious annals of the American Navy.

Let me quote the noble words of the great commander in chief of our American Army in France, Gen. Pershing, who last June sent this message to our naval forces:

Permit me to send to the force commander, the officers, and men of the American Navy in European waters, the most cordial greetings of the American Expeditionary Force. The bond which joins together all men of American blood has been mightily strengthened and deepened by the rough hand of war.

Those of us who are privileged to serve in the Army and Navy are to one another as brothers. Spaces of land and sea are nothing where a common purpose binds. We are so dependent upon one another that the honor, the fame, the exploits of the one are the honor, the fame, the exploits of the other. If the enemy should dare to leave his safe harbor and set his ships in battle array no cheers would be more ringing, as you and our allied fleets moved to meet him, than those of the American Expeditionary Forces in France. We have unshaken confidence in you and are assured that when we stand on the threshold of peace your record will be one worthy of your traditions.

No one appreciated more highly the efficient work done by our Navy than did Sir Eric Geddes, of the British Admiralty, who last October paid this tribute to our sea forces:

I venture the opinion that when the history of this war is written there will be no more glorious page in that history than the one which tells of the work done, the dangers faced, and the privations endured by your Navy in common with the navies of your cobelligerents, and there will be no greater manifestation of the overwhelming importance of sea power in a fight such as this has been. In that manifestation the great American Navy has played a highly honorable and increasingly important part.

Let us not forget the mighty work of those in the departments, in the naval districts, in office and shop and warehouse, whose efforts were as untiring as their success was complete. From the humblest yeoman upward to the Secretary, through the bureaus and their chiefs, all were animated by the same spirit of energy, of foresight, and determination to place the fleet on the highest basis of efficiency and strength. The phrase "The Navy of the United States" has a significance apart and above simply a designation of one branch of our military service. That phrase, invoking the romance of the pathless seas and the daring exploits of our seamen, appeals to our chivalry and our pride. It visualizes the traditions and the deeds of yesterday and brings to life the heroes who once trod the decks of our frigates. It opens the book of history to the brightest page of our achievements and links the accomplishments of the past with the glory of the present and the confidence of the future. It means more than crews and ships, more than power of shell and might of steel; it connotes the will and the purpose of the Republic itself and carries us forward to a nobler conception of national life. It epitomizes the spirit of America, and binds us to a closer and more resolute union. It quickens our consciousness as a member of the great family of nations and prompts us as one of the trustees of civilization to a higher duty in the solution and adjustment of world problems. It is the symbol, not only of daring but of sacrifice, not only of courage but of constructive endeavor, constant in purpose and steadfast to the end. As Secretary Daniels has so eloquently said:

Nations and people, too, that knew of the Navy of the United States only by hearsay or random incident know it now as the organized will of a free people, prompt to heed the call of right against might, tireless in effort, fertile in resource, happy in cooperation, and unyielding till the ultimate goal be won.

[Applause.]

United States Navy, Nov. 1, 1918.

BATTLESHIPS—SINGLE CALIBER.

Name.	Commissioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displacement (normal).	Speed.	Battery.				Men.	Ma- rines.
							Guns.			Torpedo tubes sub- merged.		
							Turret.	Secondary.	Antiaircraft.			
		<i>Feet.</i>	<i>Ft. in.</i>	<i>Ft. in.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Knots.</i>						
Arizona.....	1916.....	608	97 04	28 10	31,400	21	12 14", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
Arkansas ²	1912.....	562	93 24	28 6	26,000	21	12 12", 50 cal.	16 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1400	72
California.....	49 per cent completed.	624	97 34	30 3	32,300	21	12 14", 50 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
Colorado ³	7 per cent completed.	624	97 34	30 6	32,600	21	8 16", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
Delaware.....	1910.....	518	85 24	26 11	20,000	21	10 12", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1200	64
Florida ⁴	1911.....	521	88 24	28 6	21,825	22	10 12", 45 cal.	12 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1200	64
Idaho.....	Completed.	624	97 44	30 0	32,000	21	12 14", 50 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1400	75
Maryland ⁵	39 per cent completed.	624	97 44	30 6	32,600	21	8 16", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
Michigan.....	1910.....	452	80 24	24 6	16,000	18	8 12", 45 cal.	14 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1000	56
Mississippi.....	1917.....	624	97 44	30 0	32,000	21	12 14", 50 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1400	75
Nevada.....	1916.....	583	95 24	28 6	27,500	20	10 14", 45 cal.	12 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1400	75
New Mexico ^{2,6}	1918.....	624	97 44	30 0	32,000	21	12 14", 50 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1360	75
New York ⁷	1914.....	573	95 24	28 6	27,000	21	10 14", 45 cal.	16 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1350	72
North Dakota.....	1910.....	518	85 24	26 11	20,000	21	10 12", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1100	64

¹ Estimated speed.

² Fitted as a flagship.

³ In 1916 three-year program.

⁴ Formerly named California.

United States Navy, Nov. 1, 1918—Continued.

BATTLESHIPS—SINGLE CALIBER—continued.

Name.	Commissioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displacement (normal).	Speed.	Battery.				Men.	Marines.
							Guns.			Torpedo tubes submerged.		
							Turret.	Secondary.	Antiaircraft.			
Oklahoma.	1916.	Feet. 583	Ft. in. 95 2½	Ft. in. 28 6	Tons. 27,500	Knots. 20½	10 14", 45 cal.	12 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
Pennsylvania.	1916.	608	97 0½	28 10	31,400	21	12 14", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1390	75
South Carolina.	1910.	452	80 2½	24 6	16,000	19	8 12", 45 cal.	14 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1200	50
Tennessee.	52 per cent completed..	624	97 3½	30 3	32,300	* 21	12 14", 50 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
Texas ¹ .	1914.	573	95 2½	28 6	27,000	21	10 14", 45 cal.	16 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	4 21".....	1417	72
Utah ¹ .	1911.	521	88 2½	28 6	21,825	21	10 12", 45 cal.	12 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1200	64
Washington ² .	5 per cent completed..	624	97 3½	30 6	32,600	* 21	8 12", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
West Virginia ² .	19 per cent completed..	624	97 3½	30 6	32,600	* 21	8 12", 45 cal.	14 5", 51 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	1430	75
Wyoming ¹ .	1912.	562	93 2½	28 6	26,000	21	12 12", 50 cal.	16 5", 51 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	875	72
South Dakota ² .	0 per cent completed..	684	101 9	33 0	43,200	* 23	12 16", 50 cal.	16 6", 53 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	(4)	(4)
North Carolina ² .		684	101 9	33 0	43,200	* 23	12 16", 50 cal.	16 6", 53 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	(4)	(4)
Montana ² .		684	101 9	33 0	43,200	* 23	12 16", 50 cal.	16 6", 53 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	(4)	(4)
Indiana (new) ² .		684	101 9	33 0	43,200	* 23	12 16", 50 cal.	16 6", 53 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	(4)	(4)
Massachusetts (new) ² .		684	101 9	33 0	43,200	* 23	12 16", 50 cal.	16 6", 53 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	(4)	(4)
Iowa (new) ² .		684	101 9	33 0	43,200	* 23	12 16", 50 cal.	16 6", 53 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 21".....	(4)	(4)
Total normal displacement.					889,650							

¹ Fitted as a flagship.² Estimated speed.³ In 1916 three-year program.⁴ Not determined.

The last three ships on list, Indiana, Massachusetts, Iowa, not officially named.

BATTLESHIPS—MIXED CALIBER.

Name.	Com-mis-sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displacement (normal).	Speed.	Battery.			Men.	Marines.
							Turret.	Secondary.	Antiaircraft.		
Alabama.....	1900.....	Feet. 374	Ft. in. 72 2½	Ft. in. 23 6	Tons. 11,552	Knots. 17.01	4 13", 35 cal.	8 6", 40 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	759	50
Connecticut.....	1906.....	456	76 10	24 6	16,000	18.78	4 12", 45 cal.	12 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	1151	64
Georgia.....	1906.....	441	76 2½	23 9	14,918	19.26	4 12", 40 cal.	8 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	955	64
Illinois.....	1901.....	375	72 2½	23 6	11,552	17.45	4 13", 45 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	732	50
Indiana.....	1895.....	351	69 3	24 0	10,288	15.55	4 13", 35 cal.	8 6", 40 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	725	50
Iowa.....	1897.....	362	72 2½	24 0	11,346	17.09	4 12", 35 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	760	50
Kansas.....	1907.....	456	76 10	24 6	16,000	18.03	4 12", 45 cal.	12 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	1180	64
Kearsarge.....	1900.....	375	72 2½	23 6	11,520	16.82	4 13", 35 cal.	8 5", 40 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	767	50
Kentucky.....	1900.....	375	72 2½	23 6	11,520	16.9	4 13", 35 cal.	8 5", 40 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	767	53
Louisiana.....	1906.....	456	76 10	24 6	16,000	18.82	4 12", 45 cal.	12 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	1152	64
Maine.....	1902.....	394	72 2½	23 10	12,500	18.0	4 12", 40 cal.	8 6", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	830	50
Massachusetts.....	1896.....	351	69 3	24 0	10,283	16.21	4 13", 35 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	725	50
Minnesota.....	1907.....	456	76 10	24 6	16,000	18.85	4 12", 45 cal.	12 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	1170	64
Missouri.....	1903.....	394	72 2½	23 11	12,500	18.15	4 12", 40 cal.	8 6", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	968	53
Nebraska.....	1907.....	441	76 2½	23 9	14,948	19.06	4 12", 40 cal.	8 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	955	64
New Hampshire.....	1903.....	456	76 10	24 6	16,000	18.16	4 12", 45 cal.	12 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	1191	64
New Jersey.....	1906.....	441	76 2½	23 9	14,948	19.18	4 12", 40 cal.	8 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	955	64
Ohio.....	1904.....	394	72 2½	23 7	12,500	17.82	4 12", 40 cal.	8 6", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	830	50
Oregon.....	1896.....	351	69 3	24 0	10,288	16.79	4 13", 35 cal.	4 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	725	50
Rhode Island.....	1906.....	441	76 2½	23 9	14,948	19.01	4 12", 40 cal.	12 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	989	64
Vermont.....	1907.....	455	76 10	24 6	16,000	18.33	4 12", 45 cal.	8 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	1191	64
Virginia.....	1906.....	441	76 2½	23 9	14,948	19.01	4 12", 40 cal.	12 3", 50 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	989	64
Wisconsin.....	1901.....	374	72 2½	23 6	11,552	17.17	4 13", 35 cal.	8 6", 40 cal.	2 3", 50 cal.	705	50

¹ Four 8" guns in superposed turrets.

BATTLE CRUISERS.

Name.	Commissioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displacement (normal).	Speed.	Battery.					Men.	Ma- rines.
							Guns.			Torpedo tubes.			
							Turret.	Secondary.	Antiaircraft.	Sub- merged.	Above water.		
Constellation.....	0 per cent completed.	<i>Feet.</i> 874	<i>Feet.</i> 90	<i>Ft. in.</i> 31 3	<i>Tons.</i> 35, 236	<i>Knots.</i> 135	8 16", 50 cal.	14 6", 53 cal.	4 3"	4 21" .. 4 21" ..	(?)	(?)	
Constitution.....	do.....	874	90	31 3	35, 236	135	8 16", 50 cal.	14 6", 53 cal.	4 3"	4 21" .. 4 21" ..	(?)	(?)	
Lexington.....	do.....	874	90	31 3	35, 236	135	8 16", 50 cal.	14 6", 53 cal.	4 3"	4 21" .. 4 21" ..	(?)	(?)	
Ranger.....	do.....	874	90	31 3	35, 236	135	8 16", 50 cal.	14 6", 53 cal.	4 3"	4 21" .. 4 21" ..	(?)	(?)	
Saratoga.....	do.....	874	90	31 3	35, 236	135	8 16", 50 cal.	14 6", 53 cal.	4 3"	4 21" .. 4 21" ..	(?)	(?)	
No. 6 (not named).....	do.....	874	90	31 3	35, 236	135	8 16", 50 cal.	14 6", 53 cal.	4 3"	4 21" .. 4 21" ..	(?)	(?)	

¹ Estimated.² Not determined.

All these ships in 1916 three-year program.

United States Navy, Nov. 1, 1918—Continued.

ARMORED CRUISERS.

Name.	Com-mis-sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Dis-place-ment.	Speed.	Battery.			Men.	Ma-rines.
							Turret.	Secondary.	Sub-merged torpedo tubes.		
Frederick ¹	1905	Feet. 503	Ft. in. 69 6½	Feet. 26	Tons. 15,000	Knots. 22½	4 8", 45 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 10 3", 50 cal....	2 18".....	979	64
Huntington ²	1905	503	69 6½	26	15,000	22½	4 8", 45 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 10 3", 50 cal....	2 18".....	979	64
Montana.....	1908	504	72 10½	27	16,000	22½	4 10", 40 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 12 3", 50 cal....	4 21".....	1000	64
North Carolina.....	1908	504	72 10½	27	16,000	22	4 10", 40 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 12 3", 50 cal....	4 21".....	1000	64
Pittsburgh ³	1905	504	69 6½	26	15,000	22½	4 8", 45 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 10 3", 50 cal....	2 18".....	979	64
Pueblo ⁴	1905	504	69 6½	26	15,000	22½	4 8", 45 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 10 3", 50 cal....	2 18".....	979	64
South Dakota.....	1908	504	63 6½	26	15,000	22½	4 8", 45 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 10 3", 50 cal....	2 18".....	979	64
Seattle ⁵	1903	504	72 10½	27	16,000	22½	4 10", 40 cal....	4 6", 50 cal.... 12 3", 50 cal....	4 21".....	1000	64

¹ Formerly Maryland.² Formerly West Virginia.³ Formerly Pennsylvania.⁴ Formerly Colorado.⁵ Formerly Washington.

Memphis and San Diego lost. Each armored cruiser has also 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.

CRUISERS, FIRST CLASS.

Name.	Com-mis-sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displace-ment.	Speed.	Battery.		Men.	Ma-rines.
							Main.	Secondary.		
Brooklyn.....	1896	Feet. 402	Ft. in. 64 8	Feet. 26½	Tons. 10,000	Knots. 21½	8 8", 35 cal....	8 5", 40 cal....	544	61
Charleston.....	1905	426	66 0	24½	10,800	22	12 6", 50 cal....	4 3", 50 cal....	681	48
Rochester.....	1893	384	64 10	26½	8,900	21	4 8", 45 cal....	10 5", 50 cal....	517	40
St. Louis.....	1906	426	66 0	24½	9,700	22	12 6", 50 cal....	4 3", 50 cal....	681	48

Milwaukee lost. Each ship has also 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.

SCOUT CRUISERS, SECOND CLASS.

[10 in number, all of same size, design, and equipment.]

Name.	Com-mis-sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displace-ment.	Speed.	Main battery.	Torpedo tubes (deck).	Men.	Ma-rines.
No. 4-13.....		Feet. 555	Feet. 55	Feet. 14½	Tons. 7,600	Knots. 35	8 6", 53 cal....	2 21" twin	300

Percentage completed: No. 4, 32.4; No. 5, 21.5; No. 6, 17; Nos. 9 and 10, 8; Nos. 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, 0.
All these ships in 1916 three-year program. Each ship has 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.

CRUISERS—SECOND CLASS.

Name	Com-mis-sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Displace-ment.	Draft.	Speed.	Battery.	Men.	Ma-rines.
Chicago.....	1889	Feet. 342	Ft. in. 48 2½	Tons. 4,500	Ft. in. 19 0	Knots. 18	4 5", 51 cal....	382
Columbia.....	1894	413	58 2	8,270	24 6	22½	3 6", 45 cal.; 4 4", 40 cal.	411	13
Minneapolis.....	1894	413	58 2	8,270	24 6	23	3 6", 45 cal.; 4 4", 40 cal.	438
Olympia.....	1895	344	53 0½	6,558	25 0	21½	10 5", 51 cal....	391

CRUISERS—THIRD CLASS.

Name.	Com-mis-sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Displace-ment.	Draft.	Speed.	Battery.		Torpedo tubes above water.	Men.	Ma-rines.
							Main.	Secondary.			
Albany.....	1900	Feet. 354	Feet. 43	Tons. 3,954	Ft. in. 19 1	Knots. 20½	8 5", 50 cal....	303
Anniston.....	1894	269	37	2,212	16 3	19	8 4", 40 cal....	4 3-pdr.....	245
Birmingham.....	1908	423	47	4,687	18 9	24	4 5", 51 cal....	2 3", 50 cal....	2 21".....	362	18
Chattanooga.....	1904	308	44	3,514	17 0	16½	8 5", 50 cal....	6 6-pdr.....	279
Chester.....	1908	423	47	4,687	18 9	26½	4 5", 51 cal....	3 3", 50 cal....	2 21".....	362
Cincinnati.....	1894	306	42	3,339	19 6	19½	9 5", 40 cal....	4 6-pdr.....	259	38
Cleveland.....	1903	308	44	3,514	17 0	16½	8 5", 50 cal....	6 6-pdr.....	279
Denver.....	1904	308	44	3,514	17 0	16½	8 5", 50 cal....	6 6-pdr.....	279	39
Des Moines.....	1901	309	44	3,514	17 0	16½	8 5", 50 cal....	6 6-pdr.....	279	19
Galveston.....	1905	308	44	3,514	17 0	16½	8 5", 50 cal....	6 6-pdr.....	279	38
Marblehead.....	1894	269	37	2,212	16 3	18½	8 4", 40 cal....	241
New Orleans.....	1898	354	43	3,954	19 1	20	8 5", 50 cal....	2 1-pdr.....	303
Raleigh.....	1894	305	42	3,339	19 6	21	9 5", 40 cal....	4 6-pdr.....	262
Salém.....	1908	423	47	4,687	18 9	26	4 5", 51 cal....	6 3", 50 cal....	2 21".....	362
Tacoma.....	1904	308	44	3,514	17 0	16½	8 5", 50 cal....	6 6-pdr.....	279

United States Navy, Nov. 1, 1918—Continued.¹

MONITORS.

Name.	Com- mis- sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Dis- place- ment.	Speed.	Battery.		Men.
							Turret.	Secondary.	
Amphitrite.....	1895	<i>Feet.</i> 262	<i>Feet.</i> 55	<i>Ft. in.</i> 14 6	<i>Tons.</i> 3,900	<i>Knots.</i> 10.5	4 10", 30 cal...	2 4", 40 cal.; 2 3-pdr.; 2 1-pdr.	211
Cheyenne ¹	1902	255	50	12 6	3,230	11.8	2 12", 40 cal...	4 4", 50 cal.; 2 6-pdr.; 2 1-pdr.	209
Monadnock.....	1896	262	55	14 6	3,900	11.63	4 10", 30 cal...	2 4", 40 cal.; 4 6-pdr.; 2 1-pdr.	217
Monterey.....	1893	260	59	14 10	4,084	13.6	2 10", 30 cal.; 2 12", 35 cal.	6 6-pdr.; 1 1-pdr.	217
Ozark ²	1902	255	50	12 6	3,215	12.03	2 12", 40 cal...	4 4", 50 cal.; 2 6-pdr.; 2 1-pdr.	203
Tallahassee ³	1903	255	50	12 6	3,225	12.4	2 12", 40 cal...	4 4", 50 cal.; 2 6-pdr.	209
Tonopah ⁴	1903	255	50	12 6	3,250	13.04	2 12", 40 cal...	4 4", 50 cal.; 2 6-pdr.; 2 1-pdr.	209

¹ Formerly Wyoming.² Formerly Arkansas.³ Formerly Florida.⁴ Formerly Nevada.

The Cheyenne, Ozark, Tallahassee, and Tonopah have 1 3", 50 cal. A. A.

SPECIAL TYPE.

Name.	Com- mis- sioned.	Duty.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displace- ment.	Battery.	Men.
Aroostook.....	1917	Mine planter.....	<i>Ft. in.</i> 395 0	<i>Ft. in.</i> 52 2	<i>Ft. in.</i> 16 0	<i>Tons.</i> 3,800	1 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.; 2 machine.	295
Baltimore.....	1890	do.....	335 0	48 7½	19 6	4,413	4 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.; 2 machine.	291
Black Hawk.....	1918	Mine force repair ship.....	420 2½	53 9	28 5	13,500	4 5", 51 cal.; 2 machine.....	421
Canandaigua.....	1918	Mine planter.....	405 1	48 3	22 6	7,620	1 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.; 2 machine.	350
Canonicus.....	1918	do.....	405 1	48 3	22 6	7,620	do.....	350
Housatonic.....	1918	do.....	405 1	48 3	22 6	7,620	do.....	350
Quinnebaug.....	1918	do.....	375 0	42 0	18 6	5,150	1 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.; 2 machine.	329
Roanoke.....	1918	do.....	405 1	48 3	22 6	7,620	1 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.; 2 machine.	353
San Francisco.....	1890	do.....	324 6	49 2	18 9	4,083	4 5", 51 cal.; 2 1-pdr.; 2 machine..	301
Saranac.....	1917	do.....	375 0	42 0	18 6	5,150	1 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.; 2 machine.	329
Shawmut.....	1917	do.....	395 0	52 2	16 0	3,800	1 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal. A. A.; 2 machine.	296
Vestal.....	1909	Repair ship.....	465 9	60 0	26 0	12,585	4 5", 50 cal.....	273
Vesuvius.....	1890	Torpedo practice.....	252 4	26 6½	10 7	930	1 3", 50 cal.....	32
Number 1.....		Building, 48 per cent complete.	482 9½	60 10½	20 11	10,600	4 5", 51 cal.; 4 3", 50 cal. A. A.....	193
Number 2.....		Building, 5.5 per cent complete.	482 9½	60 10½	20 11	10,600	do.....	193
Number 3 (repair ship).....		Building, 0 per cent complete.	67 6	18 6	10,000	do.....	do.....	

Nos. 1 and 2 are ammunition ships.

SUPPLY SHIPS.

Name.	Com- mis- sioned.	Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Displace- ment.	Speed.	Battery.	Men.
Bridge.....	1917	<i>Ft. in.</i> 422 11	<i>Ft. in.</i> 55 2½	<i>Ft. in.</i> 20 8	<i>Tons.</i> 8,500	<i>Knots.</i> 14.0	4 5", 50 cal.; 1 machine.....	150
Celtic.....	1898	383 1	44 7	21 0	6,750	10.5	4 3", 50 cal.; 1 3", 50 cal. A. A.	157
Culgoa.....	1898	346 4	43 0	21 9	6,000	13.25	4 3", 50 cal.....	165
Glacier.....	1898	388 7	46 1	25 4	8,325	12.3	1 5", 51 cal.; 2 3", 50 cal.....	103
Supply.....	1902	355 8	43 4	19 5	4,325	9.66	6 6-pdrs.; 4 1-pdr.....	152

Dimensions, etc., of destroyers built and under construction.
[There is some variation in type.]

Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Dis- place- ment.	Cost, approxi- mate.	Speed.	Battery.	Men.
<i>Feet.</i> 314	<i>Feet.</i> 31	<i>Feet.</i> 9	<i>Tons.</i> 1,270	\$2,000,000	<i>Knots.</i> 35	Guns: 4 4" 50 cal., 2 3" 23 cal. Torpedo tubes: 4 21" triple deck tubes.	114

Dimensions of "Eagle" patrol vessels.

Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Dis- place- ment.	Speed.	Battery.	Men.
<i>Feet.</i> 200	<i>Feet.</i> 25½	<i>Feet.</i> 8½	<i>Tons.</i> 200	<i>Knots.</i> 18	Guns: 2 4" 50 cal., 1 3" 50 cal. 1 V depth-bomb projector. 2 machine guns.	44

Dimensions of "S" type submarines.
[They differ somewhat in design.]

Length.	Beam.	Draft.	Dis- place- ment.	Cost, approxi- mate.	Speed.		Battery.	Men.
					Sur- face.	Sub- merged.		
<i>Feet.</i> 231	<i>Feet.</i> 21	<i>Feet.</i> 13	<i>Tons.</i> 800	\$1,300,000	<i>Knots.</i> 15	<i>Knots.</i> 12	1 4" gun; 4 tubes with 10 21" torpedoes.	34

Naval hospitals in operation on Nov. 11, 1918.

PERMANENT HOSPITALS.

(Including temporary additions.)

	Beds.
Portsmouth, N. H.....	157
Chelsea, Mass.....	825
Newport, R. I.....	758
New York, N. Y.....	1,815

Naval hospitals in operation on Nov. 11, 1918—Continued.

	Beds.
Philadelphia, Pa.	704
Washington, D. C.	177
Annapolis, Md.	343
Norfolk, Va.	1,499
Paris Island, S. C.	151
Pensacola, Fla.	237
New Orleans, La.	209
Great Lakes, Ill.	2,265
Fort Lyon, Colo.	526
Mare Island, Cal.	834
Puget Sound, Wash.	241
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.	40
Canacao, P. I.	185
Olongapo, P. I.	105
Guam, P. I.	31
Yokohama, Japan	99
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands	29
Key West, Fla.	223
Total	10,953

TEMPORARY HOSPITALS.

League Island, Pa.	254
Charleston, S. C.	360
Hampton Roads, Va.	645
Gulfport, Miss.	168
Cape May, N. J.	98
Pelham Bay Park, N. Y.	750
New London, Conn.	223
San Diego, Cal.	500
Quantico, Va.	301
Total	3,299

HOSPITAL SHIPS.

Name.	Commissioned.	Length.	Beds.
Comfort	1918	429	315
Mercy	1918	429	315
Solace	1898	377	250
Hospital ship No. 1 (building)		453	

AMBULANCE BOATS.

Name.	Commissioned.	Length.	Beds.
Adrian	1918	125	None.
Seagate	1918	122	None.
Southport	1918	125	None.

QUARANTINE SHIP.

Name.	Commissioned.	Length.	Beds.
Newark		311	(?)

FLOATING DISPENSARY.

Name.	Commissioned.	Length.	Beds.
Repose		299	(?)

FOR POSSIBLE CONVERSION TO HOSPITAL-SHIP PURPOSES.

U. S. S. Boston.
Boston floating hospital.

FOREIGN TEMPORARY HOSPITALS.

	Beds.
United States Naval Base Hospital No. 1, with the marines in France (Brest)	500
United States Naval Base Hospital No. 2, Strathpeffer, Scotland	701
United States Naval Base Hospital No. 3, Leith, Scotland	800
United States Naval Base Hospital No. 4, Queenstown, Ireland	243
United States Naval Base Hospital No. 5, Brest, France	700
United States naval hospital, L'Orient, France	75
United States naval hospital, Pauillac, France	100
United States naval hospital, London, England	75

FOREIGN TEMPORARY HOSPITALS—continued.

	Beds.
United States naval hospital, Gibraltar	75
United States naval hospital, Cardiff, Wales	75
United States naval hospital, Plymouth, England	75
United States naval hospital, Genoa, Italy	50
United States naval hospital, Corfu, Greece	100
Total	3,569
Total capacity	18,701

Navy killed and wounded in the war.

	Officers.		Enlisted force.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Navy	134	88	1,386	623
Marine Corps	55	208	1,587	8,942
Coast Guard	12		121	
Total	201	296	3,094	9,565

The Medical Department personnel assigned to take care of the sick and wounded of this force consists of 3,018 medical officers, 485 dental officers, 1,386 nurses, and 15,294 Hospital Corps men, appointed, enlisted, or enrolled either in the regular service or in the various reserve corps.

Summary of vessels in the United States Navy, Nov. 1, 1918.

Type.	Fit for service, including those under repair.		Under construction.		Authorized but not yet placed.		Total.	
	Number.	Displacement.	Number.	Displacement.	Number.	Displacement.	Number.	Displacement.
Battleships, single caliber.	16	403,450	11	399,800	2	86,400	29	889,650
Battleships, mixed caliber.	23	308,146					23	308,146
Battle cruisers.	8	111,900	6	211,800			6	211,800
Armored cruisers.	7	24,964					7	24,964
Monitors.	4	36,765					4	36,765
Cruisers, first class.	4	25,065	10	71,000			14	96,065
Cruisers, second class.	15	47,820					15	47,820
Cruisers, third class.	92	93,786	238	286,676	12	14,580	342	395,042
Coast torpedo vessels.	15	6,275					15	6,275
Torpedo boats.	17	3,146					17	3,146
Submarines.	79	29,886	93	73,084	9	(*)	181	102,970
Tenders.	17	98,860			3	31,200	20	130,060
Gunboats.	37	34,410	2	3,150			39	37,560
Mine sweepers.	14	13,300	40	38,000			54	51,300
Patrol vessels.	2	1,000	98	49,000			100	50,000
Submarine chasers.	300	19,500	42	2,730			342	22,230
Converted yachts.	12	8,711					12	8,711
Transports.	5	57,295			1	10,000	6	67,295
Supply ships.	5	33,900					5	33,900
Hospital ships.	6	34,097	1	9,800			7	43,897
Fuel ships.	21	248,989	3	44,400			24	293,389
Special service.	13	83,891	2	21,200	1	10,000	16	115,091
Tugs.	50	22,572	81	36,350			131	58,922
Unserviceable for war purposes.	15	43,356					15	43,356
Total	777	1,791,084	627	1,246,960	28	152,180	1,432	3,190,254

* On Feb. 1, 1919, destroyers in service, 112; building and authorized, 224.

† Fourteen of these have since been canceled. On Feb. 1, 1919, submarines in service, 85; building and authorized, 82.

‡ Does not include displacement of 9 fleet submarines.

§ Five of these have since been canceled.

|| Forty of these have since been canceled.

¶ Six of these have since been canceled.

Relative standing of the navies of the world in 1917.

[Furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.]

	Great Britain.		Germany.		United States.		France.		Japan.		Russia.		Italy.		Austria-Hungary.	
	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.
Battleships	57	1,137,150	38	682,349	32	665,098	19	355,735	12	227,297	14	250,009	12	195,200	11	138,501
Battle cruisers	11	243,500	5	115,162					4	110,000					2	13,600
Cruisers	23	(?)299,960	35	153,749	9	125,580	5	26,344	13	138,483	16	102,895	5	44,573	6	18,700
Light cruisers	(?)90	(?)410,235			14	66,410			10	43,210			10	22,272	3	24,900
Coast defense	35	83,610			4	12,900	1	8,800								
Destroyers	226	192,361	137	86,666	49	43,471	75	38,130	53	25,968	113	89,010	30	15,572	23	12,978
Torpedo boats	66	10,083			6	2,128	94	94,140	19	2,384			90	13,367	62	12,420
Submarines	172	28,635	47	20,314	39	14,430	59	24,820	16	3,414	49	20,437	21	5,449	25	4,598
Total	680	2,375,564	262	1,058,240	153	860,017	270	642,386	127	550,756	192	462,351	168	396,738	132	225,697

Relative standing of the navies of the world in 1917—Continued.

	Great Britain.		Germany.		United States.		France.		Japan.		Russia.		Italy.		Austria-Hungary.	
	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.	Number.	Tons.
BUILDING AND PROJECTED.																
Battleships.....	2	53,250	1	19,192	9	288,000	{ 5 124,150 14 116,000 }	4	(?)123,800	1	27,000	4	120,000	4	96,452	
Battle cruisers.....	1	17,500	2	54,000	14	128,000										
Cruisers.....	3	13,100	(?)		4	30,000			3	11,337	4	130,000	7	12,420	6	19,959
Light cruisers.....			(?)								2	16,000	7			
Coast-defense vessels.....			(?)				7						2	(?) 7,480		
Torpedo-boat destroyers.....	50	(?) 80,000	(?)		29	32,053	7	8,300	9	9,100	9	11,970	10	7,700		
Submarines.....	19	28,000	(?)		36	22,005	25	(?)	6	3,200	(?)		42	20,451		
Total.....	75	161,850	3	73,192	82	500,058	41	248,450	22	157,437	16	185,270	65	168,051	10	116,402

¹ Not laid down.

² Unknown.

The above figures are based upon the most authentic information on file in this office and represent the approximate strength, standing, and program January 1, 1917, of the above-named powers.

Relative standing of the navies of the world in 1919.

	Great Britain.		United States.		Germany.		Japan.		France.		Russia.		Italy.		Austria-Hungary.	
	Num-ber.	Tons.	Num-ber.	Tons.	Num-ber.	Tons.	Num-ber.	Tons.	Num-ber.	Tons.	Num-ber.	Tons.	Num-ber.	Tons.	Num-ber.	Tons.
Battleships.....	55	1,103,900	39	711,596	30	464,777	13	273,427	18	338,976	13	220,502	11	177,350	11	138,501
Battle cruisers.....	9	205,500			1	27,000	7	152,950								
Cruisers.....	24	300,150	8	111,900	29	127,629	12	113,242	18	185,957	12	93,050	5	45,696	8	21,452
Light cruisers.....	73	296,045	13	55,160			9	34,845	1	2,421			6	19,538		
Coast defense vessels.....	32	8,590	4	12,900									1	1,630		
Torpedo-boat destroyers.....	389	350,020	105	109,060	173	41,800	65	37,177	65	37,505	100	67,180	47	34,950	21	11,571
Torpedo boats.....	34	9,576			101	18,857	24	2,984	79	7,312			96	15,148	50	10,397
Submarines.....	140	(¹)	84	32,176	116	116,545	16	3,414	58	22,026	44	19,533	78	(?) 21,045	12	3,465
Total.....	736	2,273,781	253	1,032,792	450	826,637	146	618,039	239	504,197	169	400,265	248	(?) 315,977	102	185,386
BUILDING AND PROJECTED, 1919.																
Battleships.....			13	485,600	² 2	56,000	³ 4	128,000	{ 5 124,150 4 83,600 }	1	27,300				4	96,452
Battle cruisers.....	4	164,800	⁴ 8	211,416	⁵ 3											
Cruisers.....			10	63,900	⁶ 4	16,000					4	130,200		6	19,959	
Light cruisers.....	21	125,235			⁷ 4						8	57,600				
Torpedo-boat destroyers.....	115	141,855	237	286,779				{ 7 24,500 14 11,700 }	1	890	17	21,650	16	19,435		
Torpedo boats.....								{ 9 11,700 14 (?) }					4	640		
Submarines.....	79	66,871	⁸ 83	68,694		24,800	{ 4 3,000 6 (?) }	8	(¹)	1	650	11	3,399			
Total.....	219	498,761	349	1,116,389	13	96,800	24	167,200	14	125,040	31	237,400	31	23,474	10	116,492

¹ Unknown.

² 4 authorized, not laid down.

³ 1 laid down.

⁴ Not laid down.

⁵ Laid down; tonnage unknown.

⁶ 4 mine-laying cruisers laid down.

⁷ Tonnage unknown.

⁸ Including 9 not laid down.

NOTE.—Battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers, and coast defense vessels over 20 years of age not included. Torpedo-boat destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines over 15 years of age not included.

German vessels surrendered to the allies not included in the above compilation. Russian vessels in the hands of the Germans not included in German or Russian figures. The entire navy of Austria-Hungary, according to the best information on file in this office, is in the hands of the Jugo-Slavs. The ships are being paid off and rendered harmless.

The warship construction of the Russian Navy has ceased and little work has been done since June, 1917.

While Germany ranks third according to tonnage, her real position, according to fighting ships and gun power, is fifth.

The Turkish Navy is in the hands of the allies.

THE COMBATANT NAVY ON MAR. 1, 1919.

DECEMBER 13, 1918.

The office of the Chief of Naval Operations has laid out plans for the operations of the naval forces which involve the elimination of all craft in use temporarily for the war. The estimates for personnel in accordance with these plans is indicated below:

	Number of ships.	Number of men.
Battleship force:		
In full commission.....	29	35,341
In reserve, two-third crew.....	8	4,400
Out of commission.....	3	
Cruiser force:		
In full commission.....	20	12,096
In reserve, two-third crew.....	2	932
Out of commission.....	3	
Patrol force:		
In full commission.....	24	3,968
Out of commission.....	21	
Destroyer force:		
In full commission.....	165	20,635
Out of commission.....	1	
Submarine force:		
In full commission.....	99	4,533
Mine force:		
In full commission.....	9	1,831
Out of commission.....	6	

THE COMBATANT NAVY ON MAR. 1, 1919—continued.

	Number of ships.	Number of men.
Train:		
In full commission.....	14	2,498
Out of commission.....	3	
Sub chasers:		
In full commission.....	168	4,032
In reserve, two-third crew.....	84	1,344
Out of commission.....	65	
Troop transports (see note), in full commission.....	42	20,383
Special and detached duty:		
In full commission.....	16	2,445
Out of commission.....	4	
Pacific Fleet:		
In full commission.....	8	1,261
Out of commission.....	5	
Asiatic Fleet, in full commission.....	28	2,307
Eagle boats, in full commission.....	17	1,156
Sweepers, in full commission.....	37	2,479
Aviation force, in full commission (stations).....	12	6,000
Miscellaneous details, receiving ship, yard and station craft, permanent training station force, naval districts, radio and communication on shore, recruiting, under treatment in hospitals, etc.....		20,000
Under training for replacements due to expiration of enlistments in trade schools.....		12,000
Apprentices and firemen under instruction.....		24,000
Total required for combatant Navy Mar. 1, 1919.....		183,641

THE COMBATANT NAVY ON MAR. 1, 1918—continued.

	Number of ships.	Number of men.
Additional for new construction to July 1, 1923:		
Battleships.....	4	5,210
Destroyers.....	185	23,125
Eagle boats.....	43	2,921
Submarines.....	21	535
Sweepers.....	17	1,139
Total for new construction.....		33,323
Grand total to man permanent Navy July 1, 1923.....		216,669

1916—THREE-YEAR PROGRAM.

By the act of August 29, 1916, the so-called three-year building program was adopted, providing for 10 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 9 fleet submarines, 50 destroyers, 58 coast submarines, 3 fuel (oil) ships, 1 repair ship, 1 transport, 1 hospital ship, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 fleet submarine tender, 2 ammunition ships, and 2 gunboats. A total of 156 ships was included in this program, but at the present time 6 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 2 scout cruisers, and 9 fleet submarines, while designed, have not been laid down.

LOSSES OF AMERICAN VESSELS DURING THE WAR.

The following is a list, according to the most authentic information on file in the Office of Naval Intelligence, of all naval losses from April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918:

Name.	Class.	Tonnage.	Lives lost.	Date.	Remarks.
BY SUBMARINES.					
Antilles.....	Transport...	6,875 gross....	70	Oct. 17, 1917	Torpedoed.
Alcedo.....	Armed yacht	981 gross.....	20	Nov. 5, 1917	Do.
Jacob Jones.....	Destroyer....	1,265 gross....	62	Dec. 6, 1917	Do.
Lake Moor.....	Cargo steamer.	1,955 gross....	45	Apr. 11, 1918	Do.
Rockefeller, Wm.	Tanker.....	7,157 gross....	3	May 18, 1918	Do.
President Lincoln.	Transport....	18,167 gross....	26	May 31, 1918	Do.
Covington.....	do.....	16,339 gross....	6	July 1, 1918	Do.
Westover.....	Army supply.	8,800 gross....	8	July 11, 1918	Do.
Westbridge ¹	N. O. T. S....	5,660 gross....	4	Aug. 15, 1918	Do.
Montanan.....	Army account.	6,659 gross....	5	Aug. 16, 1918	Do.
Mt. Vernon ²	Transport....	18,372 gross....	36	Sept. 5, 1918	Do.
Buena Ventura.....	Army cargo.	4,881 gross....	64	Sept. 16, 1918	Do.
Tampa.....	C. G. C.....	1,181 displacement.	112	Sept. 26, 1918	Do.
Ticonderoga ³	Animal cargo.	5,130 gross....	* 216	Sept. 30, 1918	Shelled and torpedoed.
BY MINES.					
Pratt, Herbert L. ⁴	Tanker.....	7,145 gross....	None.	June 2, 1918	
Californian.....	Cargo.....	5,658 gross....	None.	June 23, 1918	
San Diego.....	Cruiser.....	13,680 displacement.	50	July 19, 1918	
Minnesota ⁴	Battleship...	16,000 displacement.	None.	Sept. 29, 1918	
Saetia.....	N. O. T. S....	2,873 gross....		Nov. 9, 1918	
BY COLLISION.					
Mohawk.....	Revenue cutter.	1,148 displacement.	None.	Oct. 1, 1917	
Chauncey.....	Destroyer....	592 displacement.	18	Nov. 19, 1917	
S. C. No. 141.....	Submarine chaser.	75 gross.....	None.	Dec. 13, 1917	
F. I.....	Submarine....		19	Dec. 17, 1917	
Zaanland.....	Cargo.....	5,417 gross....	None.	May 13, 1918	
Wakiva II.....	Yacht.....	853 gross.....	2	May 22, 1918	
Schurz.....	Cruiser.....	1,630 displacement.	1	June 21, 1918	
Oosterdijk.....	Cargo.....	8,251 gross....	None.	July 11, 1918	
S. C. No. 187.....	Submarine chaser.	75 gross.....	None.	Aug. 4, 1918	
S. C. No. 60.....	Submarine chaser.	75 gross.....	2	Oct. 1, 1918	
Herman Frasch (Army).	Transport....	3,803 gross....	16	Oct. 4, 1918	
S. C. No. 397.....	Submarine chaser.	75 gross.....	None.	Oct. 5, 1918	With O-13.
Westgate.....	Cargo (Army)	8,800 dead-weight.	7	Oct. 7, 1918	
Shaw.....	Destroyer....	1,100 displacement.	12	Oct. 9, 1918	
Tarantula.....	Special patrol.		None.	Oct. 28, 1918	
MISCELLANEOUS SINKINGS.					
Rehoboth.....	Armed trawler.	254 gross....	None.	Oct. 8, 1917	
S. C. No. 117.....	Submarine chaser.	75 gross.....	None.	Dec. 22, 1917	Burned: Norfolk Navy Yard.

¹ Salvaged. ² Torpedoed; made port. ³ 216 lost, 2 captured. ⁴ Mined; made port.

LOSSES OF AMERICAN VESSELS DURING THE WAR—continued.

Name.	Class.	Tonnage.	Lives lost.	Date.	Remarks.
MISCELLANEOUS SINKINGS—CON.					
Bauman.....	Trawler.....	304 gross....	None.	Jan. 12, 1918	
Guinevere.....	Yacht.....	499 gross....	None.	Jan. 25, 1918	Struck rock.
Elfreda.....	do.....	164 displacement.	None.	Feb. 21, 1918	
Mariner.....	Tug.....	220 gross....	None.	Feb. 26, 1918	Foundered.
Cherokee.....	do.....	272 gross....	23	do.....	Do.
Cyclops.....	Collier.....	10,360 displacement.	293	Apr. 21, 1918	Mysteriously disappeared.
No. 3429.....	Motor patrol.		2	July 10, 1918	German shore battery.
Montauk.....	Patrol boat..	641 gross....	7	Aug. 21, 1918	Driven ashore.
S. C. No. 209.....	Submarine chaser.	75 gross....	17	Aug. 27, 1918	Shelled by mistake.
S. C. No. 219.....	do.....	do.....	4	Oct. 9, 1918	Internal explosion.
Lake Borgne.....	Army account.	2,100 gross....	None.	Oct. 22, 1918	Struck rock.
Ophir.....	N. O. T. S....	7,089.....	None.	Nov. 11, 1918	Internal explosion.

Summary.

NAVAL VESSELS.

	Number of vessels.	Tonnage.	Lives.
From Apr. 6, 1917, to Nov. 11, 1918:			
By submarines.....	14	103,583	677
By mines.....	5	45,356	54
By collision.....	15	30,794	65
Miscellaneous.....	14	31,128	346
Total number Navy vessels.....	48	210,861	1,142

MERCHANT VESSELS.

	Number of vessels.	Tonnage.	Lives.
From August, 1914, to Apr. 6, 1917:			
By submarines.....	15	53,671	63
By mines.....	5	10,770	4
By German cruiser Prinz Eitel Frederick.	1	3,374	
Total from August, 1914, to Apr. 6, 1917.....	21	67,815	67
From Apr. 6, 1917, to Nov. 11, 1918:			
By submarines.....	124	244,385	342
By raiders.....	6	4,388	
Total from Apr. 6, 1917, to Nov. 11, 1918.....	130	248,772	342
Total number merchant vessels.....	151	315,588	409
Total number Navy vessels.....	49	210,861	1,144
Grand total.....	200	526,449	1,553

Major units of the surrendered German fleet.

	Date of completion.	Displacement.	Best armor.	Speed.	Guns (main battery).
DREADNAUGHTS.					
Bayern.....	1916	28,000	14	22.5	8 15", 16 5.9".
Koenig.....	1914	25,400	13	22	10 12", 14 5.9".
Grosser Kurfurst.....	1914	25,400	13	22	Do.
Markgraf.....	1914	25,400	13	22	Do.
Kronprinz Wilhelm.....	1915	25,400	13	22	Do.
Kaiser.....	1912	24,500	13	23	Do.
Kaiserin.....	1913	24,500	13	23	Do.
Koenig Albert.....	1913	24,500	13	23	Do.
Friedrich der Grosse.....	1912	24,500	13	23	Do.
Regent Luitpold.....	1913	24,500	13	23	Do.
Baden ¹	1916	18,000		23	8 15", 16 5.9".
BATTLE CRUISERS.					
Hindenburg.....	1917	27,000	12	28	8 12", 16 5.9".
Derfflinger.....	1914	26,200	12	27	8 12", 14 5.9".
Seydlitz.....	1913	14,600	11	28	10 11", 12 5.9".
Moltke.....	1911	12,600	11	28	Do.
Von der Tann.....	1910	19,100	9	27	8 11", 10 5.9".
SCOUT CRUISERS.					
Bremse.....	1916	4,000		35	4 5.9".
Brummer.....	1916	4,000		35	Do.
Emden.....	1916	4,200		30	7 5.9".
Karlsruhe.....	1916	4,200		30	Do.
Nurnberg.....	1916	4,200		30	Do.
Frankfurt.....	1916	5,100		30	8 5.9".
Koln ²	1917	6,300		33	7 5.9".
Dresden.....	1918				7 5.9".

¹ Surrendered on Jan. 11 in place of Mackensen.

² Not yet given up.

All of the dreadnaughts and battle cruisers, with the exception of the Moltke are equipped with 5 submerged torpedo tubes, firing the latest 22-inch German torpedo. The Moltke carries 4 tubes. The scout cruisers are all equipped for laying mines, the Bremse and Brummer having a capacity each of 361 mines.

The armistice called for the surrender of 50 destroyers and 160 submarines. The destroyers have been surrendered, but up to the present only 133 submarines have been interned.

Allied and neutral shipping lost by enemy action, Aug. 1, 1914, to Nov. 11, 1918.

	Ships.	Gross tons.
Allied.....	4,683	10,525,391
Neutral.....	1,506	2,292,566
Grand total.....	6,189	12,817,957

STRENGTH OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SUBMARINE FORCES.

On August 1, 1918, the estimated number of German submarines was as follows: Total number built, 331; number sunk, 158; number available, 173. These 173 were divided, 26 school boats, 147 operating at sea. Of the 147 operating, 28 were in the Mediterranean and 119 in the Atlantic.

Austrian submarines: Number built, 35; number obsolete, 10; number sunk, 7; number available, 18. All of the Austrian submarines were operating in the Mediterranean, and adding the German submarines operating in the Mediterranean, 28, makes a total of 46 in those waters.

THE MARINE CORPS IN THE WAR.

[Extracts from the report of the Secretary of the Navy.]

Memorial Day shall henceforth have a greater, deeper significance for America, for it was on that day, May 30, 1918, that our country really received its first call to battle—the battle in which American troops had the honor of stopping the German drive on Paris, throwing back the Prussian hordes in attack after attack, and beginning the retreat which lasted until Imperial Germany was beaten to its knees and its emissaries appealing for an armistice under the flag of truce. And to the United States Marines, fighting side by side with equally brave and equally courageous men in the American Army, fell the honor of taking over the lines where the blow of the Prussian would strike the hardest, the line that was nearest Paris, and where, should a breach occur, all would be lost. The world knows to-day that the United States Marines held that line; that they blocked the advance that was rolling on toward Paris at a rate of 6 or 7 miles a day; that marines and soldiers of the American Army threw back the crack guard divisions of Germany, broke their advance, and then, attacking, drove them back in the beginning of a retreat that was not to end until the "cease-firing" signal sounded for the end of the world's greatest war. In this connection, Melville Stone, general manager of the Associated Press, said, following an exhaustive trip of investigation in Europe:

They (the marines) had before them the best Prussian Guards and shock troops—the Germans were perfectly sure they could drive the "amateurs" back.

It was a dramatic situation, for success meant that the Germans could probably push for Calais and other channel ports; but Foch dangled Paris before their eyes by putting raw Americans at a point across the direct road to Paris in the pocket between Rheims and Soissons. Instead of driving back the "amateurs," the "amateurs" drove them and gave them also a very sound thrashing. Their losses were heavy, but they did the work, and in doing it also did three things: They saved Paris; they seriously injured the morale of the best German troops; and they set a standard and fixed a reputation for American troops that none other dared tarnish.

Such is the opinion of the head of a great news-gathering force regarding the achievements of the United States Marines at Chateau-Thierry, where in the battle field of Boisse de Belleau, now named the Bois de la Brigade de Marine by official order of the French staff, this branch of the Navy met the Germans and blocked their drive on Paris.

The Marine Corps played a vital rôle in stemming the German rush on Paris, and in later days aided in the beginning of the great offensive, the freeing of Rheims, and participated in the hard fighting in Champagne, which had as its object the throwing back of the Prussian armies in the vicinity of Cambrai and St. Quentin.

With only 8,000 men engaged in the fiercest battles, the Marine Corps casualties numbered 69 officers and 1,531 enlisted men dead, and 78 officers and 2,435 enlisted men wounded seriously enough to be officially reported by cablegram, to which number should be added not a few whose wounds did not incapacitate them for further fighting. However, with a casualty list that numbers nearly half the original 8,000 men who entered battle, the official reports account for only 57 United States Marines who have been captured by the enemy. This includes those who were wounded far in advance of their lines and who fell into the hands of Germans while unable to resist.

ORDERED TO FRONT ON MEMORIAL DAY.

It was on the evening of May 30, after a day dedicated to the memory of their comrades who had fallen in the training days and in the Verdun sector, that the Fifth and Sixth Regiments and the Sixth Machine-Gun Battalion, United States Marines, each received the following orders:

Advance information official received that this regiment will move at 10 p. m. 30 May by bus to new era. All trains shall be loaded at once and arrangements hastened. Wagons, when loaded, will move to Scrans to form train.

All through the night there was fevered activity among the marines. Then, the next morning, the long trains of camions, busses, and trucks, each carrying its full complement of United States Marines, went forward on a road which at one place wound within less than 10 miles of Paris, toward Meaux and the fighting line.

Through the town of Meaux went the long line of camions and to the village of Montriell-aux-Lions, less than 4 miles from the rapidly advancing German line. On this trip the camions containing the Americans were the only traffic traveling in the direction of the Germans; everything else was going the other way—refugees, old men and women, small children, riding on every conceivable conveyance, many trudging along the side of the road driving a cow or calf before them, all of them covered with the white dust which the camion caravan was whirling up as it rolled along; along that road only one organization was advancing—the United States Marines.

GOT INTO LINE ON JUNE 2.

At last, their destination reached early on the morning of June 2, they disembarked, stiff and tired after a journey of more than 72 miles, but as they formed their lines and marched onward in the direction of the line they were to hold they were determined and cheerful. That evening the first field message from the Fourth Brigade to Maj. Gen. Omar Bundy, commanding the Second Division, went forward:

Second Battalion, Sixth Marines, in line from Le Thiolet through Charentais Woods to Triangle to Lucy. Instructed to hold line. First Battalion, Sixth Marines, going into line from Lucy through Hill 142. Third Battalion in support of Le Voie du Chatel, which is also the post command of the Sixth Marines. Sixth Machine-Gun Battalion distributed at line.

Meanwhile the Fifth Regiment was moving into line, machine guns were advancing, and the Artillery taking its position. That night the men and officers of the marines slept in the open, many of them in a field that was green with unharvested wheat, awaiting the time when they should be summoned to battle. The next day at 5 o'clock, the afternoon of June 2, began the battle of Chateau-Thierry, with the Americans holding the line against the most vicious wedge of the German advance.

BATTLE OF CHATEAU-THIERRY.

The advance of the Germans was across a wheat field, driving at Hill 105 and advancing in smooth columns. The United States Marines, trained to keen observation upon the rifle range, nearly every one of them wearing a marksman's medal or, better, that of the sharpshooter or expert rifleman, did not wait for those gray-clad hordes to advance nearer. Calmly they set their sights and aimed with the same precision that they had shown upon the rifle ranges at Paris Island, Mare Island, and Quantico. Incessantly their rifles cracked, and with their fire came the support of the Artillery. The machine-gun fire, incessant also, began to make its inroads upon the advancing forces. Closer and closer the shrapnel burst to its targets. Caught in a seething wave of machine-gun fire, of scattering shrapnel, of accurate rifle fire, the Germans found themselves in a position in which further advance could only mean absolute suicide. The lines hesitated. They stopped. They broke for cover, while the marines raked the woods and ravines in which they had taken refuge with machine gun and rifle to prevent them making another attempt to advance by infiltrating through. Above a French airplane was checking up on the Artillery fire. Surprised by the fact that men should deliberately set their sights, adjust their range, and then fire deliberately at an advancing foe, each man picking his target instead of firing merely in the direction of the enemy, the aviator signaled below "Bravo!" In the rear that word was echoed again and again. The German drive on Paris had been stopped.

PIERCED FIGHTING IN BELLEAU WOOD.

For the next few days the fighting took on the character of pushing forth outposts and determining the strength of the enemy. Now, the fighting had changed. The Germans, mystified that they should have run against a stone wall of defense just when they believed that their advance would be easiest, had halted, amazed, then prepared to defend the positions they had won with all the stubbornness possible. In the black recesses of Belleau Wood the Germans had established nest after nest of machine guns. There in the jungle of matted underbrush, of vines, of heavy foliage, they had placed themselves in positions they believed impregnable. And this meant that unless they could be routed, unless they could be thrown back, the breaking of the attack of June 2 would mean nothing. There would come another drive and another. The battle of Chateau-Thierry was

therefore not won and could not be won until Belleau Wood had been cleared of the enemy.

It was June 6 that the attack of the American troops began against that wood and its adjacent surroundings, with the wood itself and the towns of Torcy and Bouresches forming the objectives. At 5 o'clock the attack came, and there began the tremendous sacrifices which the Marine Corps gladly suffered that the German fighters might be thrown back.

FOUGHT IN AMERICAN FASHION.

The marines fought strictly according to American methods—a rush, a halt, a rush again, in four-wave formation, the rear waves taking over the work of those who had fallen before them, passing over the bodies of their dead comrades and plunging ahead, until they, too, should be torn to bits. But behind those waves were more waves, and the attack went on.

"Men fell like flies"; the expression is that of an officer writing from the field. Companies that had entered the battle 250 strong dwindled to 50 and 60, with a sergeant in command; but the attack did not falter. At 9.45 o'clock that night Bouresches was taken by Lieut. James F. Robertson and twenty-odd men of his platoon; these soon were joined by two reinforcing platoons. Then came the enemy counterattacks, but the marines held.

CHARGING ON MACHINE-GUN NESTS.

In Belleau Wood the fighting had been literally from tree to tree, stronghold to stronghold, and it was a fight which must last for weeks before its accomplishment in victory. Belleau Wood was a jungle, its every rocky formation forming a German machine-gun nest, almost impossible to reach by artillery or grenade fire. There was only one way to wipe out these nests—by the bayonet. And by this method were they wiped out, for United States Marines, bareheaded, shouting their battle cry of "E-e-e-e y-a-a-h-h yip!" charged straight into the murderous fire from those guns, and won! Out of the number that charged, in more than one instance, only one would reach the stronghold. There, with his bayonet as his only weapon, he would either kill or capture the defenders of the nest, and then, swinging the gun about in its position, turn it against the remaining German positions in the forest. Such was the character of the fighting in Belleau Wood; fighting which continued until July 6, when, after a short relief, the invincible Americans finally were taken back to the rest billet for recuperation.

HELD THE LINE FOR MANY WEARY DAYS.

In all the history of the Marine Corps there is no such battle as that one in Belleau Wood. Time after time officers seeing their lines cut to pieces, seeing their men so dog tired that they even fell asleep under shell fire, hearing their wounded calling for the water that they were unable to supply, seeing men fight on after they had been wounded and until they dropped unconscious; time after time officers seeing these things, believing that the very limit of human endurance had been reached, would send back messages to their post commanders that their men were exhausted. But in answer to this would come the word that the lines must hold, and if possible those lines must attack. And the lines obeyed. Companies had been so torn and lacerated by losses that they were hardly platoons; but they held their lines and advanced them. In more than one case companies lost every officer, leaving a sergeant and sometimes a corporal to command, and the advance continued. After 13 days in this inferno of fire a captured German officer told with his dying breath of a fresh division of Germans that was about to be thrown into the battle to attempt to wrest from the marines that part of the wood they had gained. The marines, who for days had been fighting only on their sheer nerve, who had been worn out from nights of sleeplessness, from lack of rations, from terrific shell and machine-gun fire, straightened their lines and prepared for the attack. It came—as the dying German officer had predicted.

GERMAN CRACK TROOPS REPULSED AND BEATEN.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of June 13 it was launched by the Germans along the whole front. Without regard for men, the enemy hurled his forces against Bouresches and the Bois de Belleau, and sought to win back what had been taken from Germany by the Americans. The orders were that these positions must be taken at all costs; that the utmost losses in men must be endured that the Bois de Belleau and Bouresches might fall again into German hands. But the depleted lines of the marines held; the men who had fought on their nerve alone for days once more showed the mettle of which they were made. With their backs to the trees and boulders of the Bois de Belleau, with their sole shelter the scattered ruins of Bouresches, the thinning lines of the marines repelled the attack and crushed

back the new division which had sought to wrest the position from them.

And so it went. Day after day, night after night, while time after time messages like the following traveled to the post command:

Losses heavy. Difficult to get runners through. Some have never returned. Morale excellent, but troops about all in. Men exhausted.

Exhausted, but holding on. And they continued to hold on in spite of every difficulty. Advancing their lines slowly day by day, the marines finally prepared their positions to such an extent that the last rush for the possession of the wood could be made. Then, on June 24, following a tremendous barrage, the struggle began.

The barrage literally tore the woods to pieces, but even its immensity could not wipe out all the nests that remained, the emplacements that were behind almost every clump of bushes, every jagged, rough group of boulders. But those that remained were wiped out by the American method of the rush and the bayonet, and in the days that followed every foot of Belleau Wood was cleared of the enemy and held by the frayed lines of the Americans.

PRaise FROM THE FRENCH STAFF.

It was, therefore, with the feeling of work well done that the depleted line of the marines were relieved in July, that they might be filled with replacements and made ready for the grand offensive in the vicinity of Soissons, July 18. And in recognition of their sacrifice and bravery this praise was forthcoming from the French:

ARMY HEADQUARTERS, June 30, 1918.

In view of the brilliant conduct of the Fourth Brigade of the Second United States Division, which in a spirited fight took Bouresches and the important strong point of Bois de Belleau, stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the general commanding the Sixth Army orders that henceforth in all official papers the Bois de Belleau shall be named "Bois de la Brigade de Marine."

DIVISION GEN. DEGOUTTE, Commanding Sixth Army.

GEN. PERSHING PERSONALLY CONGRATULATES MARINES.

Gen. Pershing's congratulations also were contained in the following order issued by the brigade commander, dated June 9, 1918, to the units of his command:

The brigade commander takes pride in announcing that, in addition to the commander in chief's telegram of congratulation to the Fourth Brigade, published in an indorsement from the division commander, dated June 9, Gen. Pershing has to-day visited division headquarters and sent his personal greetings and congratulations to the Marine brigade. He also added that Gen. Foch, commander in chief of the allied armies in France, especially charged him this morning to give the Marine brigade his love and congratulations on their fine work of the past week.

By command of Brig. Gen. Harbord. H. LAY, Major, Adjutant.

IN BATTLE FOR ST. MIHIEL SALIENT.

Then came the battle for the St. Mihiel salient. On the night of September 11 the Second Division took over a line running from Remenauville to Limey, and on the night of September 14 and the morning of September 15 attacked, with two days' objectives ahead of them. Overcoming the enemy resistance, they romped through to the Rupt de Mad, a small river, crossed it on stone bridges, occupied Thiacourt, the first day's objective, scaled the heights just beyond it, pushed on to a line running from the Zammes-Jouney Ridges to the Binvaux Forest, and there rested, with the second day's objectives occupied by 2.50 o'clock of the first day. The casualties of the division were about 1,000, of which 134 were killed. Of these about half were marines. The captures in which the marines participated were 80 German officers, 3,200 men, ninety-odd cannon, and vast stores.

CAPTURE OF BLANC MONT RIDGE.

But even further honors were to befall the fighting, landing, and building force, of which the Navy is justly proud. In the early part of October it became necessary for the allies to capture the bald, jagged ridge 20 miles due east of Rheims, known as Blanc Mont Ridge. Here the armies of Germany and the allies had clashed more than once, and attempt after attempt had been made to wrest it from German hands. It was a keystone of the German defense, the fall of which would have a far-reaching effect upon the enemy armies. To the glory of the United States Marines, let it be said, that they were again a part of that splendid Second Division which swept forward in the attack which freed Blanc Mont Ridge from German hands, pushed its way down the slopes, and occupied the level ground just beyond, thus assuring a victory, the full import of which can best be judged by the order of Gen. Lejeune, following the battle:

FRANCE, October 11, 1918.

OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE SECOND DIVISION:

It is beyond my power of expression to describe fitly my admiration for your heroism. You attacked magnificently and you seized Blanc Mont Ridge, the keystone of the arch constituting the enemy's main position. You advanced beyond the ridge, breaking the enemy's lines,

and you held the ground gained with a tenacity which is unsurpassed in the annals of war.

As a direct result of your victory, the German armies east and west of Rheims are in full retreat, and by drawing on yourselves several German divisions from other parts of the front you greatly assisted the victorious advance of the allied armies between Cambrai and St. Quentin.

Your heroism and the heroism of our comrades who died on the battle field will live in history forever and will be emulated by the young men of our country for generations to come.

To be able to say when this way is finished, "I belonged to the Second Division, I fought with it at the battle of Blanc Mont Ridge," will be the highest honor that can come to any man.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE,

Major General, United States Marine Corps, Commanding.

MARKSMANSHIP AMAZES ALLIES.

Thus it is that the United States Marines have fulfilled the glorious traditions of their corps in this their latest duty as the "soldiers who go to sea." Their sharpshooting—and in one regiment 93 per cent of the men wear the medal of a marksman, a sharpshooter, or an expert rifleman—has amazed soldiers of European armies, accustomed merely to shooting in the general direction of the enemy. Under the fiercest fire they have calmly adjusted their sights, aimed for their man, and killed him, and in bayonet attacks their advance on machine-gun nests has been irresistible. In the official citation lists more than one American marine is credited with taking an enemy machine gun single handed, bayoneting its crew, and then turning the gun against the foe. In one battle alone, that of Belleau Wood, the citation lists bear the names of fully 500 United States Marines who so distinguished themselves in battle as to call forth the official commendation of their superior officers.

CORPS FULFILLED EVERY GLORIOUS TRADITION.

More than faithful in every emergency, accepting hardships with admirable morale, proud of the honor of taking their place as shock troops for the American legions, they have fulfilled every glorious tradition of their corps, and they have given to the world a list of heroes whose names will go down to all history.

ACCOUNTS OF LOSSES BY SUBMARINES.

TORPEDOING OF THE U. S. S. "CASSIN."

[Compiled from report of the commanding officer and supplementary reports.]

On October 15, 1917, the U. S. destroyer *Cassin* was patrolling off the south coast of Ireland; when about 20 miles south of Mine Head, at 1.30 p. m., a submarine was sighted by the lookout aloft 4 or 5 miles away, about two points on the port bow. The submarine at this time was awash and was made out by officers of the watch and the quartermaster of the watch, but three minutes later submerged.

At about 1.57 p. m. the commanding officer sighted a torpedo, apparently shortly after it had been fired, running near the surface and in a direction that was estimated would make a hit either in the engine or fire room. When first seen the torpedo was between three and four hundred yards from the ship, and the wake could be followed on the other side for about 400 yards. The torpedo was running at high speed, at least 35 knots. The *Cassin* was maneuvering to dodge the torpedo, double emergency full speed ahead having been signaled from the engine room and the rudder put hard left as soon as the torpedo was sighted. It looked for the moment as though the torpedo would pass astern. When about 15 or 20 feet away the torpedo porpoised, completely leaving the water and sheering to the left. Before again taking the water the torpedo hit the ship well aft on the port side about frame 163 and above the water line. Almost immediately after the explosion of the torpedo the depth charges, located on the stern and ready for firing, exploded. There were two distinct explosions in quick succession after the torpedo hit.

But one life was lost. Osmond K. Ingram, gunner's mate, first class, was cleaning the muzzle of No. 4 gun, target practice being just over, when the attack occurred. With rare presence of mind, realizing that the torpedo was about to strike the part of the ship where the depth charges were stored and that the setting off of these explosives might sink the ship, Ingram, immediately seeing the danger, ran aft to strip these charges and throw them overboard. He was blown to pieces when the torpedo struck. Thus Ingram sacrificed his life in performing a duty which he believed would save his ship and the lives of the officers and men on board.

Nine members of the crew received minor injuries.

After the ship was hit the crew was kept at general quarters. The executive officer and engineer officer inspected the parts of the ship that were damaged, and those adjacent to the damage. It was found that the engine and fire rooms and after magazine were intact and that the engines could be worked; but that the ship could not be steered, the rudder having been blown off and the stern blown to starboard. The ship continued to turn to

starboard in a circle. In an effort to put the ship on a course by the use of the engines, something carried away which put the starboard engine out of commission. The port engine was kept going at slow speed. The ship, being absolutely unmanageable, sometimes turned in a circle and at times held an approximate course for several minutes.

Immediately after the ship was torpedoed the radio was out of commission. The radio officer and radio electrician chief managed to improvise a temporary auxiliary antenna. The generators were out of commission for a short time after the explosion, the ship being in darkness below.

At about 2.30 p. m., when we were in approximately the same position as when torpedoed, a submarine conning tower was sighted on port beam, distant about 1,500 yards, ship still circling under port engine. Opened fire with No. 2 gun, firing four rounds. Submarine submerged and was not seen again. Two shots came very close to submarine.

At 3.50 p. m. U. S. S. *Porter* stood by. At 4.25 p. m. wreckage which was hanging to stern dropped off. At dark stopped port engine and drifted. At about 9 p. m. H. M. S. *Jessamine* and H. M. S. *Tamarisk* stood by. H. M. S. *Jessamine* signaled she would stand by until morning and then take us in tow. At this time sea was very rough, wind about six or seven and increasing.

H. M. S. *Tamarisk* prepared to take us in tow, and made one attempt after another to get a line to us. Finally, about 2.10 a. m., October 16, the *Tamarisk* lowered a boat in rough sea and sent grass line by means of which our 8-inch hawser was sent over to her. At about 2.30 a. m. *Tamarisk* started towing us to Queenstown, speed about 4 knots, this vessel towing well on starboard quarter of *Tamarisk*, due to condition of stern described above. At 3.25 hawser parted.

Between this time and 10.37 a. m., when a towing line was received from H. M. S. *Snowdrop*, various attempts were made by the *Tamarisk* and two trawlers and a tug to tow the *Cassin*. An 11-inch towing hawser from the *Tamarisk* parted. All ships, except her, lost the *Cassin* during the night. The *Cassin* was drifting rapidly on a lee shore, and had it not been for the *Tamarisk* getting out a line in the early morning the vessel would have undoubtedly grounded on Hook Point, as it is extremely doubtful if her anchors would have held.

About 35 feet of the stern was blown off or completely ruptured. The after living compartments and after storerooms are completely wrecked or gone, and all stores and clothing from these parts of the ship are gone or ruined. About 45 members of the crew, including the chief petty officers, lost practically everything but the clothes they had on.

At the time of the explosion there were a number of men in the after compartments. How they managed to escape is beyond explanation.

The officers and crew behaved splendidly. There was no excitement. The men went to their stations quietly and remained there all night, except when called away to handle lines.

From the statement of all the officers it is evident that luck favored the submarine. The destroyer probably would have escaped being hit had not the torpedo broached twice and turned decidedly to the left both times—in other words, failed to function properly.

The equivalent of 850 pounds of TNT is estimated to have exploded in and upon the *Cassin's* fantail; this includes the charges of the torpedo and of both depth mines.

LOSS OF THE U. S. ARMY TRANSPORT "ANTILLES."

[Extracts from account by senior naval officer on board, Commander Daniel T. Ghent, United States Navy.]

We lost the *Antilles* on October 17, 1917. She sank in just four and one-half minutes, about 300 miles west of Quiberon Bay. Four of the guns' crew went down with her; 16 men of the United States Army; 45 of the ship's merchant crew, including 3 engineer officers, a civilian ambulance driver who had been in the French Army, and 1 colored stevedore—67 in all.

On October 15, 1917, we left Quiberon Bay, bound for America, with the transports *Henderson* and *Willehad* forming the convoy, and the *Corsair*, *Kanawha*, and *Alcedo* acting as escort; all followed a zigzag course, as we knew these waters to be infested with submarines.

The second day out we were forced to reduce our speed to permit the *Willehad*, which had been feeling the effects of the heavy seas, to regain her place in formation. The weather grew unsettled, with a strong wind and head seas. Late in the afternoon fog set in and we were ordered to stop zigzagging and proceed on a straight course. Later this fog lifted and we again resumed zigzagging.

In passing through the war zone or areas where enemy submarines are known to be operating everyone is more or less on edge, and when fire was discovered early the following morning

on the port side of the promenade deck it had the effect of stimulating everyone on board to swift action. Some difficulty was experienced in locating the fire, as the ship was darkened and the passageway filled with smoke, but once located it was soon under control. I mention this only because I think the circumstances contributed to sharpen the wits of those on board, so that when the torpedo struck us action was immediate and, so far as humanly possible, it was effective.

A half hour later, just after daylight, a torpedo was sighted heading for us about two points abaft the port beam on a course of 45° with the keel. The torpedo was seen by the second officer on the bridge, the quartermaster and signalman on watch, by the first officer and first assistant engineer from the port side of the promenade deck, and by one of the gun's crews on watch aft. They estimated the distance from 400 feet to as many yards. Immediately on sighting the torpedo the helm was put "hard over" in an attempt to dodge it, but before the ship began to swing the torpedo struck us near the after engine-room bulkhead on the port side. The explosion was terrific; the ship shivered from stem to stern, listing immediately to port. One of the lookouts in the main top, though protected by a canvas screen about 5 feet high, was thrown clear of this screen and killed on striking the hatch. This case is sighted as indicating the power of the "whip" caused by the explosion. Guns were manned instantly in the hope of getting a shot at the enemy, but no submarine was seen. Within a few seconds after the explosion the water was over the crossheads of the main engines, which were still turning over slowly. Of the 21 men on duty in the engine room and firerooms only 3 managed to escape. Besides the oiler, two firemen managed to escape through a fireroom ventilator. The fact that the engines could not be maneuvered and the headway of the ship checked added to the difficulty of abandoning ship.

Just as the torpedo struck us I was on the way to the pilot house from the scene of fire. Before I could reach the bridge the officer of the deck had sounded the submarine alarm, and I immediately sounded the signal for "Abandon ship." That only 4 boats out of 10 succeeded in getting clear of the ship was due to several causes—the short time the ship remained afloat after being torpedoed; the headway left on the ship, due to the fact that the engine-room personnel was put out of action by the explosion; the rough sea at the time; the fact that the ship listed heavily; and that one boat was destroyed by the explosion.

The ship went down vertically. The suction effect was hardly noticeable.

The behavior of the naval personnel throughout was equal to the best traditions of the service.

An instance comes back which indicates the coolness of the gun's crews. One member was rescued from the top of an ammunition box which by some means had floated clear and in an upright position. When this young man saw the *Corsair* standing down to pick him up he semaphored not to come too close as the box on which he was sitting contained live ammunition.

TORPEDOING OF THE U. S. ARMY CHARTERED TRANSPORT "FINLAND."

[Extracts from report of the senior naval officer on board, Capt. Stephen V. Graham, United States Navy.]

The *Finland* left the coast of France at nightfall on October 27, 1917, on her third return voyage to the United States. By daylight of October 28 the convoy had reached a position near the line extending from the island of Ushant to Cape Finisterre, Spain, which experience had shown to be a particularly dangerous position. From that time on the senior naval officer of the *Finland* remained on the bridge constantly and all of the lookouts were exercising the utmost vigilance.

The weather was cloudy and a moderate sea with whitecaps was running and I was personally keeping a very careful lookout for submarines and was engaged in searching the water on both sides with powerful binoculars. At about 9.25 a. m. he had just finished searching the water on the starboard side when the naval signal quartermaster on watch called out, "Commander, torpedo!" I turned and saw a torpedo about 50 to 100 yards distant making a surface run directly toward the ship. The whirring of the torpedo's propellers could be heard when they broke the surface of the water. The torpedo was so close to the ship when it was sighted that any maneuver to avoid it was entirely impossible. I sprang toward the engine telegraph to give the signal for stopping the engines, but before he could do this the torpedo exploded directly under the bridge. The concussive effect of the explosion was considerable, but not as great as had been anticipated. No one on the bridge was injured by it. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the enemy economized in the explosive charge of torpedoes destined for use against merchant vessels, and used only enough to produce the desired rupture in a vessel's skin plating.

Notwithstanding the fact that the torpedo was only 4 or 5 feet below the surface when it exploded against the ship's side an immense volume of water was thrown up. The engines were promptly stopped and the whistle signal made to indicate to the other vessels present that the ship had been torpedoed. It is a curious fact that most of the other vessels present did not know that the *Finland* had been torpedoed until this signal was made. At this time it did not appear probable that the ship would sink, but in a short time she began to list heavily to starboard and seemed to be settling. I ordered the lowering of the remaining boats which were hanging on their falls at the level of the promenade deck. These boats were scarcely in the water when the ship began to right herself.

At the time the ship was torpedoed this hold contained about 600 tons of coal. After the ship had been placed in dry dock upon her return to France it was found that most of this coal had run out through the hole made in the ship's side by the explosion of the torpedo.

When I received the master's report that the damage was confined to this one compartment, I hailed the boats which were close to the ship and directed them to come alongside and had a signal sent to the escorting yachts to send boats which were approaching them back to the *Finland*.

While the *Finland's* boats were in the water a heavy squall came up and rendered the return of the heavily laden boats very difficult. They could come alongside only on the starboard side, and getting the people back on board was very slow work. Hoisting the boats was not to be thought of, for every moment that this large ship remained stopped was attended with grave danger of receiving a second torpedo. As soon as the passengers were out of the boats the latter were cast adrift. The ship got under way to return to a French port 150 miles distant.

During the return of the ship to the French port it became necessary to send everyone to the fireroom who could shovel coal. Deck hands, stewards, and even passengers, including some of the discharged American ambulance drivers, responded with alacrity to this call, and within a short time after starting ahead the ship was making nearly 15 knots, which was as good a speed as she had made at any time during her employment in the transport service.

The bulkheads of the damaged compartment held and there was no leakage of water through the water-tight doors leading into the forward fireroom and the adjacent hold. The doors were kept closed tightly with wooden wedges.

On the way into port the nervous tension of those on deck was greatly relieved by the necessity of laughing at the earnestness with which several lookouts reported a spouting whale as a submarine. It is regrettable that eight men lost their lives on the occasion of the torpedoing of the *Finland*.

SINKING OF U. S. S. "ALCEDO."

[Extracts from report of the commanding officer, Commander W. T. Conn, Jr.]

At 4 p. m., November 4, 1917, the U. S. S. *Alcedo* proceeded to sea from Quiberon Bay on escort duty to take convoy through the war zone.

At or about 1.45 a. m., November 5, I was awakened by a commotion and immediately received a report, "Submarine, captain." I jumped out of bed and went to the upper bridge, and the officer of the deck stated he had seen submarine on surface about 300 yards on port bow, and submarine had fired a torpedo, which was approaching. I saw torpedo approaching about 200 feet distant. Lieut. Paul had put the rudder full right before I arrived on bridge, hoping to avoid the torpedo. The ship answered slowly to her helm, however, and before any other action could be taken the torpedo I saw struck the ship's side immediately under the port forward chain plates, the detonation occurring instantly. I was thrown down and for a few seconds dazed by falling debris and water.

Upon regaining my feet I sounded the submarine alarm on the siren.

Called to the forward gun's crews to see if at stations, but by this time realized that gallant forecastle was practically awash. The foremast had fallen, carrying away radio aerial. I called out to abandon ship. I then realized that the ship was filling rapidly and her bulwarks amidships were level with the water. I directed the after dories and life rafts to be cut away and thrown overboard and ordered the men in the immediate vicinity to jump over the side, intending to follow them.

Before I could jump, however, the ship listed heavily to port, plunging by the head, and sunk, carrying me down with the suction. I experienced no difficulty, however, in getting clear, and when I came to the surface I swam a few yards to a life raft, to which were clinging three men.

About this time, which was probably an hour after the ship sank, a German submarine approached the scene of torpedoing

and lay to near some of the dories and life rafts. After remaining on the surface about half an hour, the submarine steered off and submerged.

I then proceeded with the whaleboat and two dories searching through the wreckage to make sure that no survivors were left in the water. No other people being seen, at 4.30 a. m. we started away from the scene of disaster.

SINKING OF U. S. S. "JACOB JONES."

[Extracts from report of the commanding officer, Lieut. Commander David W. Bagley.]

At 4.21 p. m. on December 6, 1917, the U. S. S. *Jacob Jones* was struck on the starboard side by a torpedo from an enemy submarine. The ship was one of six of an escorting group which were returning independently from off Brest to Queens-town. All other ships of the group were out of sight ahead.

I was in the chart house and heard some one call out "Torpedo!" I jumped at once to the bridge, and on the way up saw the torpedo about 800 yards from the ship approaching from about one point abaft the starboard beam headed for a point about midships, making a perfectly straight surface run (alternately broaching and submerging to apparently 4 or 5 feet), at an estimated speed of at least 40 knots. No periscope was sighted. When I reached the bridge I found that the officer of the deck had already put the rudder hard left and rung up emergency speed on the engine-room telegraph. The ship had already begun to swing to the left.

The torpedo broached and jumped clear of the water at a short distance from the ship, submerged about 50 or 60 feet from the ship, and struck approximately 3 feet below the water line in the fuel-oil tank between the auxiliary room and the after crew space. The ship settled aft immediately after being torpedoed to a point at which the deck just forward of the after deck house was awash, and then more gradually until the deck abreast the engine-room hatch was awash.

The deck over the forward part of the after crew space and over the fuel-oil tank just forward of it was blown clear for a space athwartships of about 20 feet from starboard to port, and the auxiliary room wrecked. The starboard after torpedo tube was blown into the air. No fuel oil ignited and, apparently, no ammunition exploded. The depth charges in the chutes aft were set on ready and exploded after the stern sank. It was impossible to get to them to set them on safe as they were under water. Immediately the ship was torpedoed, Lieut. J. K. Richards, the gunnery officer, rushed aft to attempt to set the charges on "safe," but was unable to get farther aft than the after deck house.

As soon as the torpedo struck I attempted to send out an "S. O. S." message by radio, but the mainmast was carried away, antennae falling, and all electric power had failed. I then tried to have the gun-sight lighting batteries connected up in an effort to send out a low-power message with them, but it was at once evident that this would not be practicable before the ship sank. There was no other vessel in sight, and it was therefore impossible to get through a distress signal of any kind.

Immediately after the ship was torpedoed every effort was made to get rafts and boats launched. Also the circular life belts from the bridge and several splinter mats from the outside of the bridge were cut adrift and afterwards proved very useful in holding men up until they could be got to the rafts. Weighted confidential publications were thrown over the side. There was no time to destroy other confidential matter, but it went down with the ship.

The ship sank about 4.29 p. m. (about eight minutes after being torpedoed). As I saw her settling rapidly, I ran along the deck and ordered everybody I saw to jump overboard. At this time most of those not killed by the explosion had got clear of the ship and were on rafts or wreckage. Some, however, were swimming and a few appeared to be about a ship's length astern of the ship, at some distance from the rafts, probably having jumped overboard very soon after the ship was struck.

Before the ship sank two shots were fired from No. 4 gun with the hope of attracting attention of some near-by ship. As the ship began sinking I jumped overboard. The ship sank stern first and twisted slowly through nearly 180° as she swung upright. From this nearly vertical position, bow in the air to about the forward funnel, she went straight down. Before the ship reached the vertical position the depth charges exploded, and I believe them to have caused the death of a number of men. They also partially paralyzed, stunned, or dazed a number of others, including Lieut. Kalk and myself and several men, some of whom are still disabled but recovering.

Immediate efforts were made to get all survivors on the rafts and then get rafts and boats together. Three rafts were launched before the ship sank and one floated off when she sank.

About 15 or 20 minutes after the ship sank the submarine appeared on the surface about 2 or 3 miles to the westward of the rafts and gradually approached until about 800 to 1,000 yards from the ship, where it stopped and was seen to pick up one unidentified man from the water. The submarine then submerged and was not seen again.

I was picked up by the motor dory and at once began to make arrangements to try to reach the Scillys in that boat in order to get assistance to those on the rafts.

After a very trying trip, during which it was necessary to steer by stars and by the direction of the wind, the dory was picked up about 1 p. m., December 7, by a small patrol vessel about 6 miles south of St. Marys. Commander Randal, R. N. R., senior naval officer, Scilly Isles, informed me that the other survivors had been rescued.

SINKING OF U. S. S. "PRESIDENT LINCOLN."

[Extracts from report of the commanding officer, Commander P. W. Foote, U. S. Navy.]

On May 31, 1918, the *President Lincoln* was returning to America from a voyage to France, and was in line formation with the U. S. S. *Susquehanna*, the U. S. S. *Antigone*, and the U. S. S. *Ryndam*, the latter being on the left flank of the formation and about 800 yards from the *President Lincoln*. The weather was pleasant, the sun shining brightly, with a choppy sea. The ships were about 500 miles from the coast of France and had passed through what was considered to be the most dangerous part of the war zone. At about 9 a. m. a terrific explosion occurred on the port side of the ship about 120 feet from the bow and immediately afterwards another explosion occurred on the port side about 120 feet from the stern of the ship, these explosions being immediately identified as coming from torpedoes fired by a German submarine.

It was found that the ship was struck by three torpedoes, which had been fired as one salvo from the submarine, two of the torpedoes striking practically together near the bow of the ship and the third striking near the stern. The wake of the torpedoes had been sighted by the officers and lookouts on watch, but the torpedoes were so close to the ship as to make it impossible to avoid them, and it was also found that the submarine at the time of firing was only about 800 yards from the *President Lincoln*.

There were at the time 715 persons on board, including about 30 officers and men of the Army. Some of these were sick and two soldiers were totally paralyzed.

The alarm was immediately sounded and everyone went to his proper station, which had been designated at previous drills. There was not the slightest confusion, and the crew and passengers waited for and acted on orders from the commanding officer with a coolness which was truly inspiring.

Inspections were made below decks, and it was found that the ship was rapidly filling with water, both forward and aft, and that there was little likelihood that she would remain afloat. The boats were lowered and the life rafts were placed in the water, and about 15 minutes after the ship was struck all hands except the guns' crews were ordered to abandon ship.

It had been previously planned that in order to avoid the losses which have occurred in such instances by filling the boats at the davits before lowering them, that only one officer and five men would get into the boats before lowering and that everyone else would get into the water and get on the life rafts and then be picked up by the boats, this being entirely feasible, as everyone was provided with an efficient life-saving jacket. One exception was made to this plan, however, in that one boat was filled with the sick before being lowered, and it was in this boat that the paralyzed soldiers were saved without difficulty.

The guns' crews were held at their stations, hoping for an opportunity to fire on the submarine should it appear before the ship sank, and orders were given to the guns' crews to begin firing, hoping that this might prevent further attack. All the ship's company except the guns' crews and necessary officers were at that time in the boats and on the rafts near the ship, and when the guns' crews began firing the people in the boats set up a cheer to show that they were not downhearted. The guns' crews only left their guns when ordered by the commanding officer just before the ship sank. The guns in the bow kept up firing until after the water was entirely over the main deck of the after half of the ship.

The state of discipline which existed and the coolness of the men is well illustrated by what occurred when the boats were being lowered and were about half way from their davits to the water. At this particular time there appeared some possibility of the ship not sinking immediately, and the commanding officer gave the order to stop lowering the boats. This order could not be understood, however, owing to the noise caused

by escaping steam from the safety valves of the boilers which had been lifted to prevent explosion, but by motion of the hand from the commanding officer the crews stopped lowering the boats and held them in mid-air for a few minutes until at a further motion of the hand the boats were dropped into the water.

Immediately after the ship sank the boats pulled among the rafts and were loaded with men to their full capacity and the work of collecting the rafts and tying them together to prevent drifting apart and being lost was begun.

While this work was under way and about half an hour after the ship sank, a large German submarine emerged and came among the boats and rafts, searching for the commanding officer and some of the senior officers whom they desired to take prisoners. The submarine commander was able to identify only one officer, Lieut. E. V. M. Isaacs, whom he took on board and carried away. The submarine remained in the vicinity of the boats for about two hours and returned again in the afternoon, hoping apparently for an opportunity of attacking some of the other ships which had been in company with the *President Lincoln*, but which had, in accordance with standard instructions, steamed as rapidly as possible from the scene of attack.

By dark the boats and rafts had been collected and secured together, there being about 500 men in the boats and about 200 on the rafts. Lighted lanterns were hoisted in the boats and flare-up lights and Coston signal lights were burned every few minutes, the necessary detail of men being made to carry out this work during the night.

The boats had been provided with water and food, but none was used during the day, as the quantity was necessarily limited and it might be a period of several days before a rescue could be effected.

The ship's wireless plant had been put out of commission by the force of the explosion, and although the ship's operator had sent the radio distress signals, yet it was known that the nearest destroyers were 250 miles away, protecting another convoy, and it was possible that military necessity might prevent their being detached to come to our rescue.

At about 11 p. m. a white light flashing in the blackness of the night—it was very dark—was sighted, and very shortly it was found that the destroyer *Warrington* had arrived for our rescue, and about an hour afterwards the destroyer *Smith* also arrived. The transfer of the men from the boats and rafts to the destroyers was effected as quickly as possible, and the destroyers remained in the vicinity until after daylight the following morning, when a further search was made for survivors who might have drifted in a boat or on a raft, but none were found, and at about 6 a. m. the return trip to France was begun.

GOOD SEAMANSHIP—RESCUE OF "PRESIDENT LINCOLN" SURVIVORS.

No incident of service serves to dampen the ardor or spirit of the men. When the call from the sinking *President Lincoln* was received the destroyers *Warrington* and *Smith*, 275 miles away, responded at a speed of 25 knots. In telling the story of the rescue an officer said:

The moon would not rise until early morning, and we figured we must reach the survivors, if possible, before dark. We could only estimate how far they would pull in the boats or drift. About 11 o'clock we sighted a small red light and stood over toward it. We blinked our yardarm lights and heard a faint cheer in the darkness. We had the boats.

Fortunately they had been lashed together, for if they had been straggling we should have had a hopeless task in the dark. One after another of them came alongside. Boatload after boatload climbed on board, and we had taken them all in half an hour.

The discipline maintained among the survivors had been excellent. In many boats the water breakers had not been breached, although the men had been in the boats over 12 hours. The last boat we took in tow with bow and stern line and stood over in the supposed direction of the life rafts which held the rest of the survivors. The moon had risen by this time, so that the work of finding the rafts was greatly facilitated. We now had on board 443 survivors and could have taken more, but fortunately for the comfort of those already on board another destroyer had now joined us.

You can imagine the wardroom of a destroyer, normally arranged to take care of 6 officers, with 49 in it, and the decks loaded down with a living cargo. They made no noise; all were cheerful and all hands ready to get back to another ship to carry on as soon as possible.

In connection with the loss of the *Lincoln* is the very remarkable capture and final escape of Lieut. E. V. M. Isaacs, one of the ship's officers. (Condensed from his own report.)

The *President Lincoln* went down about 9.30 in the morning, 30 minutes after being struck by three torpedoes. In obedience to orders I abandoned ship after seeing all hands aft safely off the vessel. The boats had pulled away, but I stepped on a raft floating alongside, the quarter deck being then awash. A few minutes later one of the boats picked me up. The submarine, the *U-90*, then returned, and the commanding officer, while searching for Capt. Foote, of the *President Lincoln*, took me out of the boat. I told him my captain had gone down with the ship, whereupon he steamed away, taking me prisoner to

Germany. We passed to the north of the Shetlands into the North Sea, the Skaggerak, the Cattegat, and the Sound into the Baltic. Proceeding to Kiel, we passed down the canal through Heligoland Bight to Wilhelmshaven.

On the way to Shetlands we fell in with two American destroyers, the *Smith* and the *Warrington*, who dropped 22 depth bombs on us. We were submerged to a depth of 60 meters and weathered the storm, although five bombs were very close and shook us up considerably. The information I had been able to collect was, I considered, of enough importance to warrant my trying to escape. Accordingly in Danish waters I attempted to jump from the deck of the submarine but was caught and ordered below.

The German Navy authorities took me from Wilhelmshaven to Karlsruhe, where I was turned over to the army. Here I met officers of all the allied armies, and with them I attempted several escapes, all of which were unsuccessful. After three weeks at Karlsruhe I was sent to the American and Russian officers' camp at Villingen. On the way I attempted to escape from the train by jumping out of the window. With the train making about 40 miles an hour, I landed on the opposite railroad track and was so severely wounded by the fall that I could not get away from my guard. They followed me, firing continuously. When they recaptured me they struck me on the head and body with their guns until one broke his rifle. It snapped in two at the small of the stock as he struck me with the butt on the back of the head.

I was given two weeks solitary confinement for this attempt to escape, but continued trying, for I was determined to get my information back to the Navy. Finally, on the night of October 6, assisted by several American Army officers, I was able to effect an escape by short-circuiting all lighting circuits in the prison camp and cutting through barbed-wire fences surrounding the camp. This had to be done in the face of a heavy rifle fire from the guards. But it was difficult for them to see in the darkness, so I escaped unscathed.

In company with an American officer in the French Army, I made my way for seven days and nights over mountains to the Rhine, which to the south of Baden forms the boundary between Germany and Switzerland. After a four-hour crawl on hands and knees I was able to elude the sentries along the Rhine. Plunging in, I made for the Swiss shore. After being carried several miles down the stream, being frequently submerged by the rapid current, I finally reached the opposite shore and gave myself up to the Swiss gendarmes, who turned me over to the American Legation at Berne. From there I made my way to Paris and then London and finally Washington, where I arrived four weeks after my escape from Germany.

SINKING OF U. S. S. "COVINGTON."

[Extracts from the report of the commanding officer, Capt. R. D. Hasbrouck, United States Navy.]

The *Covington* sailed from Brest in convoy with several other large transports and escorted by destroyers.

Night was approaching. The lookouts, always vigilant, became more watchful as the sun approached the horizon, as this is the time of greatest danger. At exactly 9.15 p. m., on July 1, the lookout saw a white streak in the water, scarcely 300 yards from the port quarter. The ship was making nearly 15 knots speed and had only a moment before steadied on the new course. Almost before the "alarm of torpedo" could be given, the torpedo struck with a terrific detonation, throwing in the air a column of water reaching to a height above the smokestacks.

At the instant of the explosion, each man of the crew of the *Covington* at once appreciated that his vessel had been hit and knew from long training what the next step was to be. The alarm bells rung in every compartment and officers and men, quietly, as if at drill, quickly took their stations. Full gun crews were ready in case any submarines appeared, boats were gotten ready for lowering, life rafts made ready for launching, and every detail which had been so carefully worked out during the six months of war cruising was painstakingly attended to without hurry or confusion. In an incredibly short time the entire crew were at their station awaiting the next order from the bridge.

The engine and fire rooms of the *Covington* quickly filled. The ship lost headway rapidly and in 15 minutes lay dead in the water. As the water rushed into the large engine and fire room compartments the *Covington* listed, giving the impression of instability.

The order to get the boats ready for instant lowering was given from the bridge. At this time a report came to the captain that all firerooms and engine rooms were full of water; the firerooms to the top of the boilers and the engine rooms to the top of the cylinders. The most momentous thing to know at this time was how much stability remained, for upon this

knowledge depended whether the ship should be abandoned in haste. At this time, probably 15 minutes after the explosion, the *Covington* was gradually listing to port.

In such a catastrophe there are two things uppermost in the captain's mind. Steps which he must take without sufficient knowledge, and those facts obtained from others at a moment of great tension. He must decide first for the safety of his crew and second for the safety of the ship. The ship was dead in the water, reeling to port and giving one the feeling that any moment she would take a heavy lurch and sink. Nearly 1,000 men's lives now hung upon the promptness with which the captain made these decisions.

Once the captain's mind was made up, the bugle sounded the call to abandon ship and the word was passed not to hurry. Silence was also sounded on the bugle, giving this evolution a strong resemblance to a daily drill.

The behavior of the officers and men was wonderful. Twenty-one of the ship's 27 boats were lowered into the water without lights anywhere, with the ship heavily listed to port, and without the aid of a single winch, for steam had failed. The storage battery used for emergency lighting was not turned on, as it would disclose the position of the ship and thus risk a second torpedo from the submarine, which might still have been in the vicinity. Of the six boats not lowered, 2 were on the forecastle, from which it was impossible to launch them, and 3 boats were destroyed by the explosion. One boat was stove in while lowering.

Boats and rafts were lowered in the water with just sufficient men to handle them, and after all the boats and rafts were afloat the order was given "abandon ship."

It was a stirring sight to see the men go down the Jacob ladders in an orderly procession as if they were at drill.

The destroyer *Smith* stood close in alongside the *Covington* and took the men from the boats as fast as they were filled, the boats returning to the ship for more men.

A working party of 30 officers, petty officers, and men remained with the captain in the vicinity of the bridge. This working party collected the crew's enlistment records, working charts, night order book, sextants, and everything of confidential nature or valuable from the standpoint of record. This party searched the ship throughout for stragglers. The boatswain's mates went through every compartment possible, piping "All hands on deck," and finally reported to the captain that there was nobody on board save the working party.

Night had now fallen. The ship was in complete darkness, badly listed to port, and, as far as could be told, slowly bleeding to death internally with no chance to prevent the seepage of water which would eventually destroy the stability.

At 2.30 p. m. on July 2 the *Covington* began to sink rapidly by the stern. It was an awe-inspiring sight as the ship rose rapidly to a vertical position in the water, the after smoke pipe being clear when the ship was in a vertical position. This gave a spectacle of about 450 feet of this magnificent 17,000-ton liner standing as a shaft on the surface of the sea. The ship remained in this vertical position for perhaps a period of 10 to 15 seconds, then sank rapidly farther in the vertical position, the bow disappearing at 2.32 p. m. It was providential that all men had been removed from the ship before she rose vertically in the water. Had any men been aboard they would undoubtedly have been lost. Had the ship sunk immediately or shortly after the ship was torpedoed she would have sunk in the same manner as described above and the loss of life would have been appalling.

The discipline of the crew and the perfection of the drills brought about perfect order and insured safety. There were no accidents. The final muster of the crew showed that out of the entire complement of 730 men and 46 officers only 6 were lost; 3 fell overboard and were drowned while rigging out a boat; 2 were in a fireroom and were never seen afterwards, probably killed by the explosion; 1 other man was missing and was probably drowned.

A few minutes after the ship was torpedoed one gun's crew fired three shots at what was thought to be a periscope wake.

The ship went down with her colors flying.

SINKING OF U. S. S. "SAN DIEGO."

[Extracts from report of the court of inquiry.]

The court in its report reviews the main points in the testimony, as follows:

The U. S. S. *San Diego*, under the command of Capt. H. H. Christy, United States Navy, was making passage from Portsmouth, N. H., to New York, N. Y., and at or about 11.05 a. m. July 19, 1918, she was in approximate latitude 40° 30' north, longitude 73° west, on base course 304 true, and zigzagging by an approved plan; speed, 15 knots.

The captain was steering a safe and proper course at the time to minimize the submarine and mine dangers in those waters. A careful inspection watch had been maintained while last coaling ship to prevent the introduction of any foreign matter in the coal bunkers. All lookouts, gun watches, fire-control parties, etc., as prescribed by the

"Orders for ships in convoy" of the commander cruiser and transport force were at their stations and on the alert. All reasonable and necessary orders to safeguard the water-tight integrity of the ship in dangerous waters had been given and were being carried out.

At or about 11.05 a. m., July 19, 1918, an explosion took place in proximity of the skin of the ship, at about frame No. 78, on the port side and well below the water line. As a result of this explosion the ship began to list to port and she finally rolled over and sank bottom up at about 11.25 a. m., July 19, 1918. The explosion was an exterior one and as the result of this explosion the skin of the ship was ruptured in the vicinity of bulkhead No. 78, at the level of the port engine room; and bulkhead No. 78 was so deformed that water-tight door No. 142, between the port engine room and No. 8 fireroom, was opened to the ingress of water to No. 8 fireroom. The effect of this rupture was to immediately fill the port engine room and adjacent compartments, and No. 8 fireroom was soon filled also. The effect of this water would give the ship a list of 17½ degrees to port. With the increased displacement water entered through 6-inch gun port No. 10, which was justifiably open to permit using that gun, when the ship had listed 9½ degrees. This resulted in flooding the gun deck and accelerated the heeling of the ship and her final capsizing. Relatively small quantities of water entered the upper dynamo room through nonwater-tight voice tubes, but this had no appreciable effect on the sinking of the ship.

The captain properly withheld the order to abandon ship until he was certain that the ship would capsize and sink. The ship was abandoned in good order, and excellent discipline prevailed. Gun crews remained at their guns and continued firing at all suspicious objects until they were forced to jump into the water. The captain was the last to leave the ship.

ATTACK ON THE U. S. S. "MOUNT VERNON."

[Extracts from report of the commanding officer, Capt. D. E. Dismukes, United States Navy.]

About 250 miles from the coast of France, on the morning of September 5, 1918, the *Mount Vernon* and *Agamemnon* in convoy, escorted by six destroyers, were proceeding homeward bound from Brest, speed 18 knots (21 statute miles) per hour. The weather was fine and the sea smooth, making it possible to sight a submarine periscope a long distance. Everything was favorable, and it looked as though we were about to add one more trip across the war zone to our credit.

Suddenly a periscope popped above the surface of the water about 500 yards distant. Our starboard gun opened fire at once, but the periscope remained on the surface only a few seconds. Just as it disappeared, the wake of a torpedo coming straight for the ship was seen, and immediately afterwards the torpedo struck us, throwing up a huge column of water on our starboard side amidships.

The explosion was so terrific that for an instant it seemed that the ship was lifted clear out of the water and torn to pieces. Men at the after guns and depth-charge stations were thrown to the deck and one of the 5-inch guns thrown partly out of its mount. Men below in the vicinity of the explosion were stunned into temporary unconsciousness.

It was soon ascertained that the torpedo had struck the ship fairly amidships, destroying four of the eight boiler rooms and flooding the middle portion of the ship from side to side for a length of 150 feet. The ship instantly settled 10 feet increase in draft, but stopped there. This indicated that the water-tight bulkheads were holding, and we could still afford to go down 2½ feet more before she would lose her floating buoyancy.

The immediate problem was to escape a second torpedo. To do this, two things were necessary—to attack the enemy and to make more speed than he could make submerged. The depth charge crews jumped to their stations and immediately started dropping depth bombs. A barrage of depth charges was dropped, exploding at regular intervals far below the surface of the water. This work was beautifully done. The explosions must have shaken the enemy up; at any rate, he never came to the surface again to get a look at us.

The other factor in the problem was to make as much speed as possible, not only in order to escape an immediate attack, but also to prevent the submarine from tracking us and attacking after nightfall.

The men in the firerooms knew that the safety of the ship depended on their bravery and steadfastness to duty. It is difficult to conceive of a more trying ordeal to one's courage than was presented to every man in the firerooms that escaped destruction. The profound shock of the explosion, followed by instant darkness, falling soot and particles, the knowledge that they were far below the water level inclosed practically in a trap, the imminent danger of the ship sinking, the added threat of exploding boilers—all these dangers and more must have been apparent to every man below, and yet not one man wavered in standing by his post of duty.

No better example can possibly be given of the wonderful fact that with a brave and disciplined body of American men all things are possible. However strong may be their momentary impulse for self-preservation in extreme danger, their controlling impulses are to stand by their stations and duty at all hazards.

The torpedo exploded on a bulkhead separating two firerooms, the explosive effect being apparently about equal in both firerooms, yet in one fireroom not a man was saved, while in the

other fireroom two of the men escaped. The explosion blasted through the outer and inner skin of the ship and through an intervening coal bunker and bulkhead, hurling overboard 750 tons of coal. The two men saved were working the fires within 30 feet of the explosion and just below the level where the torpedo struck.

This account would not be complete without the mention of the part played by the ship's hospital corps and the 150 helpless, wounded, and crippled soldiers who had done their part so nobly on the battle fields of France and were on their way home and deserved to get there. Within a very few minutes after the explosion all of these poor fellows were safely stowed in their boats, wrapped in warm blankets, and served with hot soup and other refreshments. They were made so comfortable in the boats that they preferred to remain in them all the way back to Brest for a period of about 18 hours.

Thirty-five men were killed by the explosion and 13 injured, one of them later dying from his injuries, the large number of casualties being due to the fact that the torpedo struck just at the time the watch was being relieved.

The saving of the ship is attributed to the following circumstances: The fact that the water-tight doors were closed, that the bulkheads were tight and held, that additional strength was gained by blanking off all air-port lenses with steel plate, and that there was an organization well conceived and well carried out to meet the emergency.

SINKING OF THE U. S. S. "CHAUNCEY" IN COLLISION.

[Extract from report of the only surviving officer, Lieut. (J. G.) F. K. O'Brien, United States Navy, executive officer.]

The U. S. destroyer *Chauncey* was rammed by the steamship *Rose* and sunk at 1.46 a. m. on November 19, 1917, shortly after the *Chauncey* had cleared the port of Gibraltar. Of a crew of 91 officers and men, 1 officer and 69 men were saved, while 3 officers and 18 men were lost.

SINKING OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD SHIP "TAMPA."

The greatest disaster suffered by the Coast Guard, and the largest individual loss of life sustained by our naval forces during the war, occurred on September 26, 1918, when the cutter *Tampa* was sunk with all hands on board in Bristol Channel, presumably by a torpedo from an enemy submarine. The cutter had gone ahead of her convoy, and although a distant explosion was heard by the vessels in the convoy, no positive evidence has ever been received as to the exact cause of the disaster. Diligent search by several destroyers in the vicinity of the disaster revealed only two unrecognizable bodies in sailors' uniforms and some small pieces of wreckage. Thus perished 111 brave officers and men.

WORK OF THE ARMED GUARD.

[From reports of officer in command of guard.]

STEAMSHIP "OWASCO"—LOST DECEMBER, 1917.

We left Norfolk about November 23, and arrived in Gibraltar on the 6th of December, and we left Gibraltar on the 8th of December in company with two British, one Norwegian, and ourselves, at 8 a. m. We stood up the Spanish coast within about 3 miles of shore until dark. Then it started to blow up and rain, and it was lightning, and we lost sight of the British ship ahead of the Norwegian. The Norwegian was burning her stern lights pretty bright. I went down to my room and straightened up and looked around, and sat there until about 10 o'clock. I guess it was, and turned in. I had just about dozed off when I heard a report, or rather felt it. I dressed, got on the bridge, and asked what was the trouble. I was standing on the starboard side of the bridge when I saw something in the water, and I said, "What." This was about 11.30 p. m. on the 10th of December. That is all I got out when she struck. The ship was swinging to port slowly at the time, and a torpedo hit forward of the bridge in No. 3 hold, blew off hatches of same, and went into No. 2. The flames shot in the air as high as the mainmast. I looked up to see if mast was coming down, but she stayed there. The wireless aerial, however, came down. The wireless house lifted off the deck about four feet and shoved aft. The wireless operator and instruments were all on the deck. The captain said, "All hands abandon ship." I said, "That is all we can do," for the whole forward part of the deck was in flames. The four men on watch on the forward gun came over the platform on the port side and ran aft, as the wind was from the port and shot the flames to starboard and made it possible for them to come aft. At that time I got to the boat which was on the starboard side aft. The after gun's crew was standing by with the gun trained to port. I said, "You can't see anything, the ship is in flames, so let's lower the boats." We lowered the boats and all hands got in. There were some firemen came along and asked to get in, and I said, "Jump in." I stood on the deck and waited and hollered if there was any more on board. I got no reply; the men in the

boat said, "Come along; she is going now." I looked over at the after hatches, and they were under water. I then jumped in the boat, cut the sea painter, and got away from the ship's side. The poop was pretty near submerged at that time. I saw a boat. I hailed it and asked if there was room for some men, as I had over my capacity. It was the captain's boat, and he said "Yes." I went alongside, and he took about eight men out of my boat. He then shoved off, and I could not see the boat any more. I heard some one holler, "Pull for the light." We made for the light, and it took us from 11.30 to 1.55, which is about 2 hours and 25 minutes, to get to the shore, which was Villajoyosa, Spain.

STEAMSHIP NAVAJO—LOST AUGUST, 1917.

On August 1, 1917, at 3.30 p. m., in latitude 48° 30' N., longitude 25° W., the *Navajo* caught fire. I was sleeping at this time, as it was my watch below. I was awakened by the cry of fire. Upon arriving on outer well deck I saw that the entire after part of the vessel was in flames. I asked the captain if anything could be done. He said "No; the oil tanks were burning."

The fire spread so rapidly that it was necessary to take to the lifeboats within five minutes of the alarm. The boats were lowered; the ship still under full speed, as it was impossible to stop the engines. After leaving the ship it was discovered that some of the crew of the steamer were still on board, being unable to get to the boats owing to the intensity of the fire. Word was passed to all boats to keep together and as near the ship as possible so as to pick up the crew if necessary. As soon as possible the captain, chief engineer, and myself again boarded the *Navajo* and discovered that nothing could be done to save the ship. Shortly after our boats were lowered a sailing vessel, the Norwegian bark *Concordia*, hove in sight. The Norwegian bark picked up our lifeboats and stood by us. We then took our crew from the bark and returned to the *Navajo* to make another attempt to put out the fire. This was found impossible.

An unsuccessful attempt was made to tow the *Navajo*. The steering gear aft was destroyed, the quadrant being warped by fire, so that it was impossible to steer her. The *Navajo* was abandoned. In the morning we again boarded the *Navajo* and found that she was filling rapidly. An attempt was made again to tow her, but this failed.

STEAMSHIP JOHN D. ARCHIBALD—LOST JUNE, 1917.

About 3 p. m., June 16, 1917, four and one-half hours out of Brest, sighted what we supposed to be a submarine, 2½ points on starboard bow and at a distance of 6 to 7 miles on the rim of the horizon. Looked like a large fishing boat or cargo steamer of 1,000 or 1,500 tons, appeared to have a mast and a sail which could not be made out on account of the distance and haze. Nothing was clearly distinguishable. On sighting the submarine, the *John D. Archibald* shifted her course so as to bring the submarine about 3 or 4 points broad on the port bow. The vessel began zigzagging as soon as the submarine was sighted, zigzagged 6 to 8 points to the west and north starboard; speed about 10 knots, visibility improving. The submarine submerged. The *John D. Archibald* immediately broadcast general warning on her main radio which has a radius of about 1,000 miles, so I was informed by the operator. The gun crews had been at their stations since leaving the harbor of Brest and were at their station when submarine was sighted.

About 4 p. m., C. E. Marson, seaman, at forward gun sighted a torpedo on starboard bow at about 600 yards, which he immediately reported to the captain, who was on the bridge with most of the ship's officers and myself, the captain had the helm put hard starboard. The torpedo was coming toward the starboard beam and appeared to be going about 32 knots and about 6 or 9 feet below the surface. The torpedo left a wave similar to that made by torpedoes of the United States Navy. It ran straight. I saw the torpedo when it was about 150 yards from the ship. The ship did not answer her helm in time to save her. She was not fairly started on her swing at the time she was struck. The torpedo struck the starboard side of the ship in line with No. 3 boat and about the center of the engine room. There was a terrific explosion, the boat gear was blown away, and a large volume of water was thrown upward. This occurred on the starboard side. The port side of the ship was not affected. The engine was stopped instantly by the impact of the explosion. The explosion probably wrecked the engines and boilers. The after end of the ship immediately sank as far as the main deck.

None of the gun crew were injured. Three men in the engine room were killed instantly and one of the engine-room crew severely injured. His injury was due to inhaling gas and steam after the explosion. He was found outside the engine room by the gun crew amidst wreckage. The captain gave orders to

abandon ship, and ship's company left in five minutes in two boats.

While in the lifeboats and astern of the ship and about 150 yards from her, we saw a periscope about 100 yards away between the boats and the ship and on the ship's starboard quarter. This periscope was smaller than those used in the United States Navy. It was about 2 inches in diameter and showed a couple of feet. It was painted a dull greenish paint. There seemed to be something inside of the periscope on the order of a glass tube about 1 inch in diameter, which showed before the periscope came to the surface. The tube seemed to telescope in the periscope. There was no housing or hood on the periscope to be seen. We saw the periscope follow a course around the port side of the ship. The submarine then came to the surface on the starboard side of the ship. The boats were then about a mile away from the ship making to the eastward under oars. The submarine then fired about 10 shots into the ship. The ship listed to starboard and sank astern first. Immediately after the *John D. Archibald* sank the submarine submerged, or perhaps a little before. A short while afterwards a passing French steamer fired on No. 1 boat, mistaking her for a submarine. She afterwards discovered her mistake and ceased firing. The steamer came alongside of No. 2 and offered to rescue. The mate in charge thought it unwise to imperil the ship and expose her to submarine attack, so declined help and requested the steamer to proceed, which she did, and escaped. This French steamer said she would notify the patrols. The steamer passed on to the east. The boats in the meantime had gotten together.

At about 9 p. m. dusk, sighted a submarine on the surface bearing to the east of the boats and at about a distance of 2,000 yards. At the same time three French patrol boats were seen coming from the west at about 12 knots. It soon became hazy and dark. We were provided with a flash light and a lantern. We desired to signal to the patrols, but screen the lights from the submarine. We placed our bodies between the lights and the submarine, turning our backs on the submarine and holding the light in front of us. The patrols used their searchlights on the submarine, fired upon her, and sent our warnings. So far as I know, the submarine was not damaged. The patrols came to the boats and we hurried on board in order not to delay them in attacking the submarine. The gun crew and myself lost all our belongings on board. We were but lightly clad, as the weather was warm.

STEAMSHIP ROCHESTER—LOST NOVEMBER, 1917.

While traveling with the convoy the *Rochester* did not zigzag, as her speed on a straight course would just enable her to keep up with the other ships, which were zigzagging. On November 2 one of the men at the after gun sighted a periscope on the starboard quarter about 500 yards distant. It appeared to be about the size of a broom handle. It submerged before any shots could be fired. The same afternoon, at 4.45 p. m., the lookout in the after crow's nest reported a torpedo wake on the starboard beam less than 100 yards distant. The wake became plainer as if the torpedo had approached nearer the surface, and struck almost instantly on the starboard side abreast the after end of the engine room. The weather at the time was clear, the sea smooth, and the visibility good.

The force of the explosion caused the whole ship to lurch to port. She righted herself immediately. The explosion wrecked the engine room, put the dynamo out of commission, smashed the transmitting gear of the wireless, and knocked down two wires from the aerial. The headway of the ship was stopped immediately, and the ship filled with steam and smoke following the explosion.

The gun's crew off watch manned their station at once, but as there was nothing seen of a periscope or submarine the after gun crew were ordered to clear away the raft and launch it. The commander of the guard and master got in a boat, and all boats cast off and met 500 yards astern of the *Rochester*, according to an agreement previously made. The armed guard totaled 13, with the commander. The merchant crew complete when on board, including the master and officers, totaled 36. The entire personnel of the vessel therefore numbered 49. The three boats then separated, each steering a different direction. Just after they separated, at 5.15 p. m., a submarine opened fire at the ship. Owing to the lifeboat being so low in the water, the submarine could not be seen, but the flash of the gun was discovered. The gun flashes appeared to be about 3,000 yards off the starboard bow of the *Rochester*. The first shots fired at the vessel were high and to the left. The last shot (there were 10 in all) hit the vessel well above the water line on the starboard side. It was then rapidly getting dark. As soon as the captain thought the lifeboat was out of sight, he had the mast stepped and made sail. In the mind of the armed-guard commander there is no doubt but what the ship

was not long in sinking. At daylight of the next morning neither of the other two boats were in sight. On the afternoon of November 3 the wind blew to a gale, which lasted all the time the men were in the boat and which, together with a steady rain, caused the men to suffer from exposure.

The lifeboat was equipped as follows: One 25-gallon breaker of water; two tanks, each about 3 feet square and 10 inches deep, filled with hard bread. Some of the crew had been eating ham, which was rather salty, and drank a great deal of the water. The captain asked one of them how much water there was, and he said, "Plenty." The captain grew suspicious, however, and examined the breaker himself. He found but 5 gallons left. Some of the rain was utilized for drinking, but owing to the spray that constantly washed over the boat not much could be obtained. Regarding an article in a New York paper that the captain held the men from the water with a revolver, this story is wholly false. One man, an oiler, who was thirsty, said if he did not get water he would jump overboard. As he was making himself disagreeable, he was told to "jump ahead." He did not attempt it, however. One of the men had a bad wound in his thigh, caused by the explosion of the torpedo. This wound was attended to as well as could be done under the circumstances, with the aid of a first-aid packet. When this man was examined on arrival in port by a physician, he stated that it was the cleanest wound he had ever seen, probably due to the cold and salt water. At 2 a. m. on November 7 Tory Island light was sighted. The captain ordered the sail lowered and an improvised sea anchor put out, as the coast was strange and there was a heavy sea. At daybreak, while looking for a place to land, a British patrol boat was observed. This patrol boat picked up the members of the lifeboat and took them to Lough Swilly, where dry clothes were given to them.

STEAMSHIP "LUCIA"—LOST OCTOBER, 1918.

At 5.30 o'clock p. m. on October 17, 1918, the U. S. A. C. T. *Lucia*, bound for a European port (in convoy without escort), was torpedoed amidships on the port side, the torpedo entering the engine room and immediately killing four men. I had been on watch on the upper deck of chart house about 10 minutes, and after surveying both sides with the naked eye, I started to use my glasses. I finished looking to starboard and had just started on the port side looking aft, and as my range of vision was coming abeam I saw a white wake about 100 yards off our port beam, which was about 5 yards in length. On or about the time I saw this wake the explosion occurred. A shower of dust and debris caused by the explosion interfered with men on after gun platform and lookout in the after crow's nest, and the explosion caused such a vibration that it knocked the men stationed on after gun platform off their feet. Immediately upon recovering themselves they manned gun and trained to port at my orders. At the time of explosion I immediately ordered both guns trained to port, but could find no trace of submarine; and I then sent semaphore signal to the U. S. S. *Hawaiian* to broadcast our S O S, as the explosion had put all dynamo in engine room out of order and we had only our auxiliary set left for use. The armed guard remained at their stations from time of torpedoing until the last gun's crew had left ship, at 2.20 o'clock p. m. on the following day, a total of 20 hours and 50 minutes after being torpedoed. During the night I had a very sharp lookout kept for submarine to appear, but without result. On or about 4 o'clock a. m. on October 18 I decided that submarine might try to shell ship at daylight, and I broke out 40 rounds of ammunition for each gun, but nothing occurred. During the night the ship was in sinking condition and aft gun platform was just clear of water, as the explosion of torpedo had carried away the bulkhead between the engine room and No. 4 hatch, and slowly the heavy sea had caused water to enter No. 5 and No. 6 hatches, respectively. On or about 12 o'clock noon on the 18th the water started forcing its way forward, getting as far as No. 3 hatch.

At 2.30 p. m., after being repeatedly warned by the master that ship was in hopeless condition, the last radio operator and myself took to our boat. The boat, of which I had charge, carried, besides armed guard, the master and three members of civilian crew, and we, with the other four boats and raft, hauled well to leeward clear of wreckage and rode to sea anchors, the sea at that time being very rough. At 3.15 p. m. the stern slowly started to disappear and her bow was lifted to a vertical position, and in doing so carried away her mainmast. When she attained a vertical position she slowly disappeared from view, carrying away her stack and foremast, and finally disappeared at 3.20 p. m.

The wind was rising and the sea was beginning to run so high that it took the utmost precautions to prevent the boats from capsizing, and we managed to keep all boats afloat by continu-

ously bailing water. At 9.26 p. m. the U. S. S. *Fairfax* sighted the boat of which I had charge, and after exchanging signals we brought boat alongside and with greatest difficulty managed to get entire crew aboard.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. CARAWAY].

Mr. CARAWAY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I shall not employ any part of the time allotted me to praise or condemn the American Navy. I want to take advantage of this opportunity to have a resolution introduced and make a few remarks upon it. I ask the clerk to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the resolution in the gentleman's time.

The Clerk read as follows:

Whereas artificially controlled markets are harmful, and gambling in the price of the product of the farm, commonly called dealing in futures, is hurtful to the farmer and likewise levies tribute on the consumer; and

Whereas the New York and New Orleans Cotton Exchanges, organizations whose members deal in or are interested in deals in futures of cotton; and the representatives of foreign countries, and representatives of foreign firms engaged in the manufacture of cotton have entered into contracts affecting future deliveries of large amounts of cotton through the said exchanges, and that these Governments and firms have, it is alleged, sold short in the market, through the New York Cotton Exchange; and

Whereas it is now alleged that these Governments and firms are having carried in the New York Cotton Exchange from month to month these contracts; and

Whereas said speculations are alleged to be the cause of the violent fluctuation in the cotton market, as recorded in said exchanges, and for the low price of cotton now prevailing: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That a special committee consisting of five members be appointed by the Speaker from the membership of the House of Representatives to inquire:

First, as to the cause or causes of the present fluctuation in the price of cotton;

Second, whether the present low price of cotton is due to any conspiracy, combination, contract, or practice or restraint on the part of any persons, groups, or corporations engaged in the buying or selling of contracts for future delivery of cotton;

Third, to ascertain the extent, manner, and method of any manipulation or control of the visible supply of cotton by any individuals, groups, associations, or corporations and especially those operating through the New York Cotton Exchange;

Fourth, what legislation is needed to insure reasonable and fair market conditions for cotton and a free and open channel and distribution of same;

Fifth, that the said committee shall have the power to send for witnesses, administer oaths, examine books and papers of the said cotton exchange or any member thereof, or any person dealing in or having connection with said exchange;

Sixth, that the said committee shall have power to sit during the session of the House and shall report its findings and recommendations to the House.

Mr. CARAWAY. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I shall not use the time allotted me to discuss this naval appropriation bill. I shall rather use it to call to the attention of the Members of this House and ask of them relief from a situation that threatens with ruin the cotton growers of this country. They are being crushed by the manipulation of the cotton market. The gamblers in futures within and without the cotton exchanges are robbing the people of the South of all the fruits of their toil. Twenty million of people, directly or indirectly, are dependent for prosperity upon cotton. They have toiled early and toiled late to produce this present cotton crop, only to see the profits of their toil destroyed by gambling in futures. They now ask us, as they have asked often before, to make this thing impossible. Unless the American Congress shall aid them they perish.

Last summer the Government estimate of the cotton crop was about 14,000,000 bales. The price then was around 30 cents per pound. As the season progressed the estimate fell, and as the estimate of the crop fell the price of cotton likewise fell. In other words, this unprecedented thing happened: The less the supply and the greater the demand the lower the price. That could not happen and did not happen by any law of supply and demand. When this last season's cotton was first on the market—I am speaking now of spot cotton—it sold at from 32 to 38 cents per pound.

The Government estimate then was that the crop would be about 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 bales. With each succeeding report the estimate was reduced, until finally it was around 11,500,000 bales, and the ginning report indicates that that was about the correct estimate. We have a crop of about 11,500,000 bales. We had no visible supply of cotton when this crop was put on the market. The estimated consumption of cotton was around 18,000,000 bales, and yet since the cotton has been ready to market the price has constantly dropped, until now there is no market at all for cotton. When you read the reports from the exchanges that cotton futures are 22 or 23 cents, it does not mean that if you have spot cotton you can sell it even for 22 cents. In fact, there is cotton now in the market that has been there for months unsold, though there is a reported market every

day. But with our crop the shortest we have ever produced, with the largest acreage the South ever had planted, and the most expensive we ever grew, cotton is now selling, if selling at all, around 20 or 22 cents, although it sold as high as 38 cents when it was thought we were going to have 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 bales more. I charge that there is manipulation of the cotton market. I am informed that there is an agreement entered into by certain people in this country through the cotton exchanges to furnish certain foreign countries and firms manufacturing cotton in those countries a large amount of cotton. This cotton was contracted at a price such that they could not go into the open market and buy the spot cotton at that price. So, therefore, we have seen this remarkable thing, that the price of future cotton has fluctuated as much as 200 points in a day, or \$10 a bale. How much more the fluctuation would have been no one knows, except the exchange adopted a regulation limiting it to this amount. There can not under the rule of the exchanges now be a greater fluctuation than \$10 a bale in any one day.

Everyone knows that cotton is worth no more this morning than it will be this afternoon, and that this difference of \$10 a bale is purely speculative, although in the morning on the exchanges it appears to be worth \$10 a bale more than it is in the afternoon. If the cotton was worth what it sold for on the 1st of October—around 35 cents per pound—this fluctuation caused by gambling in exchanges represents a loss to the people who grew the cotton of more than \$800,000,000. This year's cotton crop of 11,500,000 bales is now worth less by \$867,000,000 than it was last October.

Mr. PLATT. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. CARAWAY. Yes.

Mr. PLATT. Is not practically all the cotton in the hands of the speculators, and has it not been since October?

Mr. CARAWAY. Oh, no.

Mr. PLATT. They bought it from the farmers early, did they not?

Mr. CARAWAY. The cotton speculator never bought a bale of cotton from the farmer in his life.

Mr. BAER. Do they not deal in fictitious and imaginary cotton, just as they do in wheat?

Mr. CARAWAY. Yes.

Mr. BAER. I am thoroughly in sympathy with the gentleman's resolution, and I hope he will include all of the other farm products. I am willing to vote for that.

Mr. CARAWAY. I am sure that if you should bring a bale of cotton on the floor of the Cotton Exchange in New York there is not a man there who would know what it was. Yet they deal in more imaginary bales of cotton every month than is represented by any crop that has ever been grown by the people in this country. Now, I know, and everyone knows, that it is a manipulated market which, as the supply diminishes and the demand increases, causes a fall of the price. That can not happen by any law of supply and demand.

Answering the suggestion of the gentleman from New York [Mr. PLATT] that the cotton is in the hands of speculators, I want to say that the speculator never has spot cotton. Cotton is in the hands of one of two parties—the farmer who has grown it or the small merchant who has bought it or has taken it in payment of debt.

Mr. PLATT. Isn't he a speculator?

Mr. CARAWAY. The gentleman has such a peculiar idea of speculators that I will not argue with him. If a man who buys a bale of cotton for \$50 and hopes to sell it for \$51 is a speculator, then the small merchant is a speculator. I never understood that the man who bought a bale of spot cotton and bought it at a fair price and sold it at a fair profit was a speculator.

Mr. PLATT. If I buy 100 shares of the New York Central stock with the expectation of selling it at a higher price, am I not a speculator?

Mr. CARAWAY. Does the gentleman imagine that the man who buys a horse for \$100 and hopes to sell it for \$110 is as much a gambler as the man who bets that he will hold three aces? If so, then I concede he is correct. The man who buys future cotton does not have cotton to sell. He would not know cotton if he saw it. He is the man who is now destroying, in the hands of the producer and the small merchant, the price of cotton. He has already this year destroyed more than \$860,000,000 worth of property produced by the people in 11 of these States. That is the work of these cotton exchanges and those who deal in them.

Mr. BAER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CARAWAY. Yes.

Mr. BAER. Wool is somewhat similar to cotton. I got a letter yesterday from a woolgrower who says that at the begin-

ning of the war wool was 60 cents a pound and his wife bought yarn for \$2.50 a pound. Then wool went down to 50 cents a pound, and now his wife is paying \$4 a pound for yarn.

Mr. CARAWAY. Some dishonest speculators have been manipulating the wool price. I realize that unless you gentlemen who are not directly interested in the prosperity of the people who grow cotton will help us in this situation we can not be saved. You have the votes. If our need appeals to gentlemen on that side of the House and from that section of the country where cotton is not grown, we can destroy this vampire that robs us. But if you are willing to let the people who grow cotton be stripped of every cent of profit by these cotton exchanges in New York and New Orleans, we must suffer. But you can not destroy our section of the country without reacting hurtfully on yours. Your prosperity and our prosperity are intertwined. If we are destroyed, you are to be destroyed also. Unless there is some means devised by which people shall profit by the wealth they produce the production of wealth will cease altogether.

This is not an ordinary situation that confronts this country. It is destructive to the financial interests of a majority of the people who live in 11 States of this Union. I know whereof I speak and I know their condition. I know that if the producer of wealth must sit helpless and see some agency beyond his power individually to control rob him of the profits of his toil he is going to cease to toil. And it is a self-evident fact that such a manipulation of the cotton market is now going on. No market regulated by supply and demand can vary \$860,000,000 within two and a half months.

Mr. BLACK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CARAWAY. Yes.

Mr. BLACK. Does not the gentleman think that the repeal of the embargo restriction would be of more real benefit to the cotton market than an investigation of the cotton exchange?

Mr. CARAWAY. I think the embargo affects the price of cotton some, but it has been practically lifted. There are markets open now for cotton that would consume several million bales more than the cotton now in sight, and yet this condition exists.

Mr. BLACK. My understanding is that there are certain restrictions upon neutral countries now—Norway, Sweden, Holland, and Denmark—and I think they ought to be absolutely removed.

Mr. CARAWAY. I think that is true.

Mr. LAZARO. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CARAWAY. Yes.

Mr. LAZARO. The gentleman, in speaking of the abuses on the floor of the cotton exchanges, does not mean to convey the impression that he would have an act abolishing legitimate speculation on the floor of the cotton exchanges in cotton, does he?

Mr. CARAWAY. There never was a legitimate speculation in futures. [Applause.] I would abolish that. It is wrong to gamble anywhere in anything, and I would abolish the cotton exchanges as I would any other gambling den. [Applause.]

Mr. LAZARO. Is the gentleman opposed to cotton exchanges?

Mr. CARAWAY. To anything you call an exchange if it deals with fictitious production and fictitious prices. I would oppose any place where they sell cotton or any other crop of the soil that has not been planted. The gentleman from Louisiana knows that right now he can go to a cotton exchange and buy every bale of cotton that is to be grown in 1919, although there is not now an acre of cotton planted and nobody knows how many will be planted.

Mr. LAZARO. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the gentleman, and I am willing to go as far as he to abolish abuses, but I am opposed to destroying the legitimate cotton exchanges in a cotton-growing community.

Mr. CARAWAY. Mr. Chairman, there may be a legitimate cotton exchange. I never saw one.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. CARAWAY. May I have just one or two more minutes?

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield two more minutes to the gentleman.

Mr. CARAWAY. I wanted to say this, that I see some gentlemen are very much opposed to abolishing cotton exchanges. I remember when there used to be an exchange in New Orleans called the Louisiana State Lottery. The exchange was that people all over the land would buy tickets entitling them to draw something that they never got, and this Congress abolished that because it was simply a gambling device. I have heard no one in recent years defend it, although at the time it

had many advocates. It was just as legitimate a business and it appealed just as much to legitimate business as do cotton exchanges as they are now manipulated. It was simply a means of dealing in people's credulity, and that is all that the cotton exchanges do. You can go into a cotton exchange and buy millions and millions of bales of cotton to be grown in 1919 when there is not an acre of cotton planted and nobody knows that there will be an acre planted. We presume there will be, but how many million bales will be grown no one knows, and yet that cotton crop is being sold over and over every day, and some people say that it is legitimate business. As I tried to point out once before, this condition now exists.

The interest of the spinner and the dealer in futures is identical. Under present rules of the exchanges they operate together. The spinner can say, "I want a million bales of cotton," and the dealer in futures, the legitimate speculator, as some of you gentlemen call him, says, "If you will keep out of the cotton market and not buy a bale, I will break the market until you can have that cotton at whatever price you agree to pay me," and there is no power short of this Government that can prevent their carrying that agreement out. To-day, if it were not for the fear that this Congress will abolish cotton exchanges, the cotton exchanges in New York and New Orleans could make cotton sell at \$5 a bale.

Mr. LAZARO. Has the gentleman given any thought to the Liverpool Exchange and how we could remedy the situation over there?

Mr. CARAWAY. The Liverpool Exchange can not affect the value of a single bale of cotton in the United States unless it has an exchange in the United States with which it can cooperate. Gentlemen, it is the old, old question of right and wrong. It is the question presented ever since governments began—Shall the strong plunder the weak? Shall those who toil not be rich, while those who labor from sun to sun are poor? Our actions here will give the answer.

For myself I have already decided. I shall do all that lies within me to destroy those vicious interests that gamble away the wealth of our farmers, that reward honest toil with poverty, and laugh when grim want sits at the fireside of those who have created the wealth of our land—the farmers of this country. Let us pass this resolution and destroy these plunderers of our land. [Applause.]

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN].

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, the naval bill carries appropriations amounting, I believe, to about three-quarters of a billion dollars. I do not remember for certain the amount carried by the naval bill when I came into Congress, but I am quite confident that it was far less than \$100,000,000.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. When the gentleman and I came here to Congress 22 years ago, I voted in the committee room for the first naval bill that I had anything to do with, and it carried less than \$23,000,000, and the gentleman voted for it on the floor.

Mr. MANN. From \$23,000,000 to three-quarters of a billion dollars is something of a jump. However, we have now gotten so in the habit of referring to billions of dollars that I have noticed lately that Members introducing bills requiring appropriations seem to be rather ashamed of naming any sum less than \$10,000,000 on up to \$100,000,000.

I did not rise for the purpose of discussing the naval appropriation bill itself. I introduced in the House to-day a joint resolution providing for the appointment of a commission to investigate the subject of making estimates and appropriations. I never have been on one of the appropriation committees of this House, although I have given a good deal of attention to appropriation bills, as various chairmen know. There has been a great deal of agitation in the country in favor of adopting what is called the budget system. I have some doubt as to whether many of the people who advocate the adoption of the budget system know what it means; but they do know this, and the rest of us know the same thing, that as the Government has grown up our method of getting requests from the executive, which we call estimates of appropriations, and our method of following those requests by appropriations has "just grown up," and while there is a very good reason for nearly everything that is done, still it is more or less haphazard. The original estimates of appropriations made by the executives are not examined very carefully by the heads of departments, and they

can not be. There is no correlation whatsoever between the heads of departments as to the estimates which they make, and the effort which we made at one time by legislation requiring the President to exercise his power amounts to nothing, because it is physically impossible for the President himself to give much attention to the matter of appropriations, except that he follows the requests of some of his subordinate officials. I do not know how far we can go in the way of correcting.

I have proposed the appointment of a commission to be composed of six Members of this House, to be nonpartisan or bipartisan, and six Members of the Senate, with authority and direction to investigate the whole subject and to report to Congress. I have heard a great many different Members of the House suggest at different times remedies for the existing evil, but none of the remedies which I have ever heard suggested appealed very strongly to me, and I think those suggesting the different remedies seldom agreed. Now that we have got to passing appropriation bills in time of peace amounting to three-quarters of a billion dollars, an increase from \$23,000,000 in 22 or 23 years, now that we have come to the point where we must do without many things which we would like to have and where we must appropriate much money for many things which we would like to have, and where we must appropriate much money for many things which some of us would like to do without, we have simply got to reorganize our system of making appropriations. We have got to reorganize the system which is in effect in regard to the requests which come from the departments and from the executive branches of the Government asking for appropriations. I do not myself think that it is possible or that it would remedy the difficulty to concentrate the whole power of appropriations in the hands of one committee, to be then redistributed to a lot of subcommittees, for that is what we do now. The Committee of the Whole House makes the appropriations and they are distributed among a lot of subcommittees of the House, called committees of the House; but there ought to be by scientific and expert search—and that is the real way to get at anything—suggestions made which would aid the Executive and Congress to save what otherwise would be expended, to the amount probably of hundreds of millions of dollars a year, without the loss of a single thing necessary to be done by the Government.

I want to say this resolution that I introduced I drafted in pencil while I was over in the hospital last November, and, as is my habit in such matters, I laid it away to cool off, wondering whether it was the fantasy of a moment or whether it would appeal to my judgment when I was cool. The able gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY], the great chairman of a great committee, the other day in discussing the deficiency bill said that he had an idea of this sort in his mind. I concluded I would introduce my resolution, hoping that between us and with the aid of the other Members of Congress, or aiding them, we might put into law a provision, in the form of a joint resolution or as an item on one of the deficiency appropriation bills, authorizing a commission, the expense of which may be \$100,000, as suggested here, or it may be less, or it may be a little more, but it ought to save the Government more millions of dollars a year than there are Members of this House.

Mr. GARNER. Will the gentleman yield before he takes his seat?

Mr. MANN. Yes, if I have the time.

Mr. GARNER. I fully agree with the gentleman's suggestion that we ought to have a commission to investigate this matter, and I want to suggest to the gentleman if we could not adopt the resolution, send it to the Senate, and put a similar provision in one of the appropriation bills, so if that became the law it will be sure to pass the other body?

Mr. MANN. I will say to the gentleman—

Mr. GARNER. The parliamentary situation might be such that the sundry civil bill might not become a law, and therefore we want to take both opportunities to get the other body to consider this.

Mr. MANN. Now, this plan that is in my mind practically—and I always try to be practical—is, suppose this resolution is referred to the Committee on Rules. I hope the Committee on Rules will report it, but, of course, that does not give it a privileged status, and I hope it may pass by unanimous consent; but if the Committee on Rules will report it I think the Committee on Appropriations will probably be warranted in including some item like this covering the substance—and I care nothing about the form—as an item in the general deficiency appropriation bill, which bill is almost certain to become a law. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 12 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HEFLIN].

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes of that time to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. EAGLE].

Mr. EAGLE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I want to make a few observations concerning the resolution introduced by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. CARAWAY] and submit for the serious consideration of you gentlemen who come not from the southern cotton-growing States but from the other States of the Union certain observations in order to induce, if I may, your sympathetic consideration, based partly upon your own self-interests, of that resolution. In the State of Texas the cotton crop begins to come in about the 1st of July. From the 1st of July of last year, therefore, up until about the month of October of last year, when Mr. Baruch and the President had something to say about the appointment of the commission to stabilize the price of cotton, there moved in the State of Texas about 660,000 bales of cotton of 500 pounds each at a price ranging around 30 cents per pound. That money enabled the people of the State of Texas to take more than their quota of war-savings stamps and of liberty bonds, predicated upon the supposition that there would be a legitimate market for their chief product, one-half of which is raised and owned by Republicans—our negro farmers. Therefore, if for no other reason, you should consider those, whether you do the white folks or not. [Laughter.] From then up to the present time in the State of Texas about 500,000 bales have moved at a lower price, until now it is about 22 cents per pound. In answer to the specific point raised by my friend Mr. PLATT, of New York, as to whether it were not legitimate speculation in reference to the things that have been done and are currently being done, I have this to say: There remain about 1,900,000 bales of cotton in Texas of the crop grown in the year 1918, which began to go on the market last July, and which up until now has not been sold because it will bankrupt the producer to part with it at present ruinous prices.

It will not only take from him any reward for his year's labor, but it will render him unable, as a tenant farmer or a negro cotton farmer, or a white man who has one plow or five plows, if they sell at the current price, which is manipulated and forced by English cotton spinners and the New York and New Orleans cotton spinners and the New York and New Orleans Cotton Exchange gamblers and their agents—unable to pay for the liberty bonds they have bought, predicated on that asset of cotton for which they have legitimately worked and own. Not only that, but it will render my State of Texas, which has gone "over the top" in every one of these campaigns for liberty bonds and other patriotic things, unable to subscribe its allotted part, as it wants to do, to the forthcoming liberty bond issue, and then you gentlemen, if you fail to listen to us when we tell you the truth and the reasons for it, please do not say then that the people of Texas are not patriotic because they do not subscribe the full quota; but the fact is that they will have been prevented from doing that on account of the value of their cotton crop having been beaten down several hundred million dollars by these cotton-exchange gamblers.

We buy every pair of shoes in Texas, where there are 5,000,000 human beings, from you people in Philadelphia and Boston and Lynn and other sections of the manufacturing North. We can not do business with you on the high plane we have been doing it and pay our debts and buy those stocks and make your factories prosperous so you can hire your labor if you sit silently by and permit the gamblers to wreck us. We buy our wheat from the Dakotas and from Kansas. We buy our corn, millions of bushels of corn, from the mighty States of the North and West. We buy your leather goods and machinery, and we buy the products of your factories and your looms, and we have our raw cotton to pay for them as our money crop.

This would not be such a tragedy, my friends, if your constituents got the benefit of the sacrifice to which our southern farmers are now being subjected. But will you get this into your minds and not forget it? The very price of cotton goods in the United States right now that every one of your consuming constituents is using is fixed by the cotton manufacturers having come here to the board a year ago and agreeing to pay 37½ cents a pound for the present cotton crop. They said that would be the market, and the board said all right. Manufacturers of cotton in America fixed the prices at which they are now selling their goods, wares, and merchandise predicated on 37½ cents a pound for raw cotton.

Considering that fact, every cent below 37½ cents a pound which these cotton-exchange gamblers have beaten the price down to—and they have already beaten it from 37 or 38 cents down to 22 cents, and there is no market for it at that—is so

much put into the pockets of speculators, and your constituents get no benefit from it. And thereby you help unconsciously, you men from Pennsylvania and all these other splendid Commonwealths, by your silence to pauperize the masses of the people in my State.

Mr. FOCHT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EAGLE. I will.

Mr. FOCHT. It has been long known and commented on that Liverpool controlled the price of grain throughout the world. You say the price of cotton is controlled by Great Britain just as on leather. Now, how can Pennsylvania help you break that up?

Mr. EAGLE. My friend has referred to something I did not say. I said the English cotton spinner is operating through the New York Cotton Exchange and the New Orleans Stock Exchange by furnishing money to these gamblers in selling future deliveries, but it is impossible to deliver at continually lowering prices and at the same time declining to purchase even at the market. They are unitedly so doing it, and just how you can help it I wish was clear. But I say that the unlimited and indiscriminate selling of cotton futures which they can not meet with the cotton itself is having the effect of pauperizing my people.

Mr. BAER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EAGLE. I will.

Mr. BAER. The gentleman spoke about the North and that they are buying your cotton. I wish to say that a suit of overalls up in my State costs \$5 a pair, and I looked it up the other day and weighed a suit of overalls and I find that at the present price your cotton producer gets 47½ cents for the cotton in that suit.

Mr. EAGLE. I have finished the observation I wanted to make, gentlemen. [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of permitting the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT] to submit a conference report, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 15539, the naval appropriation bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

VALIDATION OF CERTAIN WAR CONTRACTS.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, I desire to submit a conference report on the bill H. R. 13274, on which the conferees have come to no agreement, for printing under the rules.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report it.

The Clerk read as follows:

Conference report on the bill (H. R. 13274) to provide relief where formal contracts have not been made in the manner required by law.

The SPEAKER. The report is ordered printed under the rules.

The following is the conference report:

CONFERENCE REPORT (NO. 1032).

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13274) to provide relief where formal contracts have not been made in the manner required by law, having met, after full and free conference have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

On the amendment of the Senate to the bill and to the title of the bill the conferees have been unable to agree.

S. H. DENT, JR.,

W. J. FIELDS,

JULIUS KAHN,

Managers on the part of the House.

GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,

DUNCAN U. FLETCHER,

C. S. THOMAS,

F. E. WARREN,

P. C. KNOX,

Managers on the part of the Senate.

THE NAVY.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the naval appropriation bill.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 15539, with Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the bill.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 15539) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, and for other purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HEFLIN] is recognized.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am in hearty sympathy with the resolution offered by my friend, Judge CARAWAY, of Arkansas. It represents the general desire of the people of the cotton-growing States. It is plain to us who live in the cotton belt that there is a conspiracy on between certain foreign spinners and certain American spinners, and they are using the speculators upon the cotton exchanges of the United States to beat down the price far below that warranted by the law of supply and demand. To make it plain to you that there is a conspiracy, let me say that when the exchanges are honestly conducted the price of cotton futures is always above the price of cotton in the local market. Now, the situation is reversed. The future price is \$35 a bale below the spot price. This is inexcusable and indefensible and is proof positive to any man who understands the cotton business that there is a gambling deal on and operating right here in the United States to the detriment and great injury of the cotton producers of our country.

Gentlemen, here are the cotton producers of the United States, whose boys with your boys fought and fell upon the fields of France, and they are holding their cotton for a price that will yield a profit. And here are these men on the exchange, with no cotton to sell and with no intention of ever delivering a bale of real cotton on a contract, by putting up a margin of \$15 a bale are able to beat down the value of a bale of cotton that the farmer is holding, worth \$150 a bale under the law of supply and demand. Is it right? Is that fair? Is it fair to permit these men, with \$15 a bale, to go upon an exchange and, regardless of the law of supply and demand, beat down the price of a product worth \$150 that you are holding in order to obtain a legitimate profit? That is what is going on in the United States to-day. I charge that there is a conspiracy and that its agents are operating on the New York Cotton Exchange, and I think that the evil effects of this conspiracy, if not the conspiracy itself, are seen in the operations of the New Orleans exchange.

Even at that the New Orleans exchange is nearly always 100 points above the New York exchange. If the New Orleans exchange will not put its house in order, then it must not expect to survive. It is whispered around that certain foreign powers are trying to beat down the price so that they can buy this cotton at a low price and then sell the exchange market and run it up to 40 cents a pound, at which time they intend to supply the demands in Europe after they have robbed, through an American exchange, the cotton producers of the United States. [Applause.] Will we Members of the American Congress permit this to be done?

Mr. BAER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HEFLIN. I would like to, but I have only four or five minutes, and in that time I want to touch on a few other points that I had in mind. Gentlemen, at the beginning of this war the farmers in the cotton belt of the United States lost \$600,000,000 on the cotton crop of 1914. It was an awful blow to our people and caused great financial distress, and in order to help us in that financial embarrassment and hour of distress you heard—and many of you responded—the cry of “buy a bale of cotton.” Now, when the war is over, are we going to permit the same cotton producers, merchants, and bankers of the United States who suffered such heavy losses in 1914, the first year of the war, to be driven into bankruptcy now, when the war has ended in victory and the world is demanding 6,000,000 bales of cotton more than America can supply? [Applause.]

It is unfair, gentlemen, and the Congress of the United States owes it to those men who supported the Government in every way possible with their money, buying war-saving stamps and liberty bonds, who aided the Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A. during all the stress and strain of war, and, better still, who gave their brave boys to fight and die on the fields of France—I say we owe it to them to prevent the existence of an institution that denies to them a fair deal in the markets of the world. [Applause.] All that we ask is the price warranted by the law of supply and demand, and unless the exchange reflects that price there is no just excuse for its existence. [Applause.] I am willing to include an investigation of the grain dealers' exchange. I want to say here that I do not believe that there is any such supply of wheat in the world as has been floating around in newspaper reports. [Applause.] I think that is a part of the bear propaganda.

Let us join hands and go together and investigate all exchanges that speculate in farm products. You will find conditions, gentlemen, that will shock the sensibilities of an honest, justice-loving people. I for one do not believe that it is necessary to have an exchange selling in unlimited quantities mere names of "wheat" and "corn" and "cotton" in order for the farmer to have a market for his product.

The American crop of cotton, wheat, and corn is consumed every year, and yet these crooks and gamblers tell us that it is necessary for them to sit in the exchanges and bet each day that the price of the farmer's produce will go up or down in order that the producer may have a market. If Congress is to permit the existence of an exchange that deals in farm products, Congress must compel that exchange to reflect prices justified by the supply and demand. Do you know what the situation is? This year the American cotton crop is about 7,000,000 bales of cotton short of the world's demand for American cotton. Now, what would the price be under the law of supply and demand? It would be around 35 or 40 cents, and in spite of the gambling exchanges we are going to hold cotton until the price goes above the cost of production and yields a fair profit to the American producer. The cotton gamblers are selling the market short. I understand that one foreign power has sold 800,000 bales short. This is not cotton except in name. Please bear that in mind. I am told that they are passing this gambler's bogus check down the line, continuing it from month to month. My God, will the American Congress, composed of men who come from districts where the boys have died for the Republic that claims to be just to its own people—will we, I ask you, permit an institution to remain in existence here when it is being used by rival commercial interests of a foreign country to the ruin of a great industry of the United States? [Applause.] Let us pass this resolution at the earliest day possible and go to New York and New Orleans and make a thorough investigation into the conduct of these exchanges and find out the exact situation, and while we are in the reconstruction period following the war let us determine whether or not we are going to permit gambling in farm products. The Louisiana State lottery is dead. The whisky traffic is doomed. Now let us say to the gamblers in farm products, "Your days are numbered." [Applause.]

This Congress owes it to itself, to its own sense of justice, it owes it to the cotton producers of the United States, to see to it that those who produce this great staple that brings to America the balance of trade shall at least have a fair deal in the markets of America. [Applause.] Mr. Chairman, it costs \$30 a bale now to gather from the field a bale of cotton and gin it and put bagging and ties on it and put it on the market, and this does not touch the cost of production. It cost 25 cents a pound to produce the crop of 1918. Think of it. A bale of cotton sold for \$30 in 1914, and it now costs \$30 after it is produced to pick it out, gin it, and put bagging and ties on it and get it ready for market, and yet regardless of the cost of production, and regardless of the great demand for American cotton, the gamblers with no cotton to sell still sell a paper contract with the name of cotton in it, and by so doing run counter to the law of supply and demand and try to deprive the producer of a fair price for his cotton.

Shall we permit these exchanges to defy the law and defeat the operation of the law of supply and demand?

Can you tell me why it was that cotton sold for 37 cents a pound when the sea was full of submarines and it was a hard matter and an uncertain undertaking to get cotton to a foreign port at all, and then when the war had ended and submarines had gone from the sea and foreign countries were calling for American cotton, and the President declared that all cotton needed could now go freely to allied and neutral countries, and the demand had been increased about 4,000,000 bales over the time when cotton sold for 37 cents—can you tell me, I say, why it is that a cotton exchange can be manipulated so as to insult and outrage and interfere with and defeat the law of supply and demand in such a fashion? [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I ask permission to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Wingo). The gentleman from Alabama asks unanimous consent to revise and extend his remarks. Is there objection?

Mr. WALSH. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from Alabama if he means to revise and extend the remarks he has just been making?

Mr. HEFLIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. IGOE having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. Tulley, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13274) to provide relief where formal contracts have not been made in the manner required by law, had further insisted upon its amendments to the said bill, and had asked a further conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, Mr. FLETCHER, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. WARREN, and Mr. KNOX as the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Vice President had appointed Mr. WEEKS and Mr. HOLLIS members of the joint select committee on the part of the Senate, as provided for in the act of February 16, 1889, as amended by the act of March 2, 1895, entitled "An act to authorize and provide for the disposition of useless papers in the executive departments," for the disposition of useless papers in the Interior Department.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. FOCHT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am in favor of this bill, the naval appropriation bill. In the absence of any expressions from the peace commission overseas as to an international agreement for a reduction in armament, there is, in my judgment, just one policy ahead of this Nation in respect to its naval program.

I want to address myself for a few minutes to the higher aspect of the case. This war has brought many changes in this world. The world turns around every 24 hours, and it has turned around a good many times since \$23,000,000 was the basis of a naval appropriation bill. One of the results of this war is the transfer of the financial center of the earth from the Old World to the New. New York City to-day, by reason of being the chief financial city of America, is the center of distribution and the center of deposit of the world's supply of gold, monetary and commercial. It is the financial center of the earth. America is to-day the banker nation of the world. We hold to-day approximately \$10,000,000,000 of the bonds, securities, and notes of Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, and Roumania. These are deposited with us as collateral for loans advanced. They unitedly pay us approximately a million dollars a day as interest. No nation in history ever had due it such a stupendous sum of money. It is simply a prudential act to do something tending to protect and guard it.

By the very geography and topography of the surrounding country, this can be done only by the presence of a great Navy. New York should be the great naval base of America.

It is the first time in 300 years of history that the financial center of the earth is in a city capable of being reached directly from the high and open sea. Before this war there were four great financial centers—London, New York, Paris, and Berlin. The three great European cities were none of them on the seaboard, but far in the interior, where no naval fleet could reach them. Between those cities and the coast would be the battle fields. But here we have the spectacle of the financial center of the earth in a city directly upon the open sea.

There are a few places in this world where great cities are builded where God Almighty intended that they should be builded. New York is not one of them. There is one city on earth located exactly where all geographers, scientists, and strategists say that a great city should be builded, and that is the city of Constantinople, the ancient city Byzantium, the early capital of the Byzantine Empire. Mankind early discovered the strategic value of the location of that city and made it the capital of the great Byzantine nation, where now is located the modern city of Constantinople. All the armies and navies of the earth could not take Constantinople if it is properly defended. It demonstrated its natural strength of position in this very war. The great English Army and Navy failed to take it. But New York is not one of these cities. New York is a difficult city to protect. It has no natural features of strength. It can not be made impregnable. The great guns of

to-day range up to 30 miles. It is no longer necessary to get within 5 miles of a city in order to destroy it. We are building some ourselves to range of 45 miles. We are all familiar with the superguns of the Germans that ranged to 75 miles' range. Witness the spectacle of a great hostile naval fleet approaching the city of New York, the financial center of the earth, with guns having a range of 50 or 60 miles, from the open sea. The great city of New York would be absolutely helpless and hopeless. Now, it is paradoxical that a nation that has a second-class navy in a war with a nation having a first-class navy is no better off than if it did not have a single naval vessel and never had constructed one.

That was the situation of Germany in this war. Along the coast of Scotland lay the great grand fleet of Britain, stretching for 85 miles in an unbroken line of dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts; and within the Kiel Canal and behind Wilhelms-haven and the defenses of Helgoland lay the second navy of the earth, that did not dare to come out. The grand fleet of Britain lay like a deadfall at the mouth of a cave, so to speak. Behind that grand fleet we beheld the open seas of all the world.

Now, there is another aspect of this case. Any naval program that we undertake we must conceive it upon the basis that our Navy is to be continually and perpetually divided into two or more units. We have two coasts. The peculiarity of the late war, so far as naval activities were concerned, was that the British Navy could be held together as a unit. The war was fought upon a peculiar geography. Two wars never come just alike. We have two coasts approximately the same in mileage.

Mr. McCORMICK. Will the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. MILLER of Washington. I will as soon as I conclude my remarks. If you place the coast line of California upon the Atlantic it will reach from Maine to Carolina. Now, we have these two coasts. It seems that our Navy inherently and continually will be divided into at least two units, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Now, we learned a lesson in the Spanish War from the trip of the heroic *Oregon*, that left Puget Sound Navy Yard and went on its long trip around the Horn. That little ship was lying over at the navy yard in my district, floating in the roadstead, when she received orders to leave for Atlantic waters.

Mr. McCORMICK. Was that prior to the building of the Panama Canal?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Yes. A great naval fleet was supposed to have left the coast of Spain. We did not know but what it was leaving to bombard our coast cities. And by the way, I may say this in passing, that the great commercial cities of America are built on or near the seacoast, in a particularly hazardous position, either on the Great Lakes or on the ocean. Our Nation is different from most of the nations of the world. It calls inherently for a great navy. The old *Oregon* went clear around the Horn, and was 61 days in making the trip. We learned a lesson from that, to construct the Panama Canal by which we could throw together in the least possible time the fleets of the two seas. I remember when the little *Oregon* left Seattle. We were in hopes that she would stay there and guard us in that war for we had not at that time a fort on all Puget Sound or a battery. It was sent to the Atlantic waters. I remember seeing her go out sailing along the offing. We saw the waves part at her bow, the long line of smoke, and realized that the great city of Seattle on Puget Sound was without one ship to defend it.

For 61 days, day and night, that little ship held her course. Presently we were informed that she had rounded the Horn, was coming up right through the sea where the Spanish fleet was supposed to be—one ship out on the sea to meet an entire fleet. Often they would see a smoke, and that little ship would make for that smoke, plunging where the fleet was supposed to be. Nine times her decks were cleared for action. She came into the West Indies and hoisted her signal, "All well on board and ready for action." We learned a lesson and we constructed the Panama Canal.

There is another lesson in this war which we learned greater than the one we learned in the Spanish War, and that is if we had a war with any nation that had a superior navy we would be no better off than if we had not built a single war vessel.

So I am in favor of a great construction program. The changed conditions demand it. We, for the first time in all history, are the bond-holding Nation of the earth, and this world is filled with selfish men and selfish nations the same as it has always been. There is but one thing ahead of us that I can see, and that is the construction of a great and powerful Navy, together with coast defenses. I am in favor of the bill; I am in favor of the recommendations of the committee as to its building program commencing in 1922. [Applause.]

Mr. McCORMICK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Yes; I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. McCORMICK. Would the gentleman contemplate an Army on the same scale?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I do not know about an Army. We are dealing now with the Navy. Let us not confuse the two. Let every tub stand on its own bottom. We are talking Navy now and not Army.

Mr. BAER. Will the gentleman tell us as to the time it takes to go from Seattle to New York?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. It is 631 miles farther to Liverpool than it is to New York City, going round the Horn.

Mr. BAER. I mean taking the course through the canal; how much has it shortened it?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. It depends on the speed of the vessel. The *Oregon* was not a fast vessel; about 19 knots. She was a capital ship in her day. It took her 61 days. I think one of our capital ships now could make it through the canal in less than 20 days.

Mr. FARR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Yes.

Mr. FARR. Are we not as powerless on the Pacific coast to-day as when you had the *Oregon* there?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Approximately. We have forts now on Puget Sound, but by no means enough, either in number or strength. In my own city there are five transcontinental lines coming into it. It is quite a city, upward of 400,000 people. The Puget Sound district is the second district in America in exports and imports. I want my friend from Philadelphia and my friend from Boston to make note of that. It is the second district in America. Great and substantial interests are out there on the Pacific, on Puget Sound and elsewhere, and they must be protected and guarded.

Mr. KETTNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. KETTNER. In answer to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FARR], I will state that the *Oregon* at the present time is the only ship we have on the Pacific coast, and it is the flagship of Admiral Fuller.

Mr. FARR. Then I was right in the question I put to the gentleman from Washington?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Yes, sir.

We have a navy yard 11 miles from our city where they were working 7,000 men night and day during the war. We are building two 10,000-ton ammunition ships in the shoal construction dock in that yard, a fleet of seagoing tugs for the Navy, and other great construction work. Immense Government interests are centered in that locality aside from the navy yard and its activities. All along the Pacific coast are great interests, great cities increasing by leaps and bounds in importance and wealth.

I spoke a few moments ago about the peculiar conditions of this war by which the grand fleet of Great Britain could be held together as a unit. There was a time at one period of the war when it looked like that great fleet would be divided. Only a change of campaign on the part of the Germans saved such a calamity. It was in 1917, when the Germans were assaulting the front to the west of St. Quentin. You will all remember that series of great drives or lunges was toward Montdidier and Amiens. It was evidently the plan of the German campaign at that time to break the line at the point where the English front joined that of the French. It was the natural point of attack. And they did attack in all their strength and fury, drove the front westward to the very outskirts of Amiens, with the hope of separating the two armies and crumpling the British back upon the channel. And they came frightfully near being successful. If they had succeeded, the British would have been forced to fall back toward the channel. As the British would be falling back toward a coast line, it would have forced at least a part of the grand fleet to come to the defense of the army as it approached the channel. When this had been done, it undoubtedly was the plan of the Germans to then bring out its navy and catch this British fleet in the channel waters, where there was little opportunity to maneuver, and by superiority annihilate it.

Coincident with this and as a part of the plan, some of the fast cruisers could escape out of the North Sea, as the greater British unit would in all likelihood come to the rescue or attempt to rescue the fleet engaged. The military campaign I have suggested was the natural campaign or plan to adopt. It had the threefold advantage of defeating the British Army, of capturing the channel ports, and of dividing the British fleet and reducing the units to a degree where the German Navy stood a fair chance of victory. But at the very time when there was

a possibility of success, when the British Army was driven back on Amiens and the front was all but broken, the whole German campaign was changed. Thereafter the great offensives and plunges were made to the southwest in the direction of Paris.

It was evident that a strict strategic campaign of undoubted wisdom and soundness had been subordinated to a campaign the consequences of which were purely political. Paris henceforth became the objective, and the whole plan to gain the channel, and thus divide the grand fleet, was abandoned. It was, in my judgment, the second turning point in the war, the first having been the first Battle of the Marne. It was Germany's second great tactical and strategic blunder. Had she held to her first campaign, driven the wedge into Amiens and to the westward, instead of going southward to Chateau-Thierry, there might have been far different results. It follows as a corollary from the evident original campaign that the grand fleet of Great Britain would have been divided—something England always dreaded. Let us all thank God that the blunder was made.

So we can all see the danger of dividing a great fleet in time of war. England came very near being a victim in this war.

With us, in any war except where one coast, or rather one ocean, is absolutely safe, our fleet would of necessity be divided. The only result from such a situation—the only solution—is a strong Navy, so when the war hazard is greater on one coast than on the other a portion of the fleet of the lesser exposed coast can be transferred to augment the forces of the other.

Every British statesman announces England will never abandon her time-honored policy of the supremacy of the seas. That policy is of no consequence so far as it shall tend to shape our national policy. Let us build as best meets our requirements, and trust England and every other nation to do the same. We must, as I see it, shape our policy, our plans, to meet the requirements of America; for if we do not, it is safe to say no other nation will.

Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of this bill, and I am in favor of the recommendation of the committee on the three-year construction program. [Applause.]

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. PLATT].

Mr. PLATT. Mr. Chairman, I dislike to differ with my very good friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. EAGLE], and with my also good friend, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. CARAWAY], and perhaps it is a little invidious to undertake to answer arguments evidently made for the purpose of circulation in their districts. But it seems to me perhaps just as well to say a few things that everybody must know are true, even if they seem to be in answer to these arguments. We have had a great war and everything has been high in price and nearly everything is still high in price, and everybody knows that those prices have got to come down. If you sell any kind of a future, anything for future delivery months ahead, you have to take a lower price, or if you were buying anything for the future, for delivery, say, next summer, you certainly would not pay as high a price as you are paying now. This is true with respect to metals, steel, iron, copper, and other staple commodities. So far as cotton is concerned, I am informed by gentlemen who come from New England and who are interested in cotton mills that cotton goods are already piling up in the markets and that prices have already gone down, and the people are not buying things as they did, because they expect the prices to go still lower. If they knew that the prices were at the bottom, they would buy; that is the psychology of buying. If you were going to buy a house and lot and the price now were \$10,000 and you knew the agent would let you have it for \$8,000 in six months, you would not buy it now, if you had any sense. That is what is happening with cotton and everything else. Cotton futures sell lower, of course, than spot cotton, and so would wheat futures, if the Government was not holding up the price.

Mr. BAER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PLATT. Yes.

Mr. BAER. The price has been fixed on wheat, but here is a case where bran and middlings sold for \$27 a ton, and after the restriction was taken off by the Government the price went to \$48 a ton, and to-day it is over \$50 a ton, and the price still remains on wheat at the same.

Mr. PLATT. It looks to me as though there were a pool controlling the price of middlings, or else there is an abnormal demand and a short supply.

Mr. BAER. That raises the price of your fodder, and that raises the price of your milk, and the people in the city holler because the farmers are charging so much.

Mr. PLATT. Exactly, but one curious thing I have noticed. The people of the Dakotas and other farmers do not complain of the grain exchanges when the prices are going up. Neither do the cotton farmers complain of gambling in futures in cotton when the price is going up. It is only when it is going down that they complain.

Mr. BAER. They complain up in my district the year around, because the price always goes up when they have nothing to sell, and when they have something to sell the price always goes down. [Laughter.]

Mr. PLATT. They all complain that it is the short selling that makes the things go down in price. That is obviously untrue. Every time a man sells something for future delivery he has to buy it back again. It has been proven over and over again that the short selling of products steadies the market instead of putting the price down. It used to be said of pig iron that it was either a prince or a pauper. You could not deal in futures in pig iron. You always had to buy and sell at spot, and when there was very little of it on hand it sold high and when there was much of it on hand it sold low. I believe that has been changed somewhat, so that iron is now sold to some extent for future delivery and is steadier in price.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PLATT. Yes.

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. I do not know that I am right about this, but it seems to me that in the debate on the Food Administration bill a proposition was made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MOORE] that the price of cotton be fixed, and it was resisted by those in this House who were interested in the cotton-raising districts. Am I right about that?

Mr. PLATT. I think the gentleman is right about that. I will say this, that I think there was talk of fixing the cotton price in October, and I had the idea then that that talk was put out for the purpose of getting the cotton away from the small cotton farmers at lower prices into the hands of the speculators. And let me say that the southern storekeeper who buys the cotton from the small farmer is the worst bloodsucker in the United States. He is a speculator pure and simple, and is as much worse than any purchaser and seller of futures in Wall Street as the devil is—

Mr. CARAWAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PLATT. Yes.

Mr. CARAWAY. Is the gentleman making that statement on information of his own?

Mr. PLATT. I am making that statement on the testimony we took before the Banking and Currency Committee when the farm-loan bill was before Congress. We had the testimony over and over again from southern farmers and from agents of the Department of Agriculture, and we passed the Federal farm-loan act largely for the purpose of getting the small cotton farmer of the South out of the hands of these bloodsuckers, who get the cotton away from the small grower and hold it for speculation.

I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CARAWAY. You know I am not surprised at the gentleman thinking it was right, that it was perfectly legitimate, to buy and speculate in futures, but the thing we complain of is as to the money which we had to borrow from Wall Street to finance our cotton crop. A bale of cotton, if the gentleman knows about it at all, which I am sure he will admit he does not—

Mr. PLATT. I never bought any.

Mr. CARAWAY. Is handled by the merchant, who furnishes the grower of the cotton with his supplies.

Mr. PLATT. Yes; furnishes him with all his groceries and his clothing and everything else and gets the cotton grower in debt every single year for every bale of cotton he can grow, and the grower has to give up his few bales of cotton for anything the storekeeper will offer for it. And these storekeepers have the cotton now, and they are the fellows who are yelling because the price is going down. That is the whole story.

Mr. CARAWAY. That is exactly what it is. It is astounding how much misinformation a gentleman can accumulate in three or four years.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. PADGETT. I desire to yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HUDDLESTON].

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, the naval appropriation bill which we now have under consideration commits the United

States to a new policy—a policy of expansion until we shall have in 1925 the greatest fleet in all the world; as Great Britain increases her navy we are to add to ours; we are to aim at having a Navy second to none. Of course, in 15 minutes I can not anything like cover my objections to the policy expressed in the bill. To cover the subject fully would require that I present all the objections which might be made to militarism and to imperialism, to world exploitation, and to the suppression of democracy in general. This bill means in the ultimate conscription of men for service in the Navy just as we had them conscripted for service in the Army, for sufficient forces to man the immense fleets proposed can never be had under the volunteer system. It means conscription in time of peace instead, as we have had it in time of war. We must contemplate that as the final result. While I can not in the short time allotted me anything like express all the objections which I have to this bill, there are a few things I want to say in my plain way and with all modesty.

I want to express one or two superficial objections which I have to this bill. Analyze this measure and you get out of it the belief upon the part of those who bring the bill forward that we have lost the war. I had thought that we had won the war, but it seems that I was mistaken. The American people thought that they had won the war. They entered into it with all their souls to abolish armaments—to do away with war; it was said to them from rostrum after rostrum, "Win the war; drive Prussian militarism out of the world. Usher in a period when there will be no war, and the men of the earth may dwell together in brotherly unity." But it seems that instead of riding the earth of the burdens of armament we have but begun to arm. The argument was made on the floor of this House, when we were asked to vote for war against Germany, that if Germany is not defeated we would have to arm against her; we would have to make ourselves one of the great military and naval powers of the world and stagger on under the burdens of militarism—that was the reasoning that got my vote for the war; that argument got the support of the American people for the war.

AMERICA FOUGHT TO ABOLISH WAR.

I think I know something of the great heart of the common American man. I know that in that heart there was a resolve that we must do away with war and with all the hell that war means, so as to bring about a better time, one more befitting the professions of Christianity and the civilization of this age.

But in vain. We won the battles, but we have lost the war; that is the meaning of what they say who bring forward this bill. In vain the sacrifices of mothers and fathers and wives; in vain the pouring out of the blood of our soldiers upon foreign battle fields; in vain the brilliant achievements of the Argonne and Chateau-Thierry, the sufferings of Belleau Woods—all in vain; they mean nothing. The hobnails of the American doughboy are clattering upon the stones of Coblenz. They marched across the lordly Rhine over the floating bridge. They climbed the steep and planted Old Glory upon the heights of the ancient fortress of Ehrenbreitstein. But all that means nothing; all has no significance! If we are to labor and stagger on under heavy armaments throughout the years to come, we might as well never have entered into a war; or, having entered into it, we might as well have lost.

I am not going to agree to this policy. I want to be respectful to the committee; I want to be respectful to every Member of the House who may favor this bill and may support it. I want to be respectful, if I can; but I am afraid that my views upon this bill may be construed as somewhat lacking in respect. I do not so intend it. But they are my views. I submit them in all humility and in all modesty. I submit them regretfully and only as a matter of stern duty. But I hold to it with all the strength of my reason and my soul that this bill represents a policy of the most stupendous folly that was ever advocated upon this floor. I would say that it represents a wicked policy if I only might say that and still be respectful, as I would like to be.

What is the meaning of this bill? What is the reasoning back of it? Whom are we arming against? Whom do we fear? The "Hun," as the superpatriot so loved to call him, has gone. Prussian militarism lies a smoldering ruin. It is merely a corpse that the nations of the world sit upon in Paris. They are merely a coroner's jury. The strength of the German armies is gone, not only for this generation but for a hundred years to come. It is a most stupid man who does not comprehend this fact.

There are two important naval powers of the world today besides ourselves. One is Japan, which has a navy much inferior to our own, even as it is to-day. And Japan is a poor nation and her fleet must continue to be inferior, it will be

vastly inferior when we complete the program already adopted without taking the present bill into mind.

This added program and the policy it speaks for has no occasion in Japan, and no intelligent man will say so. The other great naval power is a power that has ruled the sea for ages. Britannia rules the waves to-day, and that Britannia might rule the waves has been the corner stone of British policy for over 300 years. That policy is founded on logic and has good reason to support it. With a people situated on a small island, a numerous people, depending almost wholly upon commerce and industry as a means of support, relying upon other nations for food and raw materials that enable them to live, we can well understand how the British may insist upon ruling the waves so long as Great Britain lies open to her enemies and to all the world in such fashion. We can understand how the British are not willing that their people shall be subject to be strangled to death by any power that may happen to get supremacy on the sea.

NAVAL SUPREMACY NOT ESSENTIAL TO OUR SAFETY.

But our situation is entirely different. We are self-sustaining. We have our own raw materials. We can feed ourselves. You may cut off our commerce to-morrow for a whole year long and the American people will live at the end of it; and there will be no suffering for lack of proper food, and we will be clothed. Our situation is altogether different from that of Great Britain. We have no far-flung colonies. We have embarked upon no policy of imperialism which makes it necessary that we retain control of the seas in order to get into communication with colonies that may lie in the remote corners of the world. God grant that we may never enter upon such a policy. But we will enter upon it if we carry out the policy that this bill speaks for.

But gentlemen say that these ships will never be built. Perhaps the remark has not been made upon this floor, but it has been made privately, made in the cloakrooms, and is generally current, that these ships will not be built. Some gentlemen think the world will agree upon disarmament before the ships are built, and, therefore, the next Congress will repeal the act. Then there are others that say that in order to procure disarmament by agreement of nations we must "bluff" Great Britain into agreeing to dismantle her fleet, and that the proposition merely involves a bluff upon our part.

A CHALLENGE TO GREAT BRITAIN.

Now, I want to say this: I have too high a conception of the honor of my country to take part in putting up a bluff. I will not humiliate my country. I will not descend to a contemptible plane of bluffing in order to bring about a policy of disarmament. I decline to descend to the ethics of the card table in fixing a policy for my country to pursue. Then what do we mean? We mean to build the ships. We mean to challenge British supremacy upon the seas. That is what we mean if we mean anything.

Now, I want to ask: Do you think, gentlemen, we are going to get away with it? Do you believe that Great Britain will permit the United States to challenge her naval supremacy? Do you think she will sit with folded hands while we build a fleet which shall master hers? Will she tolerate a competition in naval armament, the creation of a navy that may drive hers off the seas and starve her people into submission?

I am here to tell you that your policy means war with Great Britain. Great Britain has never stood for a challenge of her naval supremacy. For 300 years she has ruled the seas, and she will not give up that control to any other power, whether it be America, Germany, or Japan. "Go where you will, you shall not control the sea." So the British will say. "You shall not control the sea until Britain lies prostrate and bleeding and her fleet is driven by force from off the main."

Spain, in the old days, challenged British naval supremacy, and the answer was a scattered and destroyed Armada. The Dutch thought to challenge British supremacy, and the end was the wrecked and defeated fleets of Tromp and De Ruyter. France challenged it under Napoleon, and the answer was Abukir Bay and Trafalgar. Germany challenged British supremacy, and the answer was that great spectacle, the greatest the human eye ever took in, when the entire German fleet, dreadnaughts, superdreadnaughts, battle-cruisers, submarines, transports, and all sailed across the North Sea and surrendered to British supremacy.

What Great Britain would not submit to from other nations she will not tolerate from us. Let not this Nation puff itself up with foolish egotism. Let not this Nation talk the foolish patter of "blood is thicker than water." It is not a matter of blood that counts. We ourselves have already had two wars with Great Britain. I tell you, gentlemen, those of you who are

favoring this program, you are bidding for a third war with Great Britain, the bloodiest and most disastrous of them all.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. Suppose that England should notify the United States that she will not permit us to trade with any one but herself and her allies. What would you say about that? Would you sit down and calmly acquiesce in it, or say we ought to fight?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Whenever the dignity and honor of our country are at stake I would say we ought to fight. Even the peaceable gentleman from Ohio would fight under such circumstances, I think.

Mr. GORDON. Yes; but understand I am not a pacifist. [Laughter.]

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Then I will withdraw that. I said it of the gentleman as a compliment. I am a pacifist if by that is meant one who loves peace. I think there is a saner and more rational way for the nations of the world to make up their differences than by plunging against each other like bulldogs. I think there is a better way than that. And if we have not learned that lesson out of this war, if that lesson has not come to humanity out of all the sorrow and suffering of this conflict, then the war was indeed in vain, we have lost the war, and the world is much further back than I thought it was.

Of all the acts of folly that any Congress, it seems to me, has ever committed, now they come forward with the supreme and crowning folly of them all. If we mean to fight Great Britain, then, gentlemen, choose intelligently and knowingly. If we mean war, then let us understand it at the beginning, for that is what it means in the end, and let us prepare, let us get ready. Let us get ready upon the land as well as upon the sea. Let us put aside this talk about universal disarmament. Let us admit that we have lost the war; that we have come out of it worse off than we went into it; and that the sole result of it is a monstrous burden of debt that shall rest upon the shoulders of generations yet unborn. Let us not go blunderingly and unwittingly into a policy which will inevitably lead us into another awful conflict. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 12 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. QUIN].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 12 minutes.

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to speak on this bill, but when the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HUDDLESTON] makes the statement on this floor that he does, and in view of the fact that the papers report a Bolshevik meeting down here at Poli's Theater on Sunday afternoon, where an honorable Member of this House made an address which might be construed as encouragement to that movement in this Republic, as a Representative of a great, bold, and honorable, patriotic constituency, I come before this House to resent such imputations upon the people of America.

In time of peace this naval program would indeed seem to be large; but the President of this Nation, in whom the American people have placed their faith, is across the briny deep, sitting at the peace table at Versailles, endeavoring to bring about a treaty that will make war improbable in the future. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HUDDLESTON] challenges in a veiled way the purposes of the President of our splendid Republic.

Mr. BAER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUIN. I have not the time. Excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. BAER. He is defending the policy of the President.

Mr. QUIN. The gentleman from Alabama said he thought that the war was won, but from the outline of this program it appeared to be lost. Why, the gentleman from Alabama can not have a true conception of what has happened. More than 2,000,000 of the brave boys of this Republic went across the sea through the submarine zone to beard the Hun in his den. Seven hundred thousand of those lads wearing the uniform of this Government went upon the high seas as a part of the Navy of our country. Nearly 2,000,000 more were training in the camps over here ready to go when the armistice was signed November 11. After they had bearded the Hun in his den and forced a well-organized army to go down to ignominious surrender, the great German fleet surrendered, not as the gentleman from Alabama says, to the British Navy, but it surrendered to the joint navies of America, Great Britain, and France. This Government, sir, had as much to do, through its splendid Navy on the high seas, in forcing the Hun fleet to surrender as England had. [Applause.]

Do not you ever believe that the American people would submit to a policy which would force them to sit supinely with fetters on their hands, and, as the gentleman suggests, permit Great Britain to be the bully of the world and tell us where we should trade. The American people would have more contempt for this Congress than they could express in a thousand years if we were guilty of such an ignominious, contemptible policy as that indicated by the gentleman from Alabama. [Applause and laughter.] I am no war man. I always believe in peace; but the President of this Nation, through his Secretary of the Navy, an honored gentleman from a Southern State, recommended this program, and when some of the committee did not believe in it, the President of this Republic, sitting at the peace table in France, cabled back here stating the necessity and the urgency of passing this program. Does the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HUDDLESTON] think that the President of the United States would fool the American people or bunco anyone? The gentleman suggested that.

Mr. BAER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUIN. Excuse me.

The gentleman from Alabama ought to be ashamed to admit that the President of the United States would fool the American people, even if he believed it. My friends, the gentleman from Alabama says that the program suggested by the President has a provision in it that is a bunco game. He means that if a part of this program that is postponed for a year is not built, the American people will be fooled. Why, the gentleman has a misconception of what this committee has done. Would he want this \$510,000,000 spent if the President of the United States is able to bring into effect and operation a peace treaty that would not warrant it? Would he object to the American Congress repealing that proposition and saving to the American people the \$510,000,000? If the gentleman would read that bill he would see the effect and the wisdom of it. I want the gentleman from Alabama to understand that according to my conception there are many changes brought by this war. Here in this Republic in the last six years Congress has passed more beneficial legislation for the masses of the people, for the farmers, and especially the industrial laboring classes of this country, than all the Congresses in 50 years. Never in the history of our Government in any 50-year period was so much legislation passed for the laboring classes as was passed within the last six years, voted for by Republicans and Democrats alike. Not only that, but the wages of the industrial laboring classes of people in this country are higher than they ever were in any country in the world, higher than we ever dreamed they would be in our Nation.

Yet two people who have been associating in Russia with the red-handed Bolsheviks got up in a meeting at Poli's Theater within the shadow of the Capitol and brought here their nasty, contemptible, dirty doctrine of bolshevism—one female and one male. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MASON] speaks of them as clean and honorable representatives of newspapers. These two people intend to dissatisfy our laboring people and turn them against the Government. My God, I hope that species, that pair, will be exterminated, not only in the United States but throughout the world. In that one utterance down there on that afternoon, when a Member of this Congress rose up in his box in that meeting and suggested that he was not afraid to go to jail—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. PADGETT. I yield to the gentleman five minutes.

Mr. QUIN. That one suggestion, with the speeches that this man Williams made, and that female, will do more harm, will do more to spread the seeds of discontent and discord throughout this country than all other things combined, not even excepting the speech of the gentleman from Alabama. I want to get into this Record what people indorsed down there on Sunday afternoon. Do you know that the paper records that these "clean and honorable people" that the gentleman from Illinois spoke about said down there that afternoon that the ideals of these dirty, slimy bolsheviks in Russia were higher than the ideals of America. And when the gentleman from Illinois was making his remarks, the Washington Post states that the audience cried, "Hurrah for the Bolsheviks." The idea of such a thing as that happening in the Capital of the United States of America! It is an astounding thing. And some of the female contingent that picketed the White House took up a collection from the audience to pay for the rent of the theater that afternoon.

My God, where are we drifting to these days? The conduct and utterances and the real intent of these two propagandists that have been spending many months in Russia aiding the

Bolsheviki, speaking in a building that belongs to the people of the United States, which belongs to your constituents and mine, in that very building uttering this contemptible, slimy, red-handed doctrine on the holy Sabbath day! It is reported that the Russian Soviet, this Bolshevik movement that these people approve of by their conduct and by their utterances, have said that every woman who reaches the age of 18 years must register, and that any man, it makes no difference how many other women he may have, can take her for a wife. He has the first choice, and if the man does not take her she can choose him. And then the children of that union are to become the property of the State. And yet this creature in the address at Poll's Theater tells the American people that the Bolshevik in Russia are superior to the people of America. You need not think that this sentiment is not growing in America. I have not heard a word of protest on this floor. I could not remain silent any longer when such a bold performance had been pulled off in a Government building on the holy Sabbath day. It is their purpose to waive the red flag. I can not believe that the gentleman from Illinois would indorse such principles or such language as those two speakers advocated, and I can not believe that he would indorse the sentiments uttered there by this female and this male speaker, who, it is said, are honorable people. I reckon they are, but this damnable, slimy, dirty doctrine that they are scattering about is what I object to. There is an organization going into every precinct in the Nation, with the intent and purpose of scattering that kind of doctrine to overthrow the Government. I believe in organized society. I believe in the institutions of our Republic. I love my country. Whenever any man throws down the American flag and picks up a red flag and talks against my Government, damn him; he is my enemy, and I am against him. [Laughter and applause.] I do not care who he is. [Applause.]

According to my conception, every public man in this country should put his shoulder to the wheel, stand by the organized Government, protect our Constitution, although the president of the Labor Federation of this Republic has given out in pamphlet form that we shall be no longer ruled by courts.

Where are we drifting to if we are going to permit organizations that we have protected by legislation to overthrow the courts? And I want you to understand that I voted to exempt them from coming under the antitrust legislation; we have given them every possible liberty by legislation that could possibly be granted, and yet they come along, through their leaders and such meetings as at Poll's Theater, and propose to tear down the Government. The stability of this great Republic rests on the integrity and patriotism of the people, it rests on the Constitution of this Government and organized society. The Constitution and the courts stand as the bulwark to protect the rights, the property, and the liberties of the people. The boys who bared their breasts to the bullets of the enemy in France, Belgium, and Italy, as well as those on the seas and in the camps, will stand up against this slimy crowd of Bolsheviks who would tear down our Government. [Applause.]

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. VESTAL].

Mr. VESTAL. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I did not ask for time to discuss this bill that is now before the House. I want to make a short statement about another matter which came to my attention. Within the last two or three weeks quite a number of gentlemen in the House have brought to the attention of Members of this body the fact that great numbers of soldiers' letters written by their parents and friends have been returned undelivered. I think quite probably the experience of the gentlemen who have taken the floor is the same experience of every other Member of Congress. Scarcely a day passes that I do not receive from one to half a dozen letters from fathers and mothers in my district stating that their sons are not receiving the letters written them and mailed to the address across the sea.

So far I have refrained from saying anything about that situation, but a few days ago I received a letter from an old mother in my district, telling me a story that I feel it is my duty to state to this House. This mother wrote me imploring my help, making the statement that she had written two letters to her son in France, both of which were returned having written across the envelope in black letters the words "Deserter. Return to sender." I do not know what could happen to any mother that would be more cruel than to have a letter returned to her through the mail, having written on the back of the envelope by somebody, presumably some officer in the Army, the fact that her son was a deserter. Happily this mother had received a letter from her son about the time that this letter was returned to her to the effect that he was ill in a hospital.

I wanted to make absolutely sure of the matter before I made any statement on the floor of the House, so I cabled to the commanding officer of this boy's regiment, addressing my cablegram just as this mother had addressed her letter to her son. I want to read to the committee this letter that I received from the mother, and then I want to read the cablegram that I sent the commanding officer and his reply. The letter that I received from the mother is as follows:

ANDERSON, IND., January 7, 1919.

HON. A. H. VESTAL,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Inclosed you will find a letter of mine written to my son in overseas service, which was returned to me with the following inscription on the envelope: "Deserter. Return to sender." This being the second time my letters were returned to me with the same inscription on the envelope, I decided to appeal to you for an investigation of the case if within your power. While these letters were being returned to me my son has been in active service and is now in the army of occupation, the last letter received from him under date of December 10, 1918, stating that he was in a hospital at Treves, Germany. Although I am aware that this assertion is not true, according to his letters, out of justice to me, his mother, I feel as though an explanation is due, and an effort made to stop mail returning to me with such an inscription on the envelope.

You will find inclosed an addressed envelope, and, thanking you beforehand for any information you can forward me in regard to this, I am,

Respectfully,

MRS. JACKSON STINSON.

P. S.—My son's present address is, Pvt. Ralph J. Stinson, Company M, Ninth Infantry, American Expeditionary Forces.

She sent to me the letter as it was, with the inscription on the back of the envelope. I immediately sent a cablegram to his commanding officer, as follows:

[Cablegram.]

JANUARY 11, 1919.

COMMANDER COMPANY M, NINTH INFANTRY,
American Expeditionary Forces:

Wire conditions Pvt. Ralph J. Stinson.

ALBERT H. VESTAL,
Member of Congress.

Within about 10 days I received the following cablegram:

[Cablegram.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,
January 20, 1919.

ALBERT H. VESTAL,
Member of Congress, Washington:

Pvt. Ralph J. Stinson evacuated hospital December 5. Sickness. Not serious.

A. P. TURKMAN,
Captain, Ninth Infantry.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. What is the date of that cablegram?

Mr. VESTAL. His cablegram to me was dated January 20, and mine to him was dated January 11.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Was the date of the inscription of the letter prior to that?

Mr. VESTAL. Oh, yes.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. What is the date?

Mr. VESTAL. There is no date on the letter showing when the inscription was placed on the envelope, but this letter was sent to the young man in September, 1918. I can not understand why it is that a letter addressed as this letter is addressed to this soldier should not be delivered to the soldier but should be returned to the mother, when a cablegram sent by me to the commanding officer of the same regiment finds the boy sick in a hospital.

It at least shows incompetency. I do not know what the remedy may be, but I feel in justice to this soldier who has gone across the seas to fight for the honor of the flag and in justice to this old gray-haired mother, whom I know very well, sitting back at home anxiously waiting for the return of her boy, that some attention should be given to it. It seems to me that if any officer addressed the envelope as this envelope has been addressed and returned, that officer ought to be court-martialed. I care not whether he be an officer or a mail orderly. Something should be done. I called this to the attention of the House and the country because I feel I ought to do it in justice to the soldier himself and in justice to his mother.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman from Tennessee about continuing this session any longer. Several Members on this side have handed me in their names and indicated that they would like to say something before we go into the discussion of the bill under the five-minute rule, and yet many of them have said they have been here since 11 o'clock, and they feel pretty tired. The gentleman knows that Members of the House are not errand boys; they are real, live Members of Congress, and they have said they do not want to talk to-night, being tired, having been here since 11 o'clock this morning. We met at 11 o'clock and I think we have gotten along pretty well, and it is now 6. I do not want to interfere

with the gentleman's program and would like to get through as fast as we can.

Mr. PADGETT. I will say to the gentleman I was in hopes we might run a little later to-night, because I had agreed with the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN], on account of arrangements that he had made for a Republican conference to-morrow afternoon at 5, that I would move to rise at 5 to-morrow afternoon and adjourn so as to give way to the conference. For that reason I was hoping we could run a little longer to-night so as to even up.

Mr. BUTLER. Well, this is a very ungracious job and I do not want any more of it. Members of Congress are not only human beings but they are individuals who amount to something. If they were but hired boys and they had time we could say, "Very well now, make your speech or you will not make it at all." But here gentlemen say that they do not want to speak until to-morrow, and I am not saying this for the purpose, my friend, of continuing unduly the discussion of this bill, but I desire to facilitate its passage as much as I can, yet I have put upon me the responsibility of allotting this time, and these gentlemen do not seem inclined to make their speeches to-night. Of course, if the committee proposes to sit they will have to speak or lose out. Now, I do not feel that way, and if gentlemen do not want to make—

Mr. FOSTER. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania think we ought to delay this bill at this stage very long to let somebody get ready to speak?

Mr. BUTLER. Why, I do not think we ought to have an extraordinary session.

Mr. FOSTER. Do you think we ought to wait until somebody gets ready to speak?

Mr. LITTLE. There seems to be a good deal of objection about gentlemen having time to-morrow. I have been here all day listening to people talk who have been talking ever since I have been here, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania can eliminate me. As far as I am concerned I will take my medicine and they can take theirs.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how the time stands, respectively, between the two sides?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has used 3 hours and the gentleman from Tennessee 2 hours and 45 minutes.

Mr. STAFFORD. There is only 15 minutes difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee or the gentleman from Pennsylvania have a suggestion to make?

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I want to be as agreeable as I can in respect to time—

Mr. BUTLER. I want to say the gentleman is always not only agreeable but in every way he is accommodating, but I am not willing with this list before me to close general debate.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. I do not understand that the gentleman from Tennessee asks to close general debate.

Mr. PADGETT. I was wondering if we can not reach an agreement to allow them a little time under the five-minute rule and begin the reading.

Mr. WALSH. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes; I yield.

Mr. WALSH. I think the gentleman has my name upon his list for some time in general debate?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Mr. WALSH. I will say to the gentleman very frankly I would be perfectly willing if he would eliminate my name from his list.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. PADGETT. We are trying to reach an understanding, if the Chair will indulge us for a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. PADGETT. It was suggested, I will say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that we might begin reading and give those gentlemen some time under the five-minute rule. How would that do?

Mr. BUTLER. It will take just as much time. They want to make their speeches, of course. You can shut them off under the five-minute rule. The committee can not close the general debate if there is anybody who wishes to talk. But if the House sees fit to shut these gentlemen off, all right. I do not want to do it, and I will not do that.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I demand the regular order.

The CHAIRMAN. The regular order is to continue the debate.

Mr. BUTLER. I make the point of order, Mr. Chairman, that there is no quorum present.

Mr. PADGETT. Instead of doing that I move that the committee do now rise. There are other matters we want to dispose of.

The motion was agreed to.

The committee accordingly rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. Wingo, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 15539, the naval appropriation bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

Mr. SLAYDEN, by unanimous consent, was granted leave of absence for two days on account of business.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED.

Mr. LAZARO, from the Committee on Enrolled Bills, reported that they had examined and found truly enrolled joint resolution of the following title, when the Speaker signed the same: H. J. Res. 289. Joint resolution for the appointment of four members of the Board of Managers of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.

WITHDRAWAL OF PAPERS.

Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH, by unanimous consent, was granted leave to withdraw from the files of the House without leaving copies, papers in the case of Winfield H. Handley (H. R. 19260, 64th Cong., and H. R. 4808, 65th Cong.), no adverse report having been made thereon.

ORDER OF BUSINESS.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar Wednesday may be dispensed with, and that we may proceed with this bill to-morrow.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent to dispense with the business of Calendar Wednesday to-morrow, so that the House may proceed with this naval bill.

Mr. BUTLER. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. I think the Republican floor leader had some conversation with the gentleman about it. Was it agreeable to him?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. AUSTIN. Mr. Speaker, I object to dispensing with Calendar Wednesday. We have an important measure on the Wednesday calendar from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds. It will be the only opportunity to pass it during the session of Congress without a special rule.

Mr. STAFFORD. The call does not rest with that committee.

Mr. AUSTIN. The call is with the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads. It has but one bill, the Committee on Printing has not any, and then the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds will come in.

Mr. PADGETT. I can move that in the morning. I do not have to do that now.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. AUSTIN. I object.

HOOR OF MEETING TO-MORROW.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns to-day it adjourn to meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent that when the House adjourns to-day it adjourn to meet at 11 o'clock a. m. to-morrow. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS.

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Mississippi asks unanimous consent to revise and extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 59 minutes p. m.) the House, under its previous order, adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, February 5, 1919, at 11 o'clock a. m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. A letter from the president of the Georgetown & Tennessean Railway Co., transmitting report of the Georgetown & Tennessean Railway Co. for the year ended December 31,

1918 (H. Doc. No. 1758); to the Committee on the District of Columbia and ordered to be printed.

2. A letter from the president of the Washington Interurban Railroad Co., transmitting report of the Washington Interurban Railroad Co. for the year ended December 31, 1918 (H. Doc. No. 1759); to the Committee on the District of Columbia and ordered to be printed.

3. A letter from the president of the City & Suburban Railway of Washington, transmitting report of the City & Suburban Railway of Washington for the year ended December 31, 1918 (H. Doc. No. 1760); to the Committee on the District of Columbia and ordered to be printed.

4. A letter from the president of the Potomac Electric Power Co., transmitting report of the Potomac Electric Power Co. for the year ended December 31, 1918 (H. Doc. No. 1761); to the Committee on the District of Columbia and ordered to be printed.

5. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting copy of a communication from the Assistant Secretary of Labor, submitting a deficiency estimate of appropriation required by the Bureau of Immigration for refund of lead tax, and a clause of legislation authorizing the payment of a bill for advertising (H. Doc. No. 1762); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

6. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting copy of a communication from the Acting Chairman of the United States Shipping Board, submitting a substitute estimate of appropriation required by the United States Shipping Board for the fiscal year 1920, in lieu of estimate heretofore submitted (H. Doc. No. 1763); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

7. A letter from the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, transmitting fifth annual report of the Federal Reserve Board covering operations for the year 1918 (H. Doc. No. 1764); to the Committee on Banking and Currency and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. SLAYDEN, from the Committee on the Library, to which was referred the resolution (S. J. Res. 202) requesting the Commission of Fine Arts to submit to the Congress certain suggestions, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1030), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 12981) authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to refuse to permit the exportation of any work of art purporting to be a gift made by an individual or organization to a foreign nation or municipality, unless by consent of the Secretary of State, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1031), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. OSBORNE: A bill (H. R. 15612) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the city of Avalon, Los Angeles, Cal., one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. ROSE: A bill (H. R. 15613) to provide for the erection of a public building at Barnesboro, Cambria County, Pa.; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. WICKERSHAM: A bill (H. R. 15614) to increase the limit of cost for the construction of the United States public building at Cordova, Alaska; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. LEE of Georgia: A bill (H. R. 15615) authorizing the erection of a post-office building at Rossville, Ga.; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. WATSON of Virginia: A bill (H. R. 15616) to appropriate money to build an addition to the post office and customhouse at Petersburg, Va., and acquire additional land therefor; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. MANSFIELD: A bill (H. R. 15617) for the erection of a public post-office building at El Campo, Tex., and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. GOULD: A bill (H. R. 15618) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the village of East Bloomfield, N. Y.,

one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 15619) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the village of Guyanoga, N. Y., one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. McCULLOCH: A bill (H. R. 15620) to donate a captured cannon or gun to the Nashville Cemetery in the city of Nashville, Ohio; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 15621) to donate a captured cannon or gun to the city of Mineral City, Ohio; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 15622) to donate a captured cannon or gun to the city of Uhrichsville, Ohio; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. CHARLES B. SMITH: A bill (H. R. 15623) to make provision for compensating discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines who are unable to obtain employment; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Miss RANKIN: A bill (H. R. 15624) to enable American women who marry foreigners to retain their American citizenship; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. CALDWELL: A bill (H. R. 15625) to provide for further educational facilities by requiring the War Department to loan certain machine tools not in use for Government purposes to trade and technical schools and universities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. RAKER: A bill (H. R. 15626) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the city of Auburn, Cal., two German cannons or fieldpieces, with their accompaniments; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. GARLAND: A bill (H. R. 15627) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the town of Millvale, Pa., one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HAYDEN: A bill (H. R. 15628) to provide for marking the carcasses of goats with the words "goat meat"; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. MOTT: A bill (H. R. 15629) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the village of Clayton, N. Y., one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 15630) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the village of Orwell, N. Y., one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 15631) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the village of Cazenovia, N. Y., one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 15632) authorizing the Secretary of War to donate to the village of Antwerp, N. Y., one German cannon or fieldpiece; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. MANN: Joint resolution (H. J. Res. 403) to create a joint commission of Congress on estimates and appropriations; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. PARK: Resolution (H. Res. 548) to pay George D. Ellis \$1,200 for extra services; to the Committee on Accounts.

By Mr. GOULD: Resolution (H. Res. 549) directing the United States Shipping Board to furnish the House of Representatives with certain information in accordance with section 12 of the shipping act, approved September 7, 1916; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Also, a resolution (H. Res. 550) directing that the United States Shipping Board furnish the House of Representatives with certain facts as to the building and operation program of wooden ships; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. DAVIS: Memorial from the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, requesting the discontinuance of the administration of the Chippewa Indian tribal funds and the final settlement of their tribal affairs; to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

Also, memorial from the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, requesting the gratuity of three months' pay to honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, memorial from the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, requesting the increase of pensions to those disabled in service and indorsing S. 2130; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, memorial from the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, requesting the discharge of the Volunteer Army of the United States; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. FRENCH: Memorial from the Legislature of the State of Idaho on woman suffrage; to the Committee on Woman Suffrage.

By Mr. GOULD: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of New York, urging the passage of the bill now in conference to amend an act entitled "An act to regulate the construction of the dams across navigable waters," approved June 21, 1906,

as amended by the act approved June 23, 1910, and to provide for the improvement and development of waterways for the use of interstate and foreign commerce; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New York, urging Congress to authorize the Secretary of War to furnish the several States of the Union with the records of the men from such States who entered the military service; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. KAHN: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of California regarding allotment to discharged soldiers, urging six months' pay to them on discharge; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, against cancellation of loans made to foreign countries; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, urging enactment of retirement legislation; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of California urging legislation to restore to the pension rolls those who have given up right to pension by reentering service during present war; to the Committee on Pensions.

Mr. MAHER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of New York, favoring the early enactment of the water-power bill, now in conference; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New York, requesting Congress to authorize the Secretary of War to leave in the State of New York, under proper supervision, such records as will furnish information regarding citizens of the State who have been inducted into the Federal service through the medium of the selective-draft law; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. THOMPSON: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Oklahoma, relating to the fixing of the minimum price of wheat for 1919; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Oklahoma, relating to the distribution of relics of the late war for the commemoration of soldier boys; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. MONTAGUE: A bill (H. R. 15633) granting a pension to Albert Worthy; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. MOTT: A bill (H. R. 15634) granting an increase of pension to Patrick Collins; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Petition of United Mine Workers of America relative to the reducing of the price of coal; to the Committee on Mines and Mining.

Also, evidence to accompany H. R. 15602, for pension for Anna Myers; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CARY: Petition of Ladies' Auxiliary, Bluebird Lodge, No. 116, to the International Machinists' Union, urging release of all conscientious objectors and amnesty for all political prisoners under war status, also repeal of espionage act; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. DAVIS: Petition of residents of the third congressional district of Minnesota requesting guaranty of the price of wheat at \$2.26 per bushel for 1919 year crop; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. ELSTON: Petition of Alameda County Civic Association, urging passage of appropriation for new post office at Oakland, Cal.; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania: Petition of the trustees of Philadelphia Produce Exchange, asking Congress to determine the scope of work which the Bureau of Markets shall continue to perform; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. GREENE of Vermont: Petition of citizens of Waterville, Vt., protesting against the postal zone law; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GRIFFIN: Petition of the New York State Legislature, Albany, N. Y., requesting legislation permitting the retention of draft-board information at the capitol of New York State as information pertaining to the State; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of the National Bronze Corporation, New York City, relating to Senate bill 5261; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of the New York Produce Exchange, New York City, favoring removal of restrictions and discontinuing the practice of price fixing now applied to hogs, grain, and foodstuffs; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HASTINGS: Petition of railroad men, Muskogee, Okla., asking Government ownership and control of all railroads; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HERSEY: Petition of Rev. David N. Beech and other residents of Bangor, Me., urging repeal of the postal zone law; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, petition of Harold M. Hill and other residents of Carland, Me., urging repeal of the postal zone law; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH: Petition of Rev. C. H. Kern, of Wellsville, Ohio, and nine other citizens, protesting against postal and zone system and asking its repeal; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KELLY of Pennsylvania: Petition of Pittsburgh Board of Trade, requesting legislation for deportation of alien enemies and prohibition of entry of those who left the United States to enter the armed forces of the central powers; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: Resolution adopted by John Mitchell Literary Association, of Providence, R. I., urging passage of legislation favoring self-determination for Ireland; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. LONERGAN: Petition of Hartford Council, No. 210, of the U. C. T. of America, relating to private ownership of railroads; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. POLK: Petition of the teachers of Kent County, Del., favoring Senate bill 4987; to the Committee on Education.

By Mr. RANDALL: Petition of the faculty of the State Normal School of Los Angeles, Cal., favoring creation of a department of education; to the Committee on Education.

By Mr. ROGERS: Petition of citizens of Woburn, Mass., relating to self-determination of all nations, great and small, and especially of Ireland; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SCHALL: Petition of citizens of Isanti County, Minn., to repeal zone rate system; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, petition of Minneapolis District Council, No. 8, C. T. W. A., demanding thorough investigation of the wire administration under Mr. Burleson, Postmaster General, with object of correcting conditions under which employees are working; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of Minnesota Independent Telephone Association, asking that Congress fix a definite date to return telephone properties to the owners; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SNELL: Resolutions of the Senate of the State of New York relative to records of local draft boards; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, resolutions of the Senate of the State of New York relative to regulating the construction of the dams across navigable waters and to provide for the improvement and development of waterways for the use of the interstate and foreign commerce; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. VOLSTEAD: Petition of Gust. C. Albrecht and other citizens of Fairfax, Minn., to make effective the guaranteed price for 1919 wheat; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of H. B. Zimmerman and other citizens of Wellmar, Minn., for legislation to make good the guaranteed price of 1919 wheat; to the Committee on Agriculture.

SENATE.

WEDNESDAY, February 5, 1919.

The Chaplain, Rev. Forrest J. Prettyman, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, we seek from Thee that conscious power that comes with a clear vision, with a clean conscience, with a devoted and consecrated spirit to the ideal born out of Thy word. Grant to lead us to-day in the discharge of our duties. May we ever keep in mind the justice and righteousness and peace that Thou hast made known and which is Thy will concerning man. We ask it, for Christ's sake. Amen.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of the proceedings of the legislative day of Monday, February 3, 1919, when, on request of Mr. SHEPARD and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with and the Journal was approved.